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Abstract 
This thesis reads the work of the twentieth-century German-Jewish philosopher, Walter 
Benjamin alongside two contemporary American writers – David Markson and Teju Cole, 
and one poet, Susan Howe. Taking Benjamin’s notion of afterlife, or Nachleben, as my 
conceptual framework, I argue that David Markson, Susan Howe, and Teju Cole constitute 
contemporary ‘afterlives’ of Walter Benjamin.  
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Press, 1996; repr. 2001) 
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1989; repr. 1993) 
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OGTD Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. by John Osborne 
(London: Verso, 1998) 
SW Benjamin, Selected Writings, trans. various, ed. by Michael W. Jennings, et 
al, 4 vols (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1997-2003)  
TM  Susan Howe, The Midnight (New York: New Directions, 2003) 






Benjamin’s Afterlives: Reading Walter Benjamin in the Works of David Markson, 
Susan Howe, and Teju Cole 
Historical ‘understanding’ is to be grasped, in principle, as an afterlife of that which is 
understood; and what has been recognized in the analysis of the ‘afterlife of works’, 
in the analysis of ‘fame’, is therefore to be considered the foundation of history in 
general.  
– Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project1 
Thumbed pages: read and read. Who has passed here before me?’  
– David Markson, Reader’s Block2 
The relational space is the thing that’s alive with something from somewhere else.  
– Susan Howe, The Midnight3  
Wonderful stars, a distant cloud of fireflies: but I felt in my body what my eyes could 
not grasp, which was that their true nature was the persisting visual echo of something 
already in the past. 
– Teju Cole, Open City4 
In a chapter entitled ‘Benjamin in Boyle Heights’, Norman M. Klein pursues a thought 
experiment proposed by Mike Davis: Walter Benjamin boards a ship to New York and 
moves to Boyle Heights, a neighbourhood in downtown Los Angeles. He mingles with 
Schoenberg, has ‘a somewhat tortured version of a power lunch’ with Bertolt Brecht, writes 
‘a Chronik on Hollywood studios’, and becomes obsessed with a local detective. Klein even 
imagines where Benjamin would have eaten (‘Clifford’s cafeteria downtown’).5 Klein is not 
                                                     
1 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin ed. by Rolf 
Tiedmann (Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 1999; repr. 2002), [N2,3], p. 461. 
Subsequent references to this text will be abbreviated to AP.  
2 David Markson, Reader’s Block (Chicago; Normal, Ill.: 1996; repr. 2001), p. 10. Subsequent references to 
this text will be abbreviated to RB.  
3 Susan Howe, The Midnight (New York: New Directions, 2003), p. 57. Further references are to TM. 
4 Teju Cole, Open City (London: Faber and Faber, 2011), p. 256. Subsequent references to this text will be 
abbreviated to OC. 
5 Norman M. Klein, The History of Forgetting: Los Angeles and the Erasure of Memory (London: Verso, 




the only writer to envision an alternate biography for Benjamin. In John Schad’s novel, The 
Late Walter Benjamin, a protagonist named Walter Benjamin lives on a council estate in 
post-war Watford; and David Kishik’s novel, The Manhattan Project (2015), literally revises 
the chronology of his life: in 1940, Benjamin fakes his own death and ‘arrives in Lisbon with 
forged identification papers and boards the next ship to New York’ where ‘his daily research 
leads to the composition of a sequel to The Arcades Project, which he calls either The 
Manhattan Project or New York, Capital of the Twentieth Century.’ 6 In the afterword to her 
book Walter Benjamin, Esther Leslie recounts artist Lutz Dammbeck’s video installation, 
‘What if he survived?’ Like Klein, Dammbeck also situates Benjamin in Los Angeles, where 
he assists in Adorno’s ‘Authoritarian Personality’ project, participates in Timothy Leary’s 
LSD experiments, and collaborates with Heinz von Foerster on computer prototypes. In this 
version, Benjamin never becomes famous, but dies ‘a forgotten man in an old people’s home 
in Ann Arbor.’7 
Why is Dammbeck’s question, ‘What if he survived?’ such a compelling line of 
inquiry for critics, artists, and novelists? Perhaps because it is impossible to write about 
Benjamin without encountering and, so often, retelling, the agonising last facts of his life. It 
is well-known that Benjamin intended to emigrate to the United States, where he hoped to 
finally settle and establish a career at the Institute for Social Research among his exiled 
compatriots. Although he left Paris in June 1940, just days before the Wehrmacht entered 
the city, and had the good fortune to be awarded a visa from the National Refugee Service, 
Benjamin trekked through the Pyrenees with Lisa Fittko and other refugees, only to be 
detained in the French-Spanish border town of Port Bou: after learning that new visa 
regulations now required a French exit visa, and faced with the prospect of arrest and 
deportation, Benjamin took the morphine pills he had been carrying with him since 1933. 
The next day, the rest of his party was given clearance to cross the border into Spain and, four 
days later, safely arrived in Lisbon. The knowledge that his escape was so nearly within his 
grasp – that any other route, decision, or contingency may have led to his survival – and yet 
remained fatally out of reach, makes counterfactual fantasies captivating and somehow 
genuinely conceivable, but they help us to forget that Benjamin did not escape Port Bou: he 
did not write a Los Angeles diary (as he did in Moscow, Ibiza, and Berlin) or sit in a pub in 
                                                     
6 John Schad, The Late Walter Benjamin (London: Continuum, 2012); David Kishik, The Manhattan Project: 
A Theory of a City (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), p. 3.  




South Oxhey, or drop acid with Timothy Leary: Benjamin’s life in the United States was a 
posthumous one.8  
In this thesis, I suggest that key concepts in Benjamin’s philosophy can be seen to 
‘survive’ in the late novels of Markson, the poetry of Susan Howe, and Teju Cole’s novel, 
Open City. Like Benjamin, Markson’s project is concerned with the ‘afterlife of works’: his 
fractured, paratactic novels are inventories of anecdotes, quotations, and brief, intervening 
comments from their reclusive narrators. These novels testify to the survival of the works 
they cite, but Markson is also attentive to the process of destruction that creates the 
conditions for this survival. This process is reflected Markson’s montage-like method and 
the fragmentary form of his work, but also testifies to the vicissitudes of time and the 
selectivity of cultural memory that threaten to condemn these works to oblivion. Susan Howe 
is similarly conscious of the fragile and contingent nature of a work’s survival, but she places 
her focus on the afterlife of objects: books, ephemera, marginalia, and textiles – shirts, 
dresses, and bed hangings. In Howe’s work, materiality is always an index to the immaterial: 
the material object traces – and is traced by – the corporeality, or life, of the people who 
once used or owned them. This conception of materiality is extrapolated to the level of 
language and poetry: just as the material object is a depository for the immaterial trace, so 
too is poetic language a register of something beyond its ability to fully articulate. Cole 
operates somewhere in between Markson’s abstract fragments and Howe’s interest in the 
material trace. The dialogue between Cole and Benjamin is mobilised in his novel, Open 
City (2011), through the figure of the flâneur, whose perambulatory vision uncovers the 
afterlife of colonial histories sedimented in the streets, skyscrapers, and monuments of New 
York City.  
Schematically speaking, Markson examines the afterlife of works, Howe explores the 
material and linguistic manifestations of that afterlife, and Cole is interested in what we 
might call the spatio-temporal afterlives of history that are inscribed in the city. As I will 
demonstrate in the chapters that follow, Markson, Cole, and Howe cross Benjamin’s work 
at several other points of reference: not only the afterlife of works, but mortification, aura, 
allegory and the dialectical image. In doing so, these authors are not only attentive to the 
afterlife of works, but themselves constitute three of Benjamin’s philosophical ‘afterlives’. 
Though this dissertation does not seek to establish a traditional genealogy of influence 
                                                     
8 This point is not lost on Kishik: ‘Rather than contest the reports about his death, he embraces this new 
solitary life, this posthumous existence, as if it were his personal resurrection’, p. 3.  
10 
 
between Benjamin and the writers I have chosen to read alongside his thought, an 
examination of his belated reception in the United States parallels Benjamin’s own model of 
history and will establish the coordinates of this study and help to situate it within the 
contexts of contemporary literary studies and Benjamin scholarship. 
American Afterlife: Benjamin’s U.S. Reception 
Benjamin received scant critical recognition in the United States (and, indeed, his native 
Germany) during his lifetime and remained untranslated for over two decades.9 A short 
review of Origins of German Tragic Drama (Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels) appears 
in Modern Language Review in 1930; the same work is mentioned briefly by Gilbert 
Waterhouse in an issue of German Studies published during the same year. It was not until 
1941 that Benjamin’s work truly arrived in the United States, when Hannah Arendt crossed 
through Port Bou to New York and delivered his final essay, ‘On the Concept of History’ 
(1940) (Über den Begriff der Geschichte) to Theodor Adorno, Benjamin’s literary executor. 
In 1942, a volume of Adorno and Horkheimer’s journal Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 
(mimeographed in Los Angeles) was dedicated to Walter Benjamin’s memory, and included 
the essay in its appendix.10 This marks Benjamin’s official introduction to intellectual life in 
the United States, but his work would not be translated into English for well over two 
decades.11 Until then, Benjamin’s U.S. reception would remain appositely citational for a 
critic whose ‘ideal was a book that would eliminate all commentary and consist in nothing 
but quotations.’12 This citational reception began with notices of his death in journals like 
The Jewish Refugee and The New Republic. In 1944, Arendt translated the famous passage 
on Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus from ‘On the Concept of History’ in her essay on Franz Kafka, 
published in The Partisan Review.13 In 1945, Bertold Viertal, a student of Karl Krauss, 
                                                     
9 See Peter Fenves, ‘Benjamin’s Early Reception in the U.S.’, Benjamin Studien, 3, ed. by Daniel Weidner 
and Sigrid Weigel (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, 2014), pp. 253-259. Fenves provides an invaluable and 
comprehensive overview of Benjamin’s U.S. reception to which I am indebted. 
10 Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, trans. by 
Michael Roberston (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), p. 311. 
11 ‘Some Motifs on Baudelaire’ was printed in the 1939/1940 issue of Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, but, as 
Fenves notes, ‘there was no gesture toward an English translation.’ Fenves, p. 254.  
12 Françoise Meltzer, ‘Acedia and Melancholia’, Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History, ed. by 
Michael P. Steinberg (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 141-163 (p. 162). Meltzer also 
observes this feature of Benjamin scholarship, noting the capacious body of ‘critical essays examining 
Benjamin’s lack of professionalism (which is another way of reminding us that he never really “worked”), 
most of which centre around the failed habilitation thesis’, p. 152.  
13 Hannah Arendt, ‘Franz Kafka: A Revalution (on the Occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of His 




mentioned Benjamin’s ‘shock [Chock] effect’ in an article on Brecht’s dramaturgy in The 
Kenyon Review.14 With the exception of Edward Landberg’s English translation of ‘What is 
Epic Theatre?’ in The Western Review in 1948, Benjamin’s presence on the critical 
landscape continued to be purely referential: Philip Rieff made a passing reference to 
Benjamin’s concept of the aura in World Politics (1953); Michael Hamburger, known more 
recently for his acclaimed translations of W.G. Sebald’s poetry, wrote an essay on 
Baudelaire for the first issue of International Literary Annual (1958), in which he 
acknowledges his indebtedness to Benjamin’s own essay, ‘Some Motifs on Baudelaire’; a 
year later, L. Stern included a quote from ‘On the Concept of History’ in his review of 
Herbert Marcuse’s Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis.15 Finally, Susan Sontag makes 
multiple references to Benjamin in her 1966 essay collection Against Interpretation and 
Other Essays.16  
By the late 1960s, the formation of Benjamin’s image was well under way, aided by 
biographical portraits written by his friends. In 1965, Gershom Scholem delivered a lecture 
on Benjamin at the Leo Baeck Institute in New York; in 1967 Adorno’s ‘Portrait of Walter 
Benjamin’ appeared in Prisms; and in 1968, Hannah Arendt published her own profile of 
Benjamin in The New Yorker. Although it is largely due to the assiduous efforts of Scholem, 
Adorno, and Arendt that Benjamin was belatedly introduced to the world, their portraits 
resulted in a myth that was not altogether favourable. While each critic clearly feels the acute 
loss of a friend whose thought enriched their own, all three present a ‘barely controlled 
irritation’ with Benjamin, who becomes the stage for articulating their political and 
philosophical commitments.17 Scholem’s lecture, which sets out to ‘present a picture of his 
life and work’, alternates between praise for Benjamin’s ‘masterly prose of rare 
incandescence’ and disapproval of his ‘weakness’ for historical materialism for which his 
genius ‘forsake[s] it very essence’.18 In a review of The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 
edited by both Scholem and Adorno, Fredric Jameson summarises Scholem’s appraisal of 
                                                     
14 Fenves, p. 255. See Bertold Viertal, ‘Bertolt Brecht, Dramatist’, The Kenyon Review, 7 (1945), pp. 467-
475.  
15 Ibid., p. 256. See Philip Rieff, ‘Aesthetic Function in Modern Politics’, World Politics, 5 (1953): pp 478-
502; Michael Hamburger, ‘Puerile Utopia and Brutal Mirage: Notes on Baudelaire and the History of a 
Dilemma’, International Literary Annual, 1 (1958), pp. 135-152; L. Stern, ‘Herbert Marcuse’s Soviet 
Marxism’, Dissent, 6 (1959), pp. 88-93.  
16 Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: Farrar Strauss & Giroux, 1966).  
17 Meltzer, p. 103. 
18 Gershom Scholem, ‘Walter Benjamin’, trans. by Lux Furtmüller, The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book, 10.1 




Benjamin: ‘the final decision not to emigrate to Palestine […] seems to have been as much 
as anything else the result of laziness (in learning Hebrew), incompetence (in sorting out his 
divorce) and sheer lack of ideological commitment.’19 Adorno manages to make praise and 
opprobrium nearly indistinguishable when he claims Benjamin ‘had nothing of the 
philosopher in the traditional sense […] [h]is own contribution to his work was not anything 
“vital” or “organic”; the metaphor of the creator is thoroughly inappropriate for him.’20 He 
sees Benjamin’s concept of ‘dialectics at a standstill’ not as a radically interruptive or 
potentially revolutionary concept, but ‘petrified, frozen, or obsolete’, a ‘nature morte’.21 Of 
course, Benjamin, who after all described criticism as the ‘mortification of the work’ may 
not have disagreed with this assessment; but to emphasise the ‘Medusan’ ‘glance of 
[Benjamin’s] philosophy’ not only ‘subtly feminize[s] both him and his writing’, but also 
renders it unfit for purpose, unable to stand up to the methodological rigour that marks 
‘serious’ critics (such as Adorno himself).22 In essence, Benjamin’s personal and intellectual 
insufficiencies emerged when his work appeared at odds with that of his friends: for Adorno, 
Benjamin’s theology contaminated his efforts at Marxist analysis; for Scholem, Benjamin’s 
historical materialism tainted the theological aspects of his work and revealed his insufficient 
commitment to Zionism. Arendt’s profile was more sympathetic. She thoroughly dispels the 
charges of Benjamin’s laziness when she writes that ‘[w]hat strikes one as indecision […] 
as though he were vacillating between Zionism [Scholem] and Marxism [Adorno], in truth 
was probably due to the bitter insight that all solutions […] would lead him personally to a 
false salvation.’23  
Like Scholem, Arendt also minimises Marx’s (and, by implication, Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s) relevance to Benjamin’s work, controversially claiming Benjamin as a 
Heideggerian:  
                                                     
19 Fredric Jameson, ‘An Unfinished Project’, London Review of Books, 17.5 (August 1995), pp. 8-9 (p. 8). By 
Jeffrey Grossman’s reckoning, Jameson’s essays on Benjamin in the late 1960s and early 1970s were among 
the first to be written in English by someone who was not personally acquainted with him. See Grossman, 
‘The Reception of Walter Benjamin in the Anglo-American Literary Institution’, The German Quarterly, 
65.3-4 (Summer-Fall 1992), pp. 414-428 (p. 418).  
20 Theodor Adorno, ‘A Portrait of Walter Benjamin’, Prisms trans. by Samuel and Shierry Weber 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981; repr. 1997), pp. 227-242 (p. 227).  
21 Adorno qtd. in Meltzer p. 145. 
22 Meltzer, p. 150. Meltzer adds that this ‘gendering […] given the dominant masculinist culture, cannot fail 
to have its (negative) effects.’ Ibid.  
23 Arendt, ‘Introduction’, Illuminations by Walter Benjamin, ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zohn 




Without realizing it, Benjamin actually had more in common with Heidegger’s 
remarkable sense for living eyes and living bones that had been sea-changed into 
pearls and coral, and as such could be saved and lifted into the present only by doing 
violence to their context in interpreting them with ‘the deadly impact’ of new 
thoughts, than he did with the dialectical subtleties of his Marxist friends.24 
Arendt does not pause to consider that one aspect of Benjamin’s philosophical project was 
the intent to ‘do violence’ to Heidegger’s thought, nor the violence in which Heidegger was 
complicit. In a letter from 1930, Benjamin informed Scholem that he and Brecht intended to 
set up a reading group and ‘were planning to annihilate Heidegger here in the summer.’25 
Although she defends Benjamin from their charges of indecisiveness, this defence is only 
mounted in terms of his hesitancy to commit to either of their causes. Her reframing of 
Benjamin is accomplished by the same rhetorical flourish as Adorno and Scholem: by 
portraying Benjamin as a floundering incompetent unable to hold down a real job: ‘Benjamin 
[…] did not know the score. He never knew how to handle such things [as academic politics], 
was never able to move among such people […] Whenever he tried to adjust and be co-
operative so as to get some firm ground under his feet somehow, things were sure to go 
wrong’.26 Arendt reproduces Adorno’s barbed praise: she writes that ‘when he cared to 
define what he was doing’, Benjamin considered himself a literary critic, that ‘if he can be 
said at all to have aspired to a position in life, it would have been that of “the only true critic 
of German literature” (as Scholem put it in one of the few, very beautiful letters to the friend 
that have been published) except that the very notion of thus becoming a useful member of 
society would have repelled him.’27 Arendt can claim Benjamin for Heidegger for the same 
                                                     
24 Ibid.  
25 Benjamin, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 1910-1940, ed. by Gershom Scholem and Theodor 
Adorno, trans. by Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago; London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994), p. 365. Benjamin also distinguishes his philosophy of history, with its emphasis on the 
(dialectical) image, from the ‘“essences” of phenomenology.’ AP, p. 462. 
26 Arendt, ‘Introduction’, p. 10. Lisa Fittko, who aided Benjamin and countless other refugees in their 
attempts to escape deportation and internment, casts him in a similar light: emphasising his inability to 
‘adapt’, a man who ‘could only take a hot cup [of tea] in his hand when he had first developed an appropriate 
theory.’ Fittko qtd. in Michael Taussig, Walter Benjamin’s Grave (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006), p. 10. See also Fittko, Escape through the Pyrenees, trans. by David Koblick (Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press, 1985). 
27 Arendt, ‘Introduction’, p. 4. The ‘beautiful letter’ to which Arendt refers is one in which Scholem demands 
Benjamin finally decide to move to Jerusalem or not, ‘if only so that I do not find myself in an awkward 
position here […] I cannot continue, year after year, to maintain that you are on the verge of doing 
something, when in reality […] you will never actually do it.’ He writes that Benjamin’s intention to learn 
Hebrew ‘appears exaggerated and wrong; nor does your presumptive position as the only true critic of 
German literature require the study of Hebrew. I hope these comments will force you to face up […]’. 
Gershom Scholem, letter to Benjamin, 20 February 1930, in A Life in Letters, 1914-1982, ed. and trans. by 
Anthony David Skinner (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), p. 180. 
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reasons Adorno minimises the importance of Jewish mysticism and theology and for which 
Scholem dismisses Benjamin’s dialectical materialism: Benjamin ‘didn’t know the score’, 
he couldn’t commit – his genius was misdirected; he misunderstood his own work. 
Interpreting Benjamin’s work fell to the ‘real’ critics with serious convictions and rational 
methodologies. This collapse of Benjamin’s texts and his person continues to the present 
day, wrapped up in detached counterfactuals where, were he ‘practical’ enough, he would 
have escaped from Europe. The most glaring example of this is a recent article in the Los 
Angeles Review of Books by Benjamin Aldes Wurgaft, who unhelpfully points out that if 
Benjamin ‘had carefully explored all the possible routes out of Nazi-occupied Europe in the 
late 1930s’, he could have fled to Jaipur. Wurgaft goes on to list the reasons why Benjamin 
did not follow this belated advice: he was ‘famously dissolute, usually out of work, a bad 
husband, a bad father, a bad friend, always in debt: he never seems to have been quite up to 
the challenges of adult life. It is easy to imagine Benjamin blaming his lot on his stars, rather 
than on his own actions or […] personal responsibility.’28   
Arendt’s profile of Benjamin for The New Yorker was repurposed for the introduction 
to Illuminations, the first collection of Benjamin’s essays to be translated into English. It 
was published in 1968, coinciding with the global eruption of student protests, social 
movements, liberation struggles and the emergence of the New Left. The publication of 
Illuminations in the United States and the recirculation of his work elsewhere in Europe led 
to a rediscovery of his work by the student movements ‘and became the works of a 
revolutionary critic of the “moment.”’29 This rediscovery also took place just as Adorno fell 
out of favour with his students over his views on direct action; around the same time, Arendt 
published On Violence (1969), where she made the bizarre remark on the ‘curious tendency 
to yield more to Negro demands, even if they are clearly silly and outrageous’.30 These 
extremely problematic approaches, framed as genuine disquiet towards violence, were at 
odds with the radical politics of their time (and are often elided in contemporary discussions 
of either critic). It is easy to see the appeal of Benjamin, who wrote in 1921 of the general 
                                                     
28 Benjamin Aldes Wurgaft, ‘Space Jew, or Walter Benjamin Among the Stars’ Los Angeles Review of 
Books, 1 February 2016 <http://lareviewofbooks.org/article/space-jew-or-walter-benjamin-among-the-stars/> 
[accessed 7 March 2016]. 
29 Bernd Kiefer, ‘Crucial Moments, Crucial Points: Walter Benjamin and the Recognition of Modernity in 
Light of the Avant-garde’, European Avant Garde: New Perspectives, ed. by Dietrich Scheunemann 
(Amsterdam; Atlanta: Rodopi, 2000), pp. 69-82 (p. 69).   




strike as ‘a kind of revolutionary violence’, to student protestors.31 Of course, Benjamin was 
not alive to voice any unpalatable opinions on the contemporary moment, but at least he still 
believed in historical materialism. I am not attempting to demonise Benjamin’s friends. 
Adorno, Arendt, and Scholem vigorously promoted Benjamin’s writings and were crucial in 
bringing his work to Anglophone readers and across the Atlantic: Arendt uncovered his final 
essay and smuggled it out of Port Bou – without them Benjamin would not figure in the 
intellectual and cultural landscape as he does, if at all. What I wish to highlight is that the 
trajectory of Benjamin’s reception gains momentum when the frameworks of his surviving 
colleagues become insufficient for approaching, describing, and interpreting their 
contemporary moment. At the same time, the revolutionary potential of the late 1960s and 
1970 would remain largely unfulfilled by the New Left, although ‘the openings provided by 
its decisive breaks with the established system leave a significant legacy.’32  
As Jeffrey Grossman observes, with ‘the rise of a form of intellectual radicalism in 
Europe and the United States in the 1960s, literature about Benjamin begins to appear with 
such rapidity that one might be tempted to view the situation as a Derridean scene of writing 
[…] where writings and reiterations proliferate beyond human influence.’33 Certainly, the 
critical interest in Benjamin skyrocketed in the 1960s and his writings, particularly those on 
surrealism and the work of art, became a fixture in the American academy, but the 
availability of Benjamin’s translated texts was severely limited.34 The first volume of his 
Selected Writings did not appear until 1996, and The Arcades Project was not published in 
                                                     
31 At least, to German students. ‘Critique of Violence’ was published in Germany in 1955. ‘Critique’ is 
almost certainly Benjamin’s most controversial essay, and as many critics have taken issue with his concept 
of ‘divine violence’ as have defended it through careful exegesis. See ‘Critique of Violence’, in Selected 
Writings, ed. by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, trans. by various, 4 vols (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1996; repr. 2002), 1, pp. 236-252. Hereafter abbreviated to SW 1. 
32 George N. Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968 (Boston, Mass.: South 
End Press, 1987), p. 177. Katsiaficas sees the disappointments of the New Left as a global phenomenon: 
‘[w]hether in the United States or Japan, Europe or Latin America, the New Left proved incapable of 
sustaining the momentum of the popular upsurge it helped to set into motion. As the radical impetus of 1968 
was blunted and dispersed, written out of history books and caricatured in mass media and Hollywood, the 
New Left entered a period of crisis, a crisis brought on by the disintegration of a movement which had 
reached world-historical proportions. […] After the uprisings had died down […] the logic of the established 
system exerted a powerful influence in depoliticizing the counterculture and dispersing the New Left’, ibid.  
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English translation until 1999.35 As before, excerpts from these untranslated works would 
appear in English only through citation. In the late 1970s, the first books to substantially 
engage with Benjamin’s work appeared in the US: Jameson’s Marxism and Form: Twentieth 
Century Dialectical Theories of Literature (1974); Susan Buck-Morss’s landmark Origin of 
Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt School (1977) 
Carol Jacobs’s Dissimulating Harmony: Readings of Nietzsche, Artaud, Rilke, and Benjamin 
(1978).36 But it is in the 1990s that the ‘Benjamin boom’, as Noah Isenberg calls it, began in 
earnest. The fiftieth anniversary of his death in 1990 and the celebration of his centennial 
birthday occasioned new appraisals of his work, retrospective conferences, and special issues 
of journals devoted to the critic.37 This coincided with the publication of the first three 
English-language volumes of his Selected Writings in 1996 and the translation of The 
Arcades Project, which only appeared in English in 1999. From this point on, Benjamin 
ceases to be the ‘loser son’ (to borrow Avital Ronell’s ironic designation) of critical theory, 
an image imprinted by the early biographical portraits, and comes to be seen as a melancholic 
drifter born under the sign of Saturn, the ‘Last Intellectual’, a prophet of late capitalism and 
postmodernity.38 As Sándor Radnóti writes, ‘[o]vernight [Benjamin’s] life work fell under a 
penetrating light – a light which in a Benjaminian spirit might be called a redeeming light – 
taken up […] by the most varied schools of thought’.39 
Of course, in noting the distortion of Benjamin’s image, one risks going in the other 
direction: hagiography, or what might today be called a ‘brand’, one which is just as guilty 
of collapsing the person and his thought as Wurgaft does. An uncritical defence of Benjamin 
poses the grave risk of flattening the complexities and contradictions of his work in order to 
present a programmatic philosophy. For instance, although I do not believe Benjamin to be 
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as undialectical as Adorno lets on, any attempt to show that Benjamin’s idiosyncratic 
dialectics were in strict accord with that of Marx would be futile. This strategy is succinctly 
described by Gerhard Richter as the ‘assimilat[ion] [of] Benjamin’s texts mimetically into 
this or that ideology.’40 Grossman takes this further, asserting that Benjamin now functions 
allegorically, ‘as [a] sign which various discourses attempt to rewrite according to their own 
model’.41 Benjamin is not a saint to be worshipped. And yet, there is something compelling 
about Scholem’s statement, written in 1972, that ‘[a]mong the peculiarities of Benjamin’s 
philosophical prose […] is its enormous suitability for canonization; I might almost say for 
quotation as a kind of Holy Writ.’42 Compelling, because it is relevant to both Benjamin’s 
privileged, interrelated concepts of citation and translation (which I will discuss presently), 
and because it sheds some light on the reception history of Benjamin I have begun to outline. 
First, we should note that in Scholem’s formulation, it is the ‘prose’, not the person, 
which lends itself to ‘canonization’ (in both the literary and theological connotations). More 
importantly, canonization and quotation are (‘almost’) interchangeable, just as Benjamin’s 
prose is at once ‘rational and mystical’.43 And yet, the ‘suitability for canonization’ leads 
Scholem to quotation, an intervening form that, as Benjamin tells us, subverts the authority 
that it appears to appeal to. To cite something is both to call on its source and to destroy it, 
similar to Hegel’s Aufgehoben, lifting the quotation not-too-gently from its original context 
and re-placing it in an/other configuration by freeing the quotation from the confines of one 
text and resituating it in another, which is to say by ‘wrenching’ the past into the present. 
For Benjamin, citation has the force of divine violence: 
In the quotation that both saves and punishes, language proves the matrix of justice. It 
summons the word by its name, wrenches it destructively from its context, but 
precisely thereby calls it back to its origin. It appears […] in the structure of a new 
text. […] it gathers the similar into its aura; as name, it stands alone and expressionless. 
In citation the two realms – of origin and destruction – justify themselves before 
language. And conversely, only where they interpenetrate – in citation – is language 
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consummated. In it is mirrored the angelic tongue in which all words, startled from the 
idyllic context of meaning, have become mottoes in the book of Creation.44    
Citation has ‘the power not to preserve but to purify, to tear from context, to destroy; the 
only power in which hope still resides that something might survive this age – because it 
was wrenched from it’.45 But this ‘destructive element’ is directed toward the fixating, 
reifying force of history and in this way, is also a form of recovery. If the continuum of 
history is not ‘blasted open – if its discrete fragments are not dislodged from their authorizing 
context, then its content is lost in the Heraclitean flow of history. At first glance, the act of 
ripping a quotation from its context only to install it within another one may seem to be an 
act of repetition. If we take Scholem at his word and contend that, for better or for worse, 
Benjamin’s writing lends itself ‘to quotation as a kind of Holy Writ’, we must recognise that 
even the seemingly unquestionable authority of Holy Writ was subject to interlinear 
translation, juxtaposing the original script with a vernacular in an arrangement that radically 
transforms each language. The Benjamin ‘contest’ between critics – where one version is 
pitted against another, each claiming to be the ‘true’ interpretation of his philosophy – fails 
to recognise that a single version of a work does not exist. The point of the ‘truth’ – whether 
historical, materialist, or theological – is that it cannot be ‘held fast’ or for long, it ‘flits by’. 
How, indeed, could a ‘true image of the past’ remain eternal as long as time (by nature 
ephemeral and transient) is constantly in motion, each subsequent event modifying the view 
of past and present occurrences? As Benjamin writes, ‘to write history is to cite history’, and 
the historian (and the critic) must make a choice, even if it is inadvertent, whether to invoke 
the authority of its sources or to call them to account as and in citation(s).46 The goal of 
citation, like that of translation, is transformation, rather than the reduplication, of language 
in history and of history. In this study, I do not consider Benjamin’s philosophy as an 
inviolable authority fixed to its historical context but allow it to ‘come into [its] own’ afterlife 
‘by making use of it’.47  
Benjamin’s eminent ability to cite and the eminent citability of his own texts is 
epitomised in The Arcades Project, unavailable in English until 1999 but quoted far earlier 
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in secondary literature. If this citability is anything to go by, it can be concluded that 
Benjamin’s work also possesses an inherent translatability, defined in ‘The Task of the 
Translator’ as ‘an essential quality’ reserved for ‘certain works’.48 This citability and 
translatability designate the potential for Benjamin’s work to acquire new iterations, to exist 
apart and away from itself in other contexts: these are the conditions for the afterlife as 
Benjamin conceives it.  
Afterlife (Nachleben) 
Benjamin first introduces the term ‘afterlife’, or Nachleben, in his 1923 essay, ‘The Task of 
the Translator’ (Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers). A translation (Übersetzen), is that which 
crosses over from the life of the original into its afterlife; as Esther Leslie writes, ‘its renewal 
through its existence in another language, another epoch’.49 In what follows, I do not provide 
a Bloomian account of influence, but instead seek to establish establish points of contact 
between Benjamin’s figures of thought and the works of three authors who emerge ‘after’ 
him. A traditional model of influence posits a debt of fidelity between authors past and 
present and assumes the unbroken continuity of this or that tradition. Such a model 
minimises more resonant and intractable forms of relation. As this thesis is underpinned by 
Benjamin’s philosophy of history, Bloom’s historicist model of influence (and its Oedipal 
anxieties) is antithetical to my project. If one extrapolates from Benjamin’s theory of history 
(if it can be called a ‘theory’: Benjamin does not present unified concepts), a ‘Benjaminian’ 
notion of literary influence would be characterised not by genealogical lines of continuity, 
but by the sudden flashes of relation between objects that were once thought be disconnected. 
Furthermore, such a strategy would doubtless fail to establish an intentional genealogy 
between a German philosopher and three very different American authors writing in English. 
Instead, I propose an alternate model based on Benjamin’s account of translation, which 
emphasises the radical disjunction between original and translation. Benjamin writes: 
It is evident that no translation […] can have any significance as regards the original. 
Nonetheless, it does stand in the closest relationship to the original by virtue of the 
original’s translatability; in fact, this connection is all the closer since it is no longer of 
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importance to the original. We may call this connection a natural one, or, more 
specifically, a vital one. Just as the manifestations of life are intimately connected with 
the phenomenon of life without being of importance to it, a translation issues from the 
original – no so much from its life as from its afterlife.50 
A translation owes the original no fidelity; that is, it does not – cannot – exactly resemble or 
photographically reproduce the original. As usual in Benjamin’s writing, the term he 
discusses, ‘translation’, is released from the constraints of its standard definition: for 
instance, Benjamin is quick to dismiss translation as the conversion of information from one 
language into another. Because the totality of the original in its cultural and linguistic 
specificity cannot be preserved in the target language, the translation cannot reproduce the 
original. A sentence, held together by its unique syntax, grammar, and connotations, does 
not survive in translation, and indeed it must be dismantled, deformed, and often even 
reimagined for a translation to occur. 
It is at this point in the essay that Benjamin makes the distinction between ‘what is 
meant and the way of meaning it’ by using the example of Bröt and pain, the French and 
German words for ‘bread’. In both words, ‘what is meant is the same’ – they refer to the 
same object; but the ‘way of meaning’, that is, the languages in which each word is 
expressed, are not identical: ‘in fact, they strive to exclude each other.’ 
 The translator’s ‘task’ thus exposes the irreconcilable difference (which begins to look 
like différance) not only between two languages, but between language and thought.51 In 
translation, the original can no longer rely on the untranslatable idiom, and through this it is 
revealed that all language gestures toward – or cites – something that cannot be fully 
expressed within it. Put another way, by transfiguring one language into another, a 
translation calls attention to the language itself as a mere ‘figure’ of divine speech; language 
is the mediated, unfulfilled promise of the immediate, unmediated communication that 
Benjamin calls ‘pure language’ toward which all languages aspire.52 The ‘weak messianism’ 
or redemptive potential of translation is its ability to, at least briefly, overcome the Babelian 
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confusion between languages by revealing their ‘innermost relationship’, their ‘special 
kinship’ by representing ‘their interrelate[ion] in what they want to express.’53 The true 
significance of translation is that it reveals the intention of language (as such) toward (but 
never fully obtaining) transcendent expression, seeking to bridge the gap between what is 
meant and the way of meaning. In poststructuralist terms, translation both confronts and 
enacts the split between ‘signifier’ and ‘signified’. For Benjamin, this split is the defining 
distinction between fallen, human language, and the divine Word – and makes discrete, 
individual languages ‘recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are 
part of a vessel’ by ‘incorporating the original’s way of meaning’.54 Many commentaries on 
Benjamin’s translation essay emphasise the destructive element of translation, and indeed 
translation can be thought of as the destruction of the original’s syntactical unity, but it is 
not an absolute or vengeful form of destruction; rather, the translated form is what survives 
the original in the process of translation which issues the afterlife of the original.55 
Accordingly, although translation involves destruction, the ‘intentio’ of translation is 
survival, the irreducible kernel of the original that can only be drawn out by a transformation 
of both the source language and the target language. The texts I have chosen to examine each 
incorporate Benjamin’s way[s] of meaning’, and thus can be considered ‘translations’ 
insofar as they issue from, and constitute, an afterlife of his works in ‘another language’ and 
‘another epoch’.56  
Chapter 1: Mortification of the Work: David Markson, Benjamin, and the Novel  
In Chapter 1, I read David Markson’s ‘notecard quartet’ – Reader’s Block (1996), This is 
Not a Novel (2001), Vanishing Point (2004), and The Last Novel (2007) – in conversation 
with Benjamin’s concept of afterlife, which designates a form of survival beyond the origin, 
obsolescence, and/or destruction of a text. In this first chapter, I chart the development of 
citation in Markson’s work as it attempts to link disparate historical moments through the 
disjunctive form of the fragment. Markson’s novels are often inadvertently minimised as the 
‘tragic anecdotes [through which] we unexpectedly discern the entire shape of a man’s life’, 
                                                     
53 ‘Task’, p. 255. Benjamin’s most resonant remarks on weak messianism can be found in ‘On the Concept of 
History’, Selected Writings, trans. by Edmund Jephcott et al, ed. by Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, 
4 vols (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 4, pp. 389-411 (p. 390). Hereafter abbreviated to 
SW 4. Subsequent references to this essay will be shortened to ‘On the Concept’. 
54 ‘Task’, p. 260. My emphasis.  
55 For example, see Paul de Man’s essay, ‘Conclusions: Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator”’ in 
The Resistance to Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), pp. 73-105.  




but I seek to prove that there is something much more complex and philosophical about his 
work than its reception tends to suggest.57 Markson’s deployment of categories such as the 
fragment, the anecdote, and the caesura reject such claims that his late work is a cozy but 
life-affirming book of trivia. While the novels are indeed filled with a profusion of 
interesting facts, Markson wrenches them from their context, separates them from their 
sources, and allows them to ‘come into their own’ as the multiplicity of counterpoised 
presents that defy a linear continuum of history. The repetition of themes within these 
anecdotes draws out a common texture between each present, wherein each of these 
instances are united; yet the discontinuous structure of the novels, in which one relation 
dissolves into another, ensures that these moments are transient rather than timeless or 
eternal, and therefore resolutely historical in the sense Benjamin inheres.  
The anecdote, a citational form related to but distinct from quotation, is also of 
paramount importance in Markson’s novels. Most of these anecdotes refer to illness, penury, 
and death, repetitiously linking the work of art to creaturely vulnerability. I quote a few 
examples from Reader’s Block by way of illustration: ‘Jack London committed suicide’; 
‘Bruno Schulz was carrying home a loaf of bread when he was shot down in the street by 
the Gestapo’; ‘Mussorgsky died raving mad from drink’; ‘Cosimo Tura died in a 
poorhouse.’58 Anecdotes about death are anecdotes of the most intense kind: originating 
from the Greek an- ‘not’ and ekdotos ‘published’ (from ek- ‘out’ and didonai ‘to give’), the 
anecdote cannot exist until ‘after the fact’ – it is, like citation and translation, a belated, very 
often posthumous form. In the translation essay, Benjamin writes that ‘the idea of life and 
afterlife in works of art should be regarded with an entirely unmetaphorical objectivity’.59 
This is not a matter of animating dead objects with life (fetishisation) but, as Christopher 
Bush lucidly describes, of ‘understand[ing] textuality and organic life in relation to a more 
general process of living on, the general afterliving that is history’.60 Benjamin describes 
works of art as belonging to the realm of ‘linguistic creation’, intimately related to the artist 
as a trace of them having been alive, but also separate from them.61 In Markson’s novels, 
this relationship is articulated through formal fragmentation and anecdotes which seem to 
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‘speak’ to one another.           
Chapter 2: Dialectic of the Valance: Aura, Trace, and Allegory in the Poetry of Susan 
Howe  
Throughout the last two decades, many scholars have made observations about the similarity 
between Susan Howe’s poetry and the philosophical writings of Walter Benjamin. With the 
notable exceptions of Rachel Tzvia Back and Mandy Bloomfield, however, there are very 
few sustained analyses of the ways in which Howe’s work can be seen to interact with that 
of Benjamin.62 Each of these studies elegantly notes the resonance between Howe’s 
paratactic poems and Benjamin’s dialectical image. In Led by Language: The Poetry and 
Poetics of Susan Howe (2002) Back sees Howe’s lyric interventions in the established 
history of the United States as enacting Benjamin’s exhortation in ‘Theses on the Philosophy 
of History’ to ‘brush history against the grain’. Howe’s attempts to grasp at ‘shared 
memories […] through myth, fantasy, and first landscapes’ as a way of ‘articulat[ing] the 
past historically […] to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at the moment of danger’.63 
In other words, Back regards Howe’s poems as dialectical images which ‘are at every 
moment in danger of being lost’.64 Back draws on Howe’s work from the early 1980s – The 
Libertines (1980) and Pythagorean Silence (1982) while Bloomfield focuses on 
Singularities (1990). Bloomfield’s lucid work, Archaeopoetics: Word, Image, History draws 
heavily on Benjamin’s concept of history and also includes a chapter on Howe.65 Paul 
Naylor’s 1995 article, ‘Writing History Poetically’, likewise compares Benjamin’s concept 
of the dialectical image to Howe’s poetic configurations of history, calling attention to a line 
in Thorow, ‘this/ present in the Past now’, as an articulation of Jetztzeit (‘now-time’) after 
the fact.66 Likewise, Susan Barbour’s analysis of The Midnight briefly refers to the work 
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itself as ‘a caesura-image’ in its montage-like use of juxtaposing photographs, text, and 
photocopies.67 Barbour also draws attention to Howe’s fascination with the dash or hyphen 
as a ‘hush of hesitation’ from which she insightfully draws a comparison to Benjamin’s 
description of the dialectical image as ‘the caesura in the movement of thought’.68  
Howe has certainly read Benjamin, and in an interview with Lynn Keller expresses her 
admiration for ‘his interest in the fragment, the material object, and the entrance of the 
messianic into the material object.’69 The material object that features most prominently in 
Howe’s work is the book, specifically the written word which lies within its pages and which 
has the potential to – weakly, as an echo, as an afterlife – reanimate the voices of the dead, 
particularly marginalised voices which have been figuratively ‘put to death’ by the archive 
and the literary canon. Not only textiles, but texts provide the ‘relational space’ within which 
‘poetry telepathy’ occurs, a phrase I examine at length in this chapter.70 It is this attention to 
the ‘dark side of history’ that makes Howe’s work so resonant with Benjamin’s. Howe’s 
poesis is driven by the materiality of artefacts from the past: a scrap of Sarah Pierpont 
Edwards’ wedding dress, her mother’s handmade bookmarks, Emily Dickinson’s hand sewn 
fascicles – become so saturated with materiality that the poet’s contemplation of these 
objects tips into the immaterial. This, I want to argue, is the point where the aura, the cult or 
exhibition value of the artwork that Benjamin sees as endangered by technical 
reproducibility, acquires its afterlife through obsolete technologies.  
In both Howe’s and Benjamin’s accounts, language is severed from its ties to a 
transcendent and ‘pure’ meaning exemplified by edenic, pre-lapsarian communication 
between God and man found in the Book of Genesis. For Benjamin, this schism between 
word and meaning is allegorised by the story of Babel; for Howe, Babel occurs in the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony when Anne Hutchinson fatefully distinguishes between external 
‘expression’ and internal ‘judgement’. Accused by the colony’s governor, John Winthrop, 
and other minister-magistrates of a schismatic heresy, Hutchinson was banished from 
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Boston, cast out from the church, and fled to Long Island where she was later murdered in a 
raid.  By insisting on the separation of word and meaning, Hutchinson challenged the social 
order of her community. As Caldwell’s pivotal article puts it, Hutchinson ‘turn[ed] the city 
on a hill into a tower of Babel’.71 In both cases, language can only imperfectly cite its 
meaning, leading to an overwhelming proliferation of meanings and definitions attached to 
single words. In this sense, all language is ‘allegorical’ in the etymological sense of 
‘speaking otherwise’. From this intersection of language, image, and theology, one arrives 
at allegory, a point to which I return in the second half of this chapter with particular 
reference to The Midnight. 
Chapter 3: Trompe-l’oeil: Reframing Perspective in Teju Cole’s Open City  
My final chapter focuses on Teju Cole’s 2011 novel, Open City. Upon its publication, Open 
City garnered praise from critics that focused not so much on its actual content, but on its 
resemblance to the prose of W.G. Sebald, an author marked through-and-through by 
Benjamin’s philosophy of history; it was also upheld as an exemplar of the cosmopolitan 
novel and the post-9/11 novel.72 I begin this chapter by addressing these affiliations and how 
they mediate the Benjaminian aspects of Cole’s novel, which is set in post-9/11 New York 
and registers the absence of the Twin Towers as ‘a metonym of its disaster’.73 Instead of 
affirming Open City’s incarnation of these genres, I suggest the following: that Cole’s novel 
is, in fact, a critique of these genres, which are placed within largely liberal discourses. I 
argue that Cole mounts this critique through acts of literary and generic anamorphosis. 
Anamorphosis is a painterly technique that reached its nadir during the baroque period, 
which Cole is intimately acquainted with, having been an art historian before becoming a 
novelist and photographer. Like Benjamin, Sebald has become a ‘key’ or a ‘sign’ in or under 
which one might authentically compose the highly-contingent, loss-filled history of 
modernity. I identify the point of Cole’s convergence with Benjamin to be the category of 
nature-history or natural history (Naturgeschichte), which, Eric Santner writes, ‘refers […] 
not to the fact that nature also has a history but to the fact that the artefacts of human history 
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tend to acquire an aspect of mute, natural being at the point where they begin to lose their 
place in a viable form of life.’74 The outlook of natural history is exemplified in the baroque 
Trauerspiel, where ruins and death’s heads signify the bloody pageant of history as a natural, 
and therefore unstoppable, catastrophe. In Open City, as in Sebald’s novels, this manifests 
as an acute attention to the mute, oppressed and repressed historical afterlives that emanate 
from monuments, buildings, and landscapes. A scene from Open City that illustrates this 
yoking of nature and history occurs when the protagonist visits Bruges. Walking through the 
Parc du Cinqauntenaire to his hotel, Julius is caught in a rain storm: 
[The rain] fell on the bronze head of Leopold II at his monument, on Claudel at his, on 
the flagstones of the Palais Royal. The rain kept coming down, on the battlefield of 
Waterloo at the outskirts of the city, the Lion’s Mound, the Ardennes, the implacable 
valleys full of young men’s bones grown old, on the preserved cities farther out west, on 
Ypres and the huddled white crosses dotting Flanders fields, the turbulent channel, the 
impossibly cold sea to the north, on Denmark, France, and Germany.75  
Using a storm to signify the force and transience of history is bound to recall Benjamin’s 
famous thesis on Klee’s angel, a witness caught between the irrevocable pastness of history 
and the inevitability of the future. Much of the discussion surrounding Sebald and Cole 
focuses on legal and traumatic models of the witness, the possibility of ethically witnessing 
atrocity, and the potential forms this might take. For Sebald, witnessing historical trauma 
results in the secondary trauma of the witnessing represented in the angel’s open-mouthed 
gaze. There are very clear problems with this notion of the witness as it is articulated in 
Sebald, where the witness is also situated within the role of the tourist. Like Sebald’s 
protagonists, the narrator of Open City is a flâneur, a figure whose destructive qualities are 
often left by the wayside in favour of a more liberatory, subversive figure of modernism. By 
joining the figure of the flâneur, the witness, and natural history together, Open City explores 
the limits of a certain interpretation of Benjamin’s concept of history, the very interpretation 
that led critics to favourably compare Cole to Sebald.  
Despite Julius’ incomparable historical insights, to which I will pay close attention, he 
is fatally unwilling to recognise the act of sexual violence committed against Moji, the sister 
of his boyhood friend. This fact is withheld from the reader and repressed by the narrator 
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until the final chapters of the novel. It is also an element of the novel which is often elided 
by or insubstantially addressed by critics. I will discuss some of the ways critics have 
grappled with the fact of rape in Open City, which tend to attribute some sort of 
psychological portrait of the protagonist in order to better assimilate it into a coherent literary 
analysis. Put another way: readers first encounter Julius as a melancholic, intellectual 
cosmopolitan with an intricately ethical way of interpreting the world, seemingly offering 
an updated version of Sebaldian history adequate for the era that has seen the repercussions 
of the so-called War on Terror. However, this view gives little credit to Cole, 
underestimating his skill as a writer and thinker. In terms which will be elucidated in this 
chapter, the Trauerspiel, or mourning-play, represents a deformation of the classic structure 
of tragedy, in which the tragic hero recognises the truth of his situation and his own character. 
The mourning play, on the contrary, presents the world and its players as mere spectators, 
denied revelation or self-recognition.  
In the novel’s epigraph, Cole writes, ‘Death is a perfection of the eye’, a phrase I view 
as key to understanding Open City.76 Julius is first presented as having an acute visual sense, 
able to see beneath the commercial veneer of Manhattan and, as a psychiatrist, we expect 
him to be self-aware, capable of insight into the human psyche. Yet he is ultimately unable 
to relate to others, and only half-heartedly attempts to reconcile with his estranged family. 
This line of enquiry will lead me to back to Benjamin’s discussion of Trauerspiel. 
Throughout the novel, Julius often doubts his own vision: when he finds himself in Wall 
Street Station, he ‘suspect[s] for a moment that the grand hall […] was a trick of the eye’. 
Julius perceives the grand station hall as if it were an optical illusion, a trompe-l’oeil. This 
passage, I argue in the chapter, is pivotal, because it describes the novel itself. I read Open 
City as a ‘trompe-l’oeil’: only from a peculiar, singular, and even unnatural vantage point 
can the viewer see the skull in its legible dimension. While at first glance the epigraph may 
seem overtly obscure or merely ornamental, in Open City, as in The Ambassadors, the 
conditions of such legibility are predicated on reading the encoded configuration of an image 
that can be recognized only at a specific moment – and only from a distorted perspective.
                                                     




Mortification of the Work: David Markson, Benjamin, and the Novel 
Nonlinear. Discontinuous. Collage-like. An assemblage. […] Obstinately cross-
referential and of cryptic interconnective syntax.  
– David Markson, This is Not a Novel1 
Method of this project: literary montage. I needn’t say anything. Merely show. I shall 
purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious formulations. But the rags, the refuse 
– these I will not inventory but allow, in the only way possible, to come into their 
own: by making use of them. 
– Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project2 
These epigraphs demonstrate the intuition behind this chapter: the striking resemblance 
between the late novels of David Markson – Reader’s Block (1996), This is Not a Novel 
(2001), Vanishing Point (2004), and The Last Novel (2007) – and Walter Benjamin’s 
unfinished magnum opus, The Arcades Project. Placed side by side, these quotations, both 
comments on the construction of idiosyncratic works, pose an affinity between the two 
writers’ formal methods. In what follows, I do not presume to collapse Benjamin’s prehistory 
of modernity with Markson’s de facto postmodern work. Instead, I intend to gather a 
constellation of concepts that chart four theoretical points of connection between Benjamin 
and Markson: the fragment, citation, afterlife (Nachleben), and mortification. Benjamin thus 
becomes a lens through which to understand Markson’s cryptic insights into the history of 
the work of art. It is in this sense that I read Markson’s late oeuvre as an ‘afterlife’ of 
Benjamin’s own writings.  
Drawing on Benjamin’s notion of the ‘afterlife of works’ and ‘mortification of the 
works’, I argue that Markson’s texts are an instantiation of a dialectic of the fragment that is 
implicit in the work of both the philosopher and the author. The terms ‘afterlife’ and 
‘mortification’ appear to be antithetical, and yet, as I hope to make clear, are in fact facets 
of Benjamin’s ‘Janus-faced’ thought. A fragment signifies destruction and survival, and as 
such is a locus of mortification and afterlife. In what follows, I trace the various connotations 
of the fragment – as a literary form, as an object, and as a verb: ‘to fragment’ – as it appears 
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in and shapes Markson’s late novels. Next, I explore the significance of Benjamin’s use of 
quotation, which is itself another kind of fragmentation that oscillates between 
memorialisation and the juridical meaning of citation – a calling to account. I argue that 
while Markson uses fragments of other texts to form his novels, he also actively ‘fragments’, 
or, following Benjamin, ‘mortifies’ the novel form. This act of mortification allows Markson 
to offer up a critique of the novel as such; in doing so, his own novel becomes an afterlife of 
the novel, showing what ‘lives on’ or survives after the most conventional elements of the 
traditional novel (plot, setting, character) are ruptured. The relevance of Benjamin’s theory 
of history to literature – and of literature to history –  cannot be overstated. Not only is the 
dialectical image a figure like that of a word or a hieroglyph that must be read, but the 
interrelation of ‘what has been’ to ‘the now’ ‘bears to the highest degree the imprint of the 
[…] moment on which all reading is founded.’3 The foundation of Benjamin’s concept of 
history is also the foundation of reading itself, both of which are predicated on legibility, 
recognisability, and a peculiar temporal relationality whereby the present follows (after) and 
is followed (after) by the past. The model of this temporality is not one of continuity, but of 
the fragment and its disrupted network of relation. The fragments of time that Markson 
presents on the page are given the same shape: it is initially unclear how they relate to one 
another, and it takes several pages for one discrete sentence to ‘form a constellation’ with 
the sentences that follow it.  
The relationship between Benjamin and Markson is not one of traditional, explicit 
influence, but rather a kind of ‘elective affinity’. Markson, an omnivorous and obsessive 
reader, was certainly familiar with Benjamin, but no more so than he was with Plato, 
Descartes, Spinoza, Wittgenstein, and so on. The problem with pinning down a single model 
for Markson’s work is immediately evident to any reader of his novels, which reference 
thousands of writers, philosophers, artists and musicians. But while a Bloomian model of 
influence is untenable when it comes to Benjamin and Markson, the intersections of their 
intellectual paths are impossible to ignore: just as Benjamin defines the method of The 
Arcades Project by emphasising presentation (‘merely show’, ‘making use of’) and 
construction (‘literary montage’) over commentary (‘I needn’t say anything’) and exegesis 
(‘no ingenious formulations’), Markson likewise stresses his novels’ ‘nonlinear’, 
‘discontinuous’ structure, privileging a collection (‘assemblage’) of discrete fragments 
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(‘collage-like’) whose relations are ‘cross-referential’ and ‘interconnective’ over a 
traditionally progressive, plot-driven narrative.  
 Without commentary or linear narrative, what remains is the fragment. 
Consequently, Benjamin’s Arcades (and his final essay, ‘On the Concept of History’) and 
Markson’s late novels take on a fragmentary form. This form similarly reflects the materials 
Benjamin and Markson ‘make use of’: quotations, anecdotes, and brief but resonant 
interpolations by the author(s). By creating a text composed solely of fragments – of 
remnants – Markson is able to reveal that when narrative is stripped away to its bare material, 
composed ‘merely’ of fragments, what is left between them is a collection of blank spaces 
between the lines, of gaps, and a sense of incompletion – an index that can only refer to 
itself. The titles of his late novels are significant in this regard. Markson's first ‘late’ novel, 
Reader's Block displaces the creative ‘blocks’ of the author by the suggestion of a limited, 
obstructed insight of the reader. The experimental (but by no means originary) organisation 
of the novel is skeletal in two senses, as the printed text is broken up by noticeable ‘blocks’ 
of white spaces between fragments which compulsively refer to death, illness, and waste. 
Without traditional narrative devices or substantive commentary linking each fragment in 
sequence, the reader is indeed ‘blocked’ at every turn from cognising the linear narrative 
that turning the numbered pages seems to demand. The title of Markson’s third late novel, 
Vanishing Point, also suggests an infinite but obscured perspective faced by the reader when 
confronted with the fragment. 
In addition to fragmentary form and fragmented content, there is also the matter of a 
fragmented but highly disciplined organisation. In this sense, Markson also shares 
Benjamin’s compositional technique. During his forays into the Bibliothéque Nationale, 
Benjamin would ‘organise […] thousands of index cards on which he transcribed quotations 
and notations into files, called Konvolute. He developed a system of cross-referencing. The 
files comprised a vast array of interlinked scraps’.4 Compare this to Markson’s description 
of his own method: ‘I use index cards. I store them in the tops of a couple of shoe boxes. If 
I made a stack of them, they’d probably be about two feet tall. I’m constantly shuffling’.5 In 
an interview with Laura Sims, Markson describes this process in further detail:  
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All my life I’ve been an inveterate checker-off-in-the-margins, but in recent 
years, writing Reader’s Block and the rest, I simply began to copy out the stuff 
that interested me instead. And where better than on three-by-five cards? […] I 
file them one behind the other, in tops of shoe boxes, ultimately two of those 
taped end-to-end. […] I’m shuffling and rearranging repeatedly […]6 
When asked about the ordering of the cards, their placement in the novels, and the element 
of chance, Markson responded: 
Of course [their placement is sometimes random]. There are hundreds of things that I 
find intrinsically interesting, or that echo different themes, but which have to simply fall 
where they may. Nonetheless […] those other placements are all generally more intricate 
and interconnected than I’ve indicated, and often pretty subtle. […] Kurt Vonnegut 
called me. ‘David, what sort of computer did you use to juggle all that stuff?’ I had to 
tell him I didn’t own one - I still don’t, incidentally - and that it all came out of my aging 
and rapidly deteriorating brain. Plus of course those ubiquitous index cards.7 
I quote from these interviews at length to outline the key elements of Markson’s novels. 
First, the importance of the index-card method, which ‘shuffles’ between intentional, 
premeditated order and aleatory chaos. This is very much the dialectic uncovered by 
Benjamin’s 1931 essay, ‘Unpacking My Library: A Talk about Collecting’, where he writes 
‘the life of the collector manifests a dialectical tension between the poles of disorder and 
order’.8 Benjamin begins this essay by describing the partially furnished flat he occupied 
following his separation from his wife, Dora; he depicts the ‘disorder of crates that have 
been wrenched open, the air saturated with the dust of wood, the floor covered with torn 
paper’.9 A similar mise-en-scene appears in Reader’s Block, the first of Markson’s late work. 
The narrator, simply called ‘Reader’, contemplates writing a novel wherein: 
Protagonist first seen poised abstractedly amid a kind of transitory disarray?  
Cartons heaped and piled? 
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 Innumerable books, Reader presumably means?10 
The ordered row of books on a shelf belies the unassimilable heterogeneity of the objects of 
a collection. The book collection occupies an uneasy equilibrium between the order of their 
physical arrangement, the ‘chaos of [the collector’s] memory’ and the ‘disorder’ of the 
history of their circulation.11 As Jane O. Newman points out in Benjamin’s Library: 
Modernity, Nation, and the Baroque, ‘books exist in a kind of precarious “balancing act” 
over the abyss of chaos from which they derive and which, in their very material survival 
and presence, they also represent.’12 This tension between disintegration and survival runs 
through every aspect of Markson’s work: it can be found in his interest in periods of 
obscurity and fame and in the burial of artworks and their rediscovery after millennia; in his 
obsession with the death of others and their preservation in words and images (‘The peculiar 
immortality of Sulpicia. Six love poems totalling only forty lines, and tacked onto the 
collected works of Tibullius. For two full thousand years’); in his own precarious syntax, in 
which subjects and predicates grasp at one another across line breaks; and in the way one 
fragment suddenly drops off the page, only to be reprised several pages later.13  
This begs the question: how did Markson arrive at the fragmentary novels that 
comprise his final four novels? And how might reading them offer further iterations of 
Benjamin’s thought and open up new ways of thinking about the novel? 
1.1 Wittgenstein’s Mistress Between Modernism and Postmodernism 
Despite receiving favourable reviews for Wittgenstein’s Mistress (one written by David 
Foster Wallace) and attracting a small critical following (Laura Sims, a critic and poet, and 
Francoise Palleau-Papin, a French academic), Markson remains a largely little-known 
author.14 When he was mentioned in literary journalism, it was as a ‘massively under-read’ 
author; three years before he died, Vanishing Point and The Last Novel placed first on New 
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York Magazine’s list of ‘Best Novels You’ve Never Read’.15 During his youth, Markson 
became close to Malcolm Lowry, whose Joycean late modernist novel, Under the Volcano 
(1947), formed the subject of his Master’s thesis.16 Markson also frequented The White 
Horse, a pub in Greenwich Village, alongside Dylan Thomas, Jack Kerouac, Joseph Heller 
and William Gaddis. Except for Thomas, and perhaps Kerouac, most of the authors Markson 
associated with were not famous at the time; but Markson’s place at the periphery of literary 
fame is foreshadowed here.  
When in the later novels Markson writes of the material pressures placed on writers in 
societies that rarely value them and whose profession is infamous for its want of 
remuneration, he speaks from experience. Between 1959 and 1966 Markson wrote what he 
called ‘entertainments’: two satirical hardboiled detective novels in the vein of Raymond 
Chandler, Epitaph for a Tramp (1959) and Epitaph for a Deadbeat (1961), another crime 
novel called Miss Doll, Go Home (1965), and a parodic Western, The Ballad of Dingus 
Magee (1966).17 The latter novel was his most commercially successful (‘the only book I 
ever made money on’) – Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer acquired the film rights for $75,000.18 
Markson’s first ‘serious’ novel was Going Down (1970).19 A nonlinear, multi-perspectival 
narrative centring around three polyamorous characters living in Mexico (an homage to 
Lowry, but also written while Markson lived in Mexico), Going Down is a blend of gothic 
(murder by machete, amputations, and deformity form the central action of the novel) and 
late modernist writing (stream-of-consciousness, allusion, pastiche). One character, a painter 
called Fern, serves as a prototype for Wittgenstein’s Mistress’s Kate. Markson’s next novel, 
Springer’s Progress (1977), is a Joycean narrative that revolves around a hard-drinking 
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novelist experiencing writer’s block, a theme carried over into his late work.20 The 
protagonist, Lucien Springer, ends up writing a novel that, in a feat of meta-fictional 
acrobatics, becomes Springer’s Progress itself. Neither of the novels sold well – Springer’s 
Progress was deemed ‘overwrit[ten]’ by a contemporary reviewer.21 Markson would not 
write another novel for over a decade.  
 After 54 rejections, Wittgenstein’s Mistress was finally published in 1988.22 Narrated 
by protagonist Kate, who believes herself to be the last human on earth, Wittgenstein’s 
Mistress is more visibly ‘experimental’ than Markson’s early work; it is also more traditional 
than his last four novels, with a recognisable plot and a clearly-defined protagonist. After 
the publication of Wittgenstein’s Mistress and his later novels, Markson became associated 
with experimentalism and the avant-garde: his obituaries describe him as a ‘postmodern 
novelist’.23 As James McAdams writes, Markson as postmodern novelist is, in many 
respects, a matter of periodisation; Wittgenstein’s Mistress and the novels that followed it 
were written in a postmodern world: ‘Markson’s “postmodern turn” represents the 
postmodern turn in the arts in general’.24 McAdams astutely argues that Wittgenstein’s 
Mistress represents a ‘profound rupture in Markson’s career, a liminal point between his 
modernist past and postmodern future’: the early novels placed faith in the redemptive power 
of allusion to locate and anchor the text in a tradition and a literary community – a 
Wittgensteinian Lebensform in which the truth and meaning of language is formed by a tacit 
consensus.25 Such a community is abolished by the apocalyptic landscape of Wittgenstein’s 
Mistress, where Kate, the last living person on earth, can refer only to her own errant, lonely 
memories; memories that she herself constantly calls into question.26 
 The novel follows Kate as she attempts to shed her material belongings – clothes, 
cassette tapes, books – and empty her mind of memories by writing them down on a 
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typewriter, all of which she considers ‘baggage’. Such an attempt can never be fully 
accomplished, however; it remains partial and incomplete. What is fragmentary cannot be 
eradicated: ‘[s]till, perhaps there is baggage after all, for all that I believed I had left baggage 
behind. Of a sort.’27 Kate’s project of disposal is necessarily one of dispersal, of casting the 
material and mental contents of one’s life aside, only for them to scatter to the winds or 
across the page. The point, here, is that intellectual jetsam will always wash up again 
somewhere. When Kate’s rowboat is washed offshore, she meditates, ‘[s]ometimes I like to 
believe that it has been carried all of the way across the ocean by now, to tell the truth.’28 
And: ‘[f]requently, certain objects wash up onto the shore here that would well have been 
carried just as far in the opposite direction, as a matter of fact.’29 
 Despite her conviction that no other living soul exists, Kate habitually writes 
messages to unknown, apparently non-existent readers. While McAdams rightly focuses on 
Markson’s construction of profound isolation in this text as a reflection of the ‘social 
abandonism’ of postmodernity, it is important to read Kate’s messages as an attempt to 
communicate despite the apparent hopelessness; even Kate’s fantasy of the rowboat being 
carried across the ocean is a fantasy of something arriving at a destination as if a message in 
a bottle.30 The first sentence of Wittgenstein’s Mistress is ‘[i]n the beginning, sometimes I 
left messages in the street.’31 When she moves to an abandoned beach, Kate recounts how 
she often wrote messages in the sand: ‘[s]omebody is living on this beach, the messages 
would say. […] Actually, nothing that I wrote was ever still there when I went back in any 
case, always being washed away.’32 It may appear, at first, that there is a vital difference 
between a material object (the rowboat) and writing (in the sand): the former washes up 
someplace, the latter disappears, never to return. However, the common element between 
the material object and the seemingly intangible letter is that both are subject to dispersal; 
and in the text of Wittgenstein’s Mistress and Markson’s later novels, writing – in the form 
of a fact, an anecdote, or a trivial detail – disappears from the page only to appear again on 
a different page, in a slightly different form. Wittgenstein’s Mistress and the novels that 
follow it may be portraits of extreme loneliness, acute isolation and abandonment, but they 
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also make radical attempts to reach out of this void, to make contact and convey something 
significant: ‘[s]omebody is living in the Louvre, certain messages would say’.33 Somebody 
is living. I am here.  
 This attempt to connect – the desire to make contact with a potential ‘referee’ or 
mediator rather than become subsumed in a postmodern zone free of any referent, is what 
makes Wittgenstein’s Mistress a ‘liminal’ text suspended between modernism and 
postmodernism. But Markson’s last four novels are even more difficult to place in either 
category: they are allusive, self-referential, and carry an implicit sense of the modernist 
dictum ‘make it new’ – in This is Not a Novel (a reference to Magritte’s Ceci n’est pas une 
pipe), the narrator declares that the work is ‘Novelist’s personal genre. In which part of the 
experiment is to continue keeping him offstage to the greatest extent possible’.34 Such an 
assertion recalls Joyce’s description of the artist who, ‘like the God of creation, remains […] 
invisible, refined out of existence’, or Flaubert’s invisible author.35 By the same turn, the 
late novels’ self-avowed intertextuality and fragmented deconstruction of the novel form 
align themselves with postmodern stylistics. In many ways, Markson’s work draws out the 
vexed distinctions between modernism and postmodernism in literature, evidence that, as 
‘mere period labels’, they have been ‘drained of their provocative cultural significance’ since 
the modernism/postmodernism debate began.36 It is worth noting that this debate emerged 
during Markson’s lifetime, and though it still endures today, it is a discussion that is over 
sixty years old. Without dismissing this debate, I would like to suggest a more useful 
category, one which addresses the ‘untimeliness’ of Markson’s work: late style.  
1.2 Markson’s Late Style 
The stylistic and formal shift from the verbose, linguistically playful modernism of 
Markson’s early novels to the spare, ascetic prose of the late novels is related to the 
‘baggage’ Kate tries to jettison. But rather than dramatise the attempt to discard personal and 
cultural memories, as Wittgenstein’s Mistress does, Markson turns his eye toward the 
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‘furniture’ of the traditional novel. In an interview with Michael Silverblatt, the author uses 
‘baggage’ once more, this time to describe discarding ‘the baggage of the usual novel: plot, 
character, dramatic incidents, dramatic scenes [to the point that it] sounds as if nothing much 
is left’.37 What is implicit but remains unsaid in McAdams’s essay is that the real apocalyptic 
event of Wittgenstein’s Mistress is the loss of a modernist aesthetic whose ‘models of 
knowledge are ultimately untenable’: ‘Kate is unable to cherish or properly “nostalgize” 
famous thinkers’ in the way Joyce, Eliot, Pound, and Nabokov did.38 Modernism is a place 
to which Markson can no longer return, as Steven Moore further elucidates when he writes 
that ‘for earlier writers (and in Markson’s earlier works), culture was stable and objective, 
an orderly accumulation of facts.’39 In Wittgenstein’s Mistress, however, culture is unstable 
and subjective, a fading memory of “baggage” that teases Kate with false connections’.40 
 What is left out of these discussions of Markson’s modernism, late modernism, and 
modernism is his age. Unlike many writers of his generation born in the late 1920s, Markson 
lived to see the twenty-first century. Markson was 70 years old when Reader’s Block was 
published. By the time The Last Novel debuted, he was 81. Having suffered a heart attack 
and bouts of cancer, any of the late novels might have been ‘the last’. Presented without 
comment in The Last Novel are the words ‘Old. Tired. Sick. Alone. Broke.’41 It might, 
therefore, be more useful to consider Markson’s work in terms of Edward Said’s notion of 
‘late style’. As Said writes, drawing from Adorno, ‘[b]oth in art and in our general ideas 
about the passage of human life there is assumed to be a general abiding timeliness.’42 In 
contrast, the ‘late’ artist is characterised by a sense of ‘untimeliness’; they are exiled from 
the time of their youth and from the contemporary moment in which they find themselves 
living. This is not to say that Markson’s work is ahistorical, or somehow ‘transcends’ history 
– far from it. To quote Said once more, ‘[l]ateness is being at the end, fully conscious, full 
of memory, and also very (even preternaturally) aware of the present’.43 The quotation of 
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Adorno’s which Said uses to illustrate the subjectivity of the late artist and the formal 
qualities of late style describes Markson’s late work precisely:  
This law is revealed precisely in the thought of death […] Death is imposed only on 
created beings, not on works of art, and thus it has appeared in art only in a refracted 
mode, as allegory […] The power of subjectivity in the late works of art is the irascible 
gesture with which it takes leave of the works themselves. It breaks their bonds, not in 
order to express itself, but in order, expressionless, to cast off the appearance of art. Of 
the works themselves it leaves only fragments behind, and communicates itself, like a 
cipher, only through the blank spaces from which it has disengaged itself. Touched by 
death, the hand of the master sets free the masses of material that he used to form; its 
tears and fissures, witnesses to the finite powerlessness of the I confronted with Being, 
are its final work.44 
Adorno is referring to Beethoven’s very late sonatas and quartets, known for their 
discontinuous structure, and which are filled with interruptions and abrupt silences. 
Markson’s late work is self-consciously ‘discontinuous’ and ‘non-linear’, ‘an assemblage’ 
of ‘masses of material’ (pace Adorno). Although each fragment reprises certain themes – 
the dominant one is death, others are the creation, destruction, and recovery of works, as 
well as poverty, illness, and everyday details – the way they interrelate on the page is not 
immediately discernible. Such themes blur into one another and disappear as quickly as they 
coalesce. Although the novels are relatively short, never exceeding 200 pages, the vast 
quantity and alternating arrangement of fragmentary sentences impedes any clean 
demarcations between such themes. The fragments are not held together by a progressive 
narrative or given any exposition – in other words, their appearance is uncontextualised. 
Instead, Markson’s fragments are held together by the white blanks between each sentence; 
they act as negative spaces which nevertheless link each discrete sentence to their potential 
connections [Fig. 1].  
Adorno characterises Beethoven’s late work in terms of fragmentation: there are 
‘sudden discontinuities’, ‘moments of breaking away’, the work takes leave of itself – it ‘is 
silent at the instant it is left behind’; it is composed of ‘tears and fissures’; musical 
conventions are ‘splintered off’ from the compositional themes, which are ‘fallen away and 
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abandoned’.45 In the background, Said writes, is the ‘decay of the body’, ‘a sense of 
abandonment’, ‘a lamenting personality’ that ‘seems to inhabit the late works’.46 In the 
discourse of late style, bodily decline and mortality are linked to the ‘decay’ of structural 
coherence; the abrupt quietude of death inflects the sudden abandonment of theme and 
convention. There is distinctly melancholy tenor to late style, coupled with an ‘irascibility’ 
which does not withdraw from creation but defiantly produces work, rips up convention, 
tears up serene harmonies and linear narratives. This form of melancholy is a radical refusal 
to mourn – to paraphrase Eric Santner, it ‘says no!’ to a graceful departure from creative life 
or the repetition of old, faithful tricks.47 As Said writes, the melancholy of late style is ‘a sort 
of deliberately unproductive productiveness going against…’48 The sense of isolation and 
abandonment inherent in the lines, ‘Nobody comes. Nobody calls’, is a chiastic reflection of 
Markson’s ‘abandonment’ of narrative structure and his ‘isolation’ of ephemera, obscure 
anecdotes, and cultural scraps.  
To summarise, late style is an aesthetic response to the proximity of death; Markson’s 
literary response reflects, stylistically and formally, a view of death as the experience of a 
sudden discontinuity, a breaking-off from life through the use of fragmentation, disjunctive 
syntax, and textual pauses. From Reader’s Block onward, Markson’s novels signal the 
author’s late style; furthermore, the diegetic subjectivity of his narrators is marked by an 
overriding sense of lateness. But by the same turn, late style marks a stage of continued 
creative life in which a new style is born, a reappraisal and rearrangement of the body of 
work that lies behind it and with which it decisively breaks. But when Markson splits his 
sentences, he does not merely create a syntax that is mimetic of death; more importantly, the 
brokenness of these sentences opens them up to new ways of meaning which stress what 
comes after rather than what arrives ‘too late’. It is at this point that Adorno’s emphasis on 
lateness becomes adjacent to Benjamin’s concept of Nachleben (afterlife) as adumbrated in 
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the translation essay, whereby the translation enacts a ‘breaking away’ from the original text 
whereby the original to takes on an altered but renewed form of life.49 
 
 
Figure 1. Page 32, The Last Novel. 
Late style is an ‘afterlife’ within a life. While the these (late) novels indicate Markson’s late 
style in Adornian terms, helping us to reconcile the vexed matter of periodising him, the 
content and presentation of these novels pertain to what Benjamin calls ‘the afterlife of 
works’.50  
                                                     
49 See Rodolphe Gasché, ‘Saturnine Vision and the Question of Difference: Reflections on Walter 
Benjamin’s Theory of Language’, Studies in 20th Century Literature, 11.1 (September 1986), pp. 69-90. 
Gasché’s reading of Benjamin’s early language writings leads him to suggest that human language is the 
‘afterlife’ of the paradisiacal ‘pure language’. See SW 1, pp. 62-74.  
50 AP, [N2,3], p. 461. My emphasis.  Adorno’s essay ‘Valéry Proust Museum’ mentions ‘the afterlife of 
works’ exactly three times without mentioning his colleague Benjamin. See ‘Valéry Proust Museum’ in 




1.3 Afterlife (I): History, Time, Textuality 
The mutuality of Benjamin’s philosophical writings and Markson’s late novels comes 
together in a fragment from ‘Konvolut N’ of The Arcades Project: ‘Historical 
“understanding” is to be grasped, in principle, as an afterlife of that which is understood; and 
what has been recognized in the analysis of the “afterlife of works,” in the analysis of “fame,” 
is therefore to be considered the foundation of history.’51 Benjamin’s privileging of the 
‘afterlife’ is radical and strategic: it opposes the methodology of the late nineteenth-century 
historian Leopold von Ranke, for whom history is the objective science which ‘merely [tells] 
how it really was’.52 Ranke’s historicism refused to ‘judge the past and to instruct the 
contemporary world as to the future’ – in other words, history was an empirical science, not 
moral philosophy.53 Benjamin’s last major essay, ‘On the Concept of History’ (1940), is a 
pointed critique of Ranke’s historicism, asserting that ‘[a]rticulating the past historically 
does not mean recognising it “the way it really was.”’54 Ranke’s method was distinguished 
by its emphasis on original sources such as archival documents, bureaucratic records, and 
government reports rather than chronicles and contemporary histories – an approach that 
unmistakably retains its value and remains the basis of present-day historiographical 
practice.  
Yet Benjamin recognised what Ranke overlooked: that even documentary evidence 
can be biased (or indeed falsified) and that official data is ideologically determined and 
selected. This is what Benjamin attacks when he writes, famously, that ‘there is no document 
of civilisation which is not at the same time a document of barbarism’.55 Unlike Ranke, 
Benjamin regards history as subject to an ethical imperative whereby ‘history is not simply 
a science but not least a form of remembrance.’ Indeed, ‘what science has determined’ as 
the victors and losers, ‘remembrance can modify.’56 It does this by ‘constantly calling into 
question every victory, past and present, of the rulers.’57 Thus, while historicism’s model of 
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temporality is a monodirectional one which privileges ‘what really happened’ (as if such a 
determination were possible) without regarding its relevance to the past or to the future, 
Benjamin’s concept of history views past, present, and future as engaged in a complex and 
mutually transformative relationship. The complexity of this temporality derives from its 
explicitly non-synchronic character. Benjamin’s concept of history is centred on writing and 
textuality. This is clear in ‘On the Concept of History’ when he writes that ‘the past carries 
with it a secret index by which it is referred to redemption’; and ‘only for a redeemed 
mankind has its past become citable in all its moments’; this can be seen, too, in the earlier 
quotation about ‘documents’ of civilisation and barbarism.58 The language of textuality is 
no doubt in large part due to the influence of Jewish theology and mysticism, similarly 
organised around books and exegetical scrutiny. Even if the role of the theological in his 
work were minimized, as critics such as Irving Wohlfarth wish it to be, it is clear that 
Benjamin locates his philosophy in textual terms even when he writes about the dialectical 
image:59 
What distinguishes images from the ‘essences’ of phenomenology is their historical 
index. […] the historical index of images not only says that they belong to a particular 
time; it says, above all, that they attain legibility only at a particular time. And, indeed, 
this acceding ‘to legibility’ constitutes a specific critical point in the movement at their 
interior. Every present day is determined by the images that are synchronic with it: 
each ‘now’ is the now of a particular recognizability. In it, truth is charged to the 
bursting point with time. (This point of explosion and nothing else, is the death of the 
intentio, which thus coincides with the birth of authentic historical time, the time of 
truth.) It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present 
casts its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes 
together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words: image is 
dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past is purely 
temporal, the relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: not temporal in nature 
but figural [bildlich]. Only dialectical images are genuinely historical – that is, not 
archaic – images. The image that is read – which is to say, the image in the now of its 
                                                     
58 Ibid.  
59 Wohlfarth writes: ‘the task facing today’s students of Benjamin is to find ways through his work; to renew 
his efforts to “blot out” the theology in which it was steeped.’ Irving Wohlfarth, ‘The Measure of the 
Possible, the Weight of the Real and the Heat of the Moment: Benjamin’s Actuality Today’, New 




recognisability – bears to the highest degree the imprint of the perilous critical 
moment on which all reading is founded.60 
Several strands of thought are put into motion in this dense and complicated passage. First, 
Benjamin insists here on opposing temporality to the dialectical, and for good reason: by 
discarding the terms ‘past’ and ‘present’, he can evade the terms of Rankean historicism and 
assert the image as something which, as the arrest of time, operates outside of time and 
belongs to another category altogether: the dialectical. This does not mean that time is 
altogether abolished from Benjamin’s account of history.61 (For Benjamin, the task of 
constructing a new form of anti-historicist history necessitated a redefinition of time itself.) 
Rather, he adjusts the terms with which history is conceived and discussed: not the ‘past’, 
but the ‘what has been’; not the ‘present’ but the ‘now’.62 The collision of these terms brings 
about a ‘particular’ temporality in which two events are brought into relation: the ‘what has 
been’ belonging to the ‘particular time’ (its origin) and the ‘particular time’ (in the future, at 
some other moment) the past attains its legibility. The temporality that results from this 
coincidence is what Benjamin calls ‘the Now of a particular recognisability’. These images 
are ‘charged to the bursting point with time’ because the encounter between what we know 
of as the past (what has been) and the present (now) constitutes a rupture of the linear 
continuum that conditions such terms, filling the vacant space of ‘empty, homogeneous time’ 
with a plenitude of multi-temporal moments.63 
 This brings me to my second point. In the remarks quoted above Benjamin is 
developing his own constellation of two strands of thought which come together (‘in a flash’) 
in his use textual rhetoric throughout: legibility, indexicality, reading. The first strand of 
thought is the interrelation of temporalities (which he nonetheless distinguishes from the 
concept of the temporal which he associates with Heidegger’s phenomenology) – I have 
already outlined some of these subtleties, but it is worth probing them a bit more. Benjamin 
‘explodes’ the linear continuum of historicist time in order to liberate history from the 
positivist yoke of universal history where each catastrophe is deemed to occur in the service 
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of progress. Events are no longer linked in a determinate chain that subsumes the particular 
to the general, rather, they are allowed the possibility of being recognised as ‘small 
individual moment[s]’ recognised as having once been ‘nows’, and through their recognition 
in the present, are restored once again to the realm of ‘the now’. These discrete fragments of 
time, credited with a history of their own, are no longer linked in a causal chain; instead, 
they carry the potential to form constellations.  
 Taken generally, constellations are groups of relatively proximate stars which are 
then ‘read’ as forming recognisable shapes or patterns. Constellations are not permanent – 
they depend on the viewer’s position in the hemisphere, belief systems and culture: while 
some rise in popularity, others fade into obscurity. Finally, the pattern of a constellation is 
not fixed, but shifts or even disappears with the passing of millennia. In essays written 
between 1929 and 1933, before the constellation’s development as a dialectical concept, 
Benjamin remarks that divinatory practices – astrology, haruspicy, augury – were preliterate 
practices of reading quite literally avant la lettre: ‘The schoolboy reads his ABC book, and 
the astrologer reads the future in the stars. […] [T]he astrologer reads the constellation from 
the stars in the sky; simultaneously, he reads the future or fate from it.’64 The constellation 
is thus both the condition of writing and the possibility of reading that is tied to a ‘critical 
moment’ in time (in astrology, this is the moment of birth); this provides the basis for the 
reading of writing ‘in which similarities flash up fleeting out of the stream of things only to 
sink down once more’. Here, ‘similarities’ inheres the meaningful combination of words, the 
relation of subject, predicate, noun, verb, etc that flash into the reader’s perception ‘out of 
the stream’ or sentence, ‘only to sink down once more’ with the approach of the following 
sentence. Each moment of reading, ‘if it is not to forsake understanding altogether […] is 
subject to a […] critical moment, which the reader must not forget at any cost lest he go 
away empty-handed.’65  
 The time of reading is fleeting and transitory, constituted by a succession of moments 
where the eye meets each unit of text; each of these moments presents the reader with a 
‘critical moment’ offering the possibility of ‘understanding’ which the reader must seize and 
remember for that possibility to be grasped. The somewhat tautological task of the reader is 
‘to read’ – not passively but actively and authentically, much as Benjamin’s historian is 
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charged with recognising authentic time. The reader and the historical materialist are thus 
confronted with the same task: the arrest of the ‘critical moment’ and its remembrance. The 
succession of moments which unremittingly flit by can’t be altered – we can’t reverse the 
clock, and ‘the slain are really slain’ – but the critical moment that arrests and interrupts this 
succession, transforms history from a progressive narrative into something more like a 
montage.66 This moment of arrest, writes Carlo Salzani, ‘is what allows history to become 
legible, to become a text’ capable of being read.67 Benjamin’s authentic historical time is 
also literary time.  
Markson’s novels offer a concrete instantiation of Benjamin’s concept of afterlife and 
its discontinuous temporality. Indeed, Markson’s narrators have no proper names, each 
instead bearing an allegorical title that is in some way related to the act of reading: in 
Reader’s Block, he is explicitly called ‘Reader’; in This is Not a Novel, ‘Writer’; in Vanishing 
Point, ‘Author’; and in The Last Novel, ‘Novelist’. Benjamin’s materialist historian is, above 
all, a reader; and if history is to be ‘read’ like a text, then the novel offers an opportunity to 
explore the limits of its legibility. I read Markson’s approach to the novel as running parallel 
to Benjamin’s approach to history: Markson ‘reads’ – and writes – the novel ‘against the 
grain’, brushing up against the traditional linearity of the literary narrative. The physical 
form of the book necessitates that we read it ‘in order’, flipping the numbered pages from 
beginning to end (though there is of course nothing stopping the reader from reading back 
to front or picking a page at random). This ordering of the book, which mimics the ordering 
of traditional narratives (beginning, middle, end), pressures us to read progressively, 
encountering each event ‘like the beads of a rosary.’68 It reproduces the kind of historicist 
time that Benjamin rejects. Despite its physical form, Markson’s book actively resists this 
temporality of reading, for there is no narrative progression to speak of; the numbered pages 
do not tell us where we are or where we are going. The constellations the reader draws from 
Markson’s fragments arrests this linear flow.  
Likewise, and most importantly to Benjamin’s concept of history, we only understand 
or cognise what has been read after we have read a text. This does not minimise the moment 
of actuality that occurs during reading; as is well known, Benjamin often speaks in terms of 
immediacy – instants, moments, flashes – recognition happens ‘now’, in a ‘flash’, but this 
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moment must be held in memory if it is to be politically and ethically productive, and it can 
occur only after the act of reading. Of course, this can be said to apply to every text that is 
read, but Markson’s work incorporates the temporality of reading into the very form of his 
work, translating the experience of reading (or, as Benjamin might say, ‘the read’) back into 
the structure of text itself. Markson’s narrators, who were conceived when the author was in 
his late 70s, are all portrayed – semi-autobiographically – as aging authors. The inherent 
belatedness of reading is therefore intensely dramatised. It reminds us that every novel is, in 
a sense, ‘posthumous’ of its own creation, engendering a spectral relationship between 
author (disembodied to the reader) and reader (absent and speculative to the writing writer). 
The act of writing gestures somewhere beyond the writer, just as the text that is read comes 
from someone and somewhere other than the reader. Markson does not ever portray his 
narrators in the act of reading; instead, they are constantly engaged in the act of 
remembrance, their memories and recollections of reading narrated as they ‘flash up’ in the 
minds of these protagonists.  
1.4 Afterlife (II): Fame 
In Benjamin’s terms, Markson’s fragments would be the ‘images’ whose ‘index’ belongs to 
the past, but which ‘attain legibility only at a particular time’ on a particular page, just as 
translation ‘comes later than the original.’69 Historical understanding by its very nature 
cannot be simultaneous with the occurrence of its object; it can only be arrived at ‘after’ the 
fact. ‘What has been’ indicates an action that ‘will have been’ completed at a ‘particular 
point’ in the future (this is its ‘messianic’ structure by which it is ‘referred to redemption’). 
Peter Szondi correctly notes that ‘what has been’ is ‘not the perfect [tense], but the future 
perfect in the fullness of its paradox: being future and past at the same time.’70 It is a 
temporality which recognises that time is incomplete: it is ‘in particular’ - ‘in parts’. Where 
this temporality unfolds, I want to suggest, is in the literary text ‘in particular’.  
The content of Markson’s novels often place particular focus on the everyday life of 
authors, artists, athletes, poets, painters, musicians, scientists, and philosophers: ‘Euripides’ 
mother was a fruit seller’; ‘Paracelsus may have died after a brawl in a tavern’; ‘Francois 
Villon’s heatless garret near the Sorbonne – where his inkwell froze solid’; ‘George Sand 
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did virtually all of her writing between midnight and six AM - and then slept until three in 
the afternoon.’71 In collecting these facts, Markson reminds the reader that these figures, 
now firmly established in the canonical firmament, are not ‘characters’, but were indeed 
once living, breathing, sometimes freezing, human beings who occupied the material plane 
of their now-historical worlds.  He reasserts the ‘life’ of these lives not only by allowing 
them to ‘live on’ in his own work, but by tracing the history – the afterlife - of their works. 
At first glance, it would seem that in humanising his subjects, Markson is merely glorifying 
the famous denizens of Western literature, many of whom are in regular rotation on 
syllabuses in English departments the world over.  However, a more scrupulous reading 
quickly disabuses us of this notion and reveals Markson’s scathing critique of the formation 
of such a canon.  In a review of Reader’s Block, Steven Moore asserts that the ‘common 
theme’ of Markson’s late novels is Schopenhauer’s Parerga and Paralipomena (1851), 
where the philosopher writes: 
I wish someone would one day attempt a tragic history of literature, showing how the 
various nations which now take their highest pride in the great writers and artists they 
can show treated them while they were alive. In such a history, the author would bring 
visibly before us that endless struggle which the good and genuine of all ages and all 
lands has to endure against the always dominant bad and wrong-headed; depict the 
martyrdom of almost every genuine enlightener of mankind, almost every great master 
of every art; show us how, with a few exceptions, they lived tormented lives in poverty 
and wretchedness, without recognition, without sympathy, without disciples, while 
fame, honour and riches went to the unworthy […]72 
Although it would be easy to dismiss this as the shrill complaint of an overlooked ego, what 
Moore touches on vis-à-vis Schopenhauer, and which Markson’s novels emphasise with 
great pathos, is that the ‘fame’ and ‘honour’ either apportioned or withheld by critics to 
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artists has very real, very material consequences. The illusion of meritocracy is perhaps no 
greater than in the realm of art and literature, and Markson is interested in reminding us that 
artists who experienced critical derision and financial precarity (if not grinding poverty) are 
later valorised as uncontested geniuses. For instance, readers of Markson’s novels will learn 
that Florentines cried, ‘What beautiful marble you have ruined’ when Donatello presented 
his fountain of Neptune in the Piazza della Signoria; that ‘[t]hroughout much of her life, 
Marina Tsvetayeva was forced to endure practically a beggar’s existence’; that Richard 
Lovelace ‘sometime[s] scavenged for garbage to subsist. And [died] of consumption in a 
cellar’; that Etienne Joseph Théophile Thoré ‘resurrected Vermeer after two full centuries of 
disregard.’73  
The observation that artists and writers rarely receive their just rewards is not unique 
to Schopenhauer or Markson; his late novels are full of other voices that acknowledge such 
a state of affairs: 
Minor authors – who lived, men know not how, and died obscure, men marked not 
when. 
Roger Ashton takes notice of.  
Those rare intellects who, not only without reward, but in miserable poverty, brought 
forth their works. 
Vasari likewise commemorates.  
[…] 
My time will come. 
Said Gregor Mendell, ignored throughout his life.74 
Rather than write a hitherto unwritten ‘tragic history of literature’, Markson is signalling that 
all cultural history, even history as such, is tragic. Tragedy, by definition, is rooted in belated 
recognition. What is important, and what rescues such a position from nihilism and brings it 
within the remit of Benjamin’s messianic account of history, is that recognition is possible. 
What underlies Moore’s observation vis-à-vis Schopenhauer is the dialectic of fame and 
obscurity; both terms are conditioned by the act of recognition. One mode of recognition is 
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cultural acknowledgment: whether a ‘nation […] takes their highest pride in the great writers 
and artist’. This form of the recognition of a work is measured by its circulation and, it cannot 
be ignored, by its commercial value. Additionally, for a work to be ‘famous’, it must be read, 
written about – be spoken of. This, I believe, is what Benjamin is referring to when he 
appends ‘the analysis of fame’ to his definition of historical understanding. Markson 
articulates the movement from recognition to obscurity (and back again) many times over, 
but there are two fragments from This Is Not a Novel which resonate most with the conditions 
of I have just described. On page 29, Markson writes: ‘For as long as a millennium, until 
well into the Middle Ages, Menander was the most widely quoted author in Western 
literature outside Homer.’ Menander’s fame is measured by the rate at which his work is 
quoted in other works. This sentence is followed by several other apparently unrelated and 
random sentences until page 40, where Markson adds: ‘Except for fragments quoted by 
others, everything of Menander’s disappeared utterly in the Dark Ages. A first complete play 
was not discovered until excavations in Egypt during Reader’s own lifetime’.  
 These two quotations (about quotation) contain the keywords to Markson’s late 
work: fragment, quotation, disappearance, excavation. It is toward the two former terms, 
fragment and quotation, that I wish to draw attention next. Quotation allows further iterations 
of a work to exist even if the original of the work ‘disappear[s] utterly’; this disappearance 
refers to the loss of the work’s material presence which is reanimated through quotation. 
What quotation allows for is the circulation of the traces of a lost work, in other words, the 
work’s survival. Although Markson’s works are morbid in the extreme, obsessively 
recounting suicides and other deaths, his last four novels are orientated toward survival 
rather than extinction. My claim does not exclude the importance death plays in his work; 
indeed, death provides the ‘matter’ of his novels. Insofar as death is cited in Markson’s texts, 
it is linked to remembrance, and thus to the fragmented survival of the works and the artist’s 
signature therein. Such remembrance is actualised through the moment of reading.  
1.5 Afterlife (III): Of Works 
As a form of remembrance and thus survival, is quotation, then, really a matter of life and 
death? Schopenhauer’s remarks on fame (which Moore quotes in relation to Markson) 
suggest so: he is concerned with the posthumous recognition of artists who were denied 
popular recognition (and the requisite material comforts) ‘while they were alive’.75 What’s 
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more, Schopenhauer describes having died in obscurity as ‘martyrdom’, using terms like 
‘torment’, ‘wretchedness’ and ‘poverty’. Such language resonates with Markson’s work, 
which relates fragments of the impoverished, ‘tormented’ lives of artists.76 Benjamin 
elaborates the constellation of life, history, and afterlife in a passage from his essay on 
translation: 
A translation issues from the original – not so much from its life as from its afterlife. For 
a translation comes later than the original, and since the important works of world 
literature never find their chosen translators at the time of their origins, their translation 
marks their stage of continued life. The idea of life and afterlife in works of art should 
be regarded with an entirely unmetaphorical objectivity.77 
Viewed from the perspective of Markson’s novels, we might also add that just as ‘works of 
world literature never find their chosen translators at the time of their origin’, neither do they 
find their readers. Moreover, as Steven Rendall remarks, it is possible to ‘define translation 
as quotation in another language’: since a translation is the iteration of a text in another, 
foreign, language, it fulfils a similar function to quotation, which likewise (and often 
violently) transports the words of others into a new text.78 Because there is an intervening 
period, sometimes of centuries, between the origin of a work and its translation, translation 
thus ‘marks their stage of continued life.’ However, this ‘continued’ form of life or afterlife 
does not mean the original is perfectly preserved – indeed, as Benjamin writes later in this 
essay, ‘it is not the highest praise of a translation […] to say that it reads as if it had originally 
been written in that language’.79 Rather, ‘in its after life – which could not be called that if 
it were not a transformation and a renewal of something living – the original undergoes a 
change’.80 Thus, afterlife pertains not to the eternal or to immortality, but to mutability; to a 
form of survival that acknowledges and is predicated by a certain measure of destruction and 
even loss.  
If the afterlife of works, its modalities of quotation and translation, and its fragmentary 
structure pivot on both a spectral notion of death implicit in the ‘after’ (Nach-) and life (-
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leben), what does Benjamin mean when he insists that it be ‘regarded with an entirely 
unmetaphorical objectivity’? Such a position requires no less than a radical and expansive 
definition of life that is not based on nature, but on history:  
Even in times of narrowly prejudiced thought there was an inkling that life was not 
limited to organic corporality. But it cannot be a matter of extending its dominion 
under the feeble sceptre of the soul, as Fechner tried to do, or, conversely, of basing 
its definition on even less conclusive factors of animality, such as sensation, which 
characterises life only occasionally. The concept of life is given its due only if 
everything that has a history of its own, and is not merely the setting for history, is 
credited with life. In the final analysis, the range of life must be determined by the 
standpoint of history rather than that of nature, least of all by such tenuous factors as 
sensation and soul. The philosopher’s task consists in comprehending all of natural life 
through the more encompassing life of history.81 
 
To reduce to life to ‘mere corporeality’ is to define life as ‘mere’ or ‘bare’ life pace Agamben 
– clearly, this is not an ethical way to identify life. Life is therefore not ascribed to everything 
that technically has a pulse, but to everything that has a history. In turn, for life to be ‘given 
its due’, which is to say, for life to be ‘redeemed’, one must also extend history to that which 
has a life. As Andrew Benjamin writes, ‘[h]aving a history includes plants and animals – 
perhaps even rocks – even though the way history figures in relation to such entities remains 
an important if unresolved project. […] If the lives of animals can be reconsidered as 
historical, then the question of what counts as history will have to be rethought.’82 What 
Benjamin calls for in the translation essay is not just a radical definition of life, but of a 
definition of history that respects life.  
  
From the standpoint of history, life would not be determined by corporeality or 
sensation, but by ‘the expression of its nature, in the presentation of its significance’ – even 
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the mute expressiveness of plants, animals, and rocks.83 Works of art, as expressions of the 
nature of life, may be regarded as having not only an afterlife, but as the ‘afterlife of life’. 
Therefore, Benjamin writes: 
   
And indeed, isn’t the afterlife of works of art far more easy to recognise than that of 
living creatures? The history of the great works of art tells us about their descent from 
prior models, their realisation in the age of the artist, and what in principle should be 
their eternal afterlife in succeeding generations. Where this last manifests itself, it is 
called fame. Translations that are more than transmissions of subject matter come into 
being when a work, in the course of its survival, has reached the age of its fame. 
Contrary, therefore, to the claims of bad translators, such translations do not so much 
serve the works as owe their existence to it. In them the life of the original attains its 
latest, continually renewed, and most complete unfolding.  
   
What at first appears to be a troubling assertion of ‘works’ above ‘living creatures’ becomes 
more generous and comprehensible once it is viewed considering the above remarks on 
Benjamin’s notions of life and afterlife. The ‘afterlife of works’ provides a ‘continually 
renewed’ index to the ‘models’ from which they descend, their original ‘realisation’, and 
their historical potentiality in ‘succeeding generations’ – this last point means that the 
afterlife is also an index to its future (after)life, an index that gestures toward a potential, 
unseen, but appointed afterlife. It would, however, be mistaken to suggest that ‘the afterlife 
of works’ is fixed and secure, even if Benjamin uses the word ‘eternal’ to describe a work’s 
afterlife in ‘succeeding generations’. If works were immortal, they would not have an 
afterlife: where this assertion manifests itself, to borrow Benjamin’s rhetoric, is in his 
invocation of fame, as Markson’s late works make acutely clear. Even the material survival 
of the works themselves, like the continued remembrance of artists and their work, is 
precarious and highly contingent: 
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Throughout the Middle Ages, often no more than a single manuscript of certain 
classics existed. One leaking monastery roof and the Satyricon could have been lost 
forever, for instance.84  
380 A.D. Saint Gregory of Nazianzus, Bishop of Constantinople - ordered Sappho’s 
poems to be burned. 
1073 A.D. Pope Gregory VII - ordered Sappho’s poems to be burned.85  
Any number of literary works were flung into Savonarola’s conflagrations with the 
rest. With print still in its essential infancy, how many irreplaceable single copies of 
Greek and Latin manuscripts were lost?86 
Markson’s narrator asks, ‘how many irreplaceable single copies […] were lost?’ The other 
excerpts I have quoted above emphasise the fact of having survived multiple attempts at 
destruction, not only by clerics but by the vicissitudes of nature. That the Satyricon or any 
other manuscript was one ‘leaking monastery roof’ away from oblivion is no less than a 
miracle that Markson enters into his own manuscript with an implied sense of wonder. The 
hole in the papyrus, the leak in the roof, the gaps between Markson’s own fragments, are 
entrances of the messianic that recall the ‘small gateway in time through which the Messiah 
might enter’.87 Andrew Benjamin explains that ‘this line [of Benjamin’s] locates […] the 
possibility that holds at every moment for what is to be other than it is.’88 This insight further 
elaborates what has been uncovered in an earlier section about afterlife, wherein such an 
afterlife is not immortal, but transient and ephemeral. The object of afterlife is subject to 
destruction, yes, but within and beside it lies the potentiality of rescue and redemption: 
‘Apelles’ long-lost Birth of Venus, painted 1,800 years before Botticelli’s – and said to have 
been a likeness of Phryne, the most beautiful of them all.’89 
   
Thus, we learn that one of the most famous images in Western art history is an 
iteration of a lost painting that neither Botticelli nor anyone else since antiquity has ever 
seen. Markson’s terse fragment on the births of Venus contains a perfect expression of 
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afterlife as it is manifested in visual art.90 Apelles, one of the few ancient Greek painters 
known by name, enjoyed the patronage of Alexander the Great – none of his artworks 
survive. It is only through Pliny the Elder’s references to Apelles and Lucian’s ekphrasis 
(which we might consider a poetic quotation or translation of the original work) of an 
allegorical depiction of Calumny that any information about the artist’s life and works exist. 
Having read both Pliny and Lucian, Botticelli ‘aspired to’ a similar position as Alexander’s 
‘sole court painter’, and his celebrated – and very much extant – Birth of Venus is an 
‘[attempt] to reconstruct’ Apelles’s famous work.91 Despite being wholly, materially lost, 
Apelles’s work endures, first in the ancient fragments that describe it; then, through the 
rediscovery of these works in the Renaissance, the work survives by becoming something 
else in the entirely new but eminently citational work of Botticelli: the original reaches its 
‘continued stage of life’. Although Botticelli based his Venus on textual sources, the absence 
of Apelles’s original suggests that it be viewed as a visual response to Benjamin’s 
exhortation to ‘read what was never written’, or rather, ‘see what was never seen’.92 The 
three forms of afterlife I have outlined in the section above culminate in a dialectic of the 
fragment, whereby points of absence and presence, as well as loss and recovery, in which 
destruction provides the conditions for survival.  
1.6 Dialectic of the Fragment 
As Benjamin asserts, the afterlife of a work does not owe its existence to the original; rather, 
the original owes its existence to the afterlife. This means that the temporality of the afterlife 
is not a continuous one, but is marked by gaps, interventions, interruptions, and resurgences 
in which the renewed life carries traces of the original, but importantly, is radically non-
identical to the original. Benjamin emphasises the fundamental alterity of the afterlife when 
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he remarks that ‘the translation [aims] at that single spot where the echo is able to give, in 
its own language, the reverberation of the work in the alien one’.93 This alterity can be seen 
in the way a quotation takes on startlingly ‘other’ meanings than the ones inhered by the 
author of the original text; or the way the words in ancient fragments cross over the gaps left 
by missing text and bond to form new, poetic configurations. 
 While the blank spaces between Markson’s lines indicate the absence of any 
exposition that might link them, the reader scans these lines as if they had always appeared 
in this order, both intuiting and eliding this absence. Fragments give us no choice but to ‘read 
what was never written’ in ‘the afterlife of works’.94 Markson’s narrators are fascinated with 
lost works, unearthed masterpieces, and physical fragments, including Sappho’s poetry, of 
which, one narrator exclaims, ‘fewer than seven hundred lines remain out of probably twelve 
thousand.’95 Halfway through Reader’s Block, Markson writes: ‘Now and again, a fragment, 
still, flitting through Protagonist’s consciousness?’96 More than any other, this sentence 
underwrites the substance of Markson’s late project. The phrase ‘now and again’ signals the 
structure of the novels, which introduce anecdotes, unattributed quotations, decontextualized 
lines from poems or novels whose significance is only revealed in the duration of the 
narrative – ‘now’ and then ‘again’. For instance, Markson reproduces the following: ‘Severn 
lift me up, I am dying. Don’t breathe on me, it comes like ice.’ – without informing the 
reader that these were Keats’s last words.97 One page later, Markson includes a single 
address, without context: ‘26 Piazza di Spagna’, which happens to be the location of the 
Keats-Shelley Memorial House. The attentive reader may feel they are onto something, but 
this thread soon vanishes. On the same page, a fragment mentions ‘[a] copy of the Iliad that 
[Alexander the Great] carried in a jewelled chest contain[ing] emendation in Aristotle’s 
handwriting’.98 
 Not only do these two fragments appear unrelated, they are separated by other 
fragments – about Laurence Sterne’s corpse, a quote by Xenophanes about oxen, an 
unattributed Latin quotation (‘Tolle lege, tolle lege’, or ‘take up and read’ –  St. Augustine), 
and others. Several pages later, another fragment appears: ‘Biographers who conclude at the 
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death of their subjects and do not at least briefly address their survivors’, followed 
immediately by: ‘Joseph Severn, who would remain in Rome throughout most of the next 
six decades. Eventually serving as British Consul.’99 Nearly a hundred pages later, another 
fragment appears: ‘The books Shelley had with him when he drowned were a Keats and a 
Sophocles’.100 A few pages further, and an interpolation by the narrator laments, ‘Nothing 
now, but my books’, a refrain that will accrue significance as the novel progresses.101 Toward 
the end of the novel, the narrator seems to gather all of the above fragments – last words, 
last books, knowledge of survivors – when he mournfully asks: ‘Why does it sadden Reader 
to realize he will almost certainly never know what books will turn out to be the last he ever 
read? What piece of music, the last he ever heard?’102 Neither of these questions can be 
objects of experience or self-knowledge; finality, the ultimate end of things – life itself or 
indeed the end of history – is not something that can be known from the standpoint of history, 
whose remit is only what has come before and of which we constitute the ‘after’.  
Amid the lines I have just drawn between these particular fragments, which at first 
appear to be non-sequiturs but grow into meaning through a kind of non-identical repetition, 
are hundreds of other disjointed, contracted narratives. Thus, not only do they take the form 
of terse, ascetic fragments, but their narrative development is also scattered, occurring within 
a fragmented temporality of reading. ‘Now and again […] still’ perfectly describes this 
intermittent temporality, emphasising both motion and stasis. Markson deploys the fragment 
on several levels: the books themselves are composed wholly of fragments, short sentences 
that never exceed more than four or five lines; and while these fragment-sentences could 
have been arranged in a linear order, each line supplementing and clarifying the other, the 
narrative is itself fragmented – each sentence interrupts the miniature narrative of the one 
that follows it. Furthermore, Markson portrays the fragmentation of the aging narrator’s 
mind, in which memories leak into the text and jostle one another; further still, he refers to 
the fragmentation of the body, alluding to the narrator’s hospitalisations, physical pain, even 
his threadbare shirts and ragged jeans. In addition to this, the subject of many of these 
fragments is the physical fragment, such as the ‘Nike of Samothrace, in the Louvre, which 
was excavated in 1863 – in more than one hundred fragments’.103 Clearly, the degrees of 
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fragmentation are themselves dizzyingly fragmented; and although I have referred to the 
fragment as a form of afterlife throughout this chapter, it is necessary to provide a more 
detailed account of the fragment as such in order to unpack the many modalities it takes in 
Markson’s texts: the literary fragment, which we may consider to be Markson’s gnomic 
sentences; the physical fragment, to which he often refers; and the active fragmentation of 
form. 
The ‘philological acceptation’ of the fragment that Jean-Luc Nancy and Phillipe 
Lacoue-Labarthe note in The Literary Absolute, recalls ‘the crucial link between the ancient 
model and the fragmentary state of many of the texts of Antiquity’.104 Although these 
fragments mark a form of survival, the fragment and the concept of fragmentation are rarely 
figured in the restitutive terms with which I have characterised ‘the afterlife of works’. 
Fragments are associated with natural disaster, political catastrophe, general abandonment 
and decay. Fragments signify loss and decline; they are lacking the whole to which they 
mutely refer, and their original context can neither be placed nor replaced. In this sense, there 
is a melancholy texture to fragments: they ‘miss’ the words they were once attached to and 
as such are inherently mournful objects, placing Markson’s work in range of baroque tropes 
of death. The British and German Romantics responded to the ancient fragment by 
completely reinventing it, turning its conceptual premise on its head. Instead of a point 
severed from a vanished whole, the Romantic literary fragment would be an autonomous 
and ‘isolated’ work of art, not materially and metaphysically incomplete but fundamentally 
whole. Commenting on Schlegel's dictum that ‘the fragment, like a miniature work of art, 
has to be entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be complete in itself like a 
hedgehog,’ Charles Rosen writes that the hedgehog/Romantic fragment ‘projects into the 
universe precisely by the way it cuts itself off.’105 Dalia Nassar reminds us that ‘[w]hile the 
ancient fragment is bequeathed to us as such, a modern fragment is […] intentionally open-
ended and resists final meaning or closure.’106 Markson’s fragments are situated somewhere 
in between the ancient or philological fragment and the literary fragment. 
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Conceptually, the fragment is thus the locus of tension between the indestructible 
afterlife of works, multiplied each time it is divided, and the political violence that underlies 
fame and artistic canonization (remember Schopenhauer’s martyrs). Following Benjamin, 
historical understanding requires us to recognise, which is to say, read, both states of this 
tension. The fragment signifies the ultimate survival and living-after of a work, even if it is 
in pieces or patched together from quotations; indeed, it is this partial state that attests to its 
endurance in change. The act of fragmentation divides, disperses, and scatters the contents 
of a work like seeds, enabling it to grow into new contexts and form new relations; it 
becomes, to slightly modify Andrew Benjamin’s phrasing, something other than what it once 
was. The fragment acts as a witness to the politics of its original reception and the forces that 
caused its decay or decline and makes this political dimension legible. As the remainders of 
decay and destruction, fragments are the very signification of survival. Yet, if, as remainders, 
they are vibrant talismans of a continued form of life, they are also reminders of catastrophes 
and disintegrations to come. This is the dialectic of the fragment, in which absence points in 
the direction of presence and presence points toward absence. It is neither a transcendent 
triumph of life over death, nor is it a nihilistic evacuation of hope. Samuel Weber’s remarks 
on Benjamin’s translation essay are instructive here: the afterlife ‘take[s] us from the notion 
of life through that of death toward a strange kind of hybrid’; and ‘the history that emerges 
out of this discussion […] is a history that is mindful of mortality, a history that does not try 
to overcome or transfigure finitude.’107   
Markson’s reader-narrator is acutely mindful of mortality, constructing a contrapuntal 
movement between images of survival: 
The Laocöon was come upon by workmen digging in a vineyard not far from the 
Colosseum in 1506. In no time, Michelangelo was at the scene. And identified it at 
once, from descriptions in the elder Pliny.108 
And images of transience: 
The Colossus of Rhodes crashed down in an earthquake in 224 B.C. Fully three 
centuries later Pliny the Elder would comment on the monstrous bronze fragments that 
still lay about the harbour.  
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Chares of Lindus. 
The first quotation above presents an image of survival and historical recognition that 
follows the redemptive contours drawn around the afterlife: an excavation delivers a great 
work (a work which we should not forget is known for its representation of intense human 
suffering) as if it had been gestating under the earth. In this fragment, an artwork is 
‘identified […] at once’ based on the citational iterations of its ‘afterlife’. The latter quotation 
appears to follow a similar line of thought: one of the wonders of the world, destroyed by 
natural disaster but surviving in ‘monstrous bronze fragments that still lay about the harbor’. 
However, a few lines down, on the same page, the name ‘Chares of Lindus’ appears without 
further context.  When single names are mentioned in Markson’s work, they belong to a list 
of deaths shot through the dispersive text. Chares of Lindus (also spelled Lindos) was the 
Greek sculptor who designed the Colossus of Rhodes. According to Sextus Empiricus, 
Chares killed himself after discovering an error in his calculations and never saw his project 
reach completion.109   
Why does Markson insert the name, ‘Chares of Lindus’ after the Laocöon fragment, 
without comment? It is a reminder that fragments can be ‘monstrous’; that even as they 
signal survival they also signify a loss that must also not be forgotten. Whether or not the 
story of Chares is apocryphal, many are familiar with the Colossus of Rhodes, but few 
remember the name of its sculptor. The name is so brief that any reader might skim over it 
to get to the next micro-narrative fragment or to seek a reference with which they are more 
familiar. This, I think, is the crux of Markson’s late work and one of its most resonant 
intersections with Benjamin’s concept of history. Names and images of the dead flash up in 
the stream of the history and/as narrative, challenging the reader of Markson’s work, and 
Benjamin’s reader-as-historian, to recognise them and commit them to remembrance. If this 
act of recognition and subsequent remembrance does not occur, these images of the past ‘flit 
by’, ‘never to be seen again’.110 This does not mean that we have only one chance at 
historical insight; rather, since history is always becoming something other than it once was, 
each of these chances is singularly unique and unrepeatable. 
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Markson registers the two poles of the fragment’s significance – loss and survival – 
by ‘shuffling’ his deck of index cards to reveal an arrangement of fragments that alternate 
between destruction and redemption. For every image of ‘the afterlife of works’ contained 
within Markson’s novels, there is another, equally resonant image of death and irrevocable 
loss, a co-presence which may appear to diminish or even extinguish the redemptive terms 
with which such an afterlife is articulated. But for Benjamin, redemption is not an eventuality 
but a potentiality that lies within the fragment. It is worth recalling that ‘only a redeemed 
mankind receives the fullness of the past’ – for everyone else, it remains incomplete, 
fragmented, but with a ‘weak messianic power’. This is not, however, a cause for despair. 
As Peter Osborne explains, ‘only if the Messianic remains exterior to history can it provide 
the perspective of a completed whole (without the predetermination of a teleological end) 
from which the present may appear in its essential transience, as radically incomplete’.111 
This incompletion is ‘radical’ because it leaves history open to the possibility of change and 
justice rather than regarding it as a closed case.112 As Benjamin’s concept of the afterlife 
makes clear, history is never closed; indeed, history, by dint of its transformative relationship 
to the present, has a future. 
1.7 Mortification (I): Allegory 
So far, I have outlined a theory of the fragment based on its status as a remainder signifying 
the survival or ‘afterlife’ of works. This definition of the fragment fits the content of 
Markson’s novels: historical anecdotes and quotations presented in short, disjointed 
sentences. I want to turn now to the form of these novels and to the issue of fragmentation 
to which, I argue, Markson subjects the genre of the novel. The act of fragmentation which 
Markson carries out in the form of his late novels is related to but also quite different to the 
temporal decay of manuscripts. Clearly, Markson’s fragments have not mouldered in the 
damp of a monastery or been conflagrated by a pope; they are not ancient fragments. What, 
then, is the source of their fragmentation? The answer to this has two parts, one which can 
be traced in the setting of Reader’s Block, and the other is found in Markson’s subsequent 
novel, This Is Not a Novel. Reader’s Block, the first of Markson’s ‘last’ novels, introduces 
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the plethora of deaths and grim anecdotes through the frame of an aging novelist narrator 
planning a prospective novel – about an aging novelist who lives in the grounds of a 
cemetery, and whose room is described in terms of a melancholic medieval scholar. Reader’s 
Block, I argue, should be seen as Markson’s ‘baroque’ work, in which nature (setting) and 
history appear together allegorically in the way Benjamin describes the Trauerspiel. What 
is allegorised by the funereal imagery in Reader’s Block is the novel as such; its narrator 
calls into question the novel’s ability to communicate life. Markson explores this question 
by experimenting with form, by fragmenting the novel to reveal its ruined structure and 
examining what remains. Where Reader’s Block foregrounds the imagery of decomposition, 
This Is Not a Novel inaugurates the de-composition of the novel form.  
In the final sections of this chapter, I want to turn to the ‘mortification of the work’ – 
a concept derived from Benjamin’s early work (his rejected post-doctoral thesis which 
definitively made him an academic exile) on the baroque German Trauerspiel or mourning-
play – which, as Bettine Menke indicates, informs the concept of afterlife introduced in the 
translation essay. So far, I have explored Benjamin’s concept of afterlife and its designation 
of a work’s ‘continued stage of life’. At first glance, ‘the afterlife of works’ and their 
mortification are two antithetical concepts. In fact, afterlife and mortification are 
interarticulative and mutually constitutive notions that are figured in the fragment and the 
ruin. As I indicated earlier in this chapter, afterlife is not a form of immortality; in fact, as a 
form of life, it is a concept that presupposes mortality. In the translation essay, Benjamin 
further describes the afterlife of works as ‘the transformation and renewal of something 
living – the original undergoes a change’, adding that ‘[e]ven words with fixed meaning can 
undergo a maturing process’.  
One example Benjamin gives of this ‘maturing process’ is how certain idioms and 
expressions which ‘sounded fresh once may sound hackneyed later; what was once current 
may someday sound archaic’ – one of the many challenges faced by any translator. 
Furthermore, Benjamin definitively quashes any question of immortality regarding afterlife 
when he remarks that ‘even the greatest translation is destined to become part of the growth 
of its own language and eventually to perish with its renewal.’113 As Menke asserts, ‘this 
constitutes the works’ mortification’ and with it the point where Benjamin’s concepts of 
                                                     




translation and criticism converge.114 ‘Translation, like “criticism”,’ Menke clarifies, ‘is the 
mortifying (mode of) “afterlife” of that which remains ruined, dead and disintegrated’.115 
Afterlife therefore has more than one ‘mode’, one of ‘mortification’ and one of survival, the 
exact same dialectic that I have described in relation to the fragment (which is itself a figure 
of afterlife). Thus, even if afterlife is a form of life defined by history rather than ‘organic 
corporeality’, it, too, is subject to mortality; indeed, it is mortality that provides the very 
conditions of afterlife. Rebecca Comay draws a link between Benjamin’s insistence on an 
expansive conception of life that is ‘determined by history rather than by nature’ by way of 
his remarks on the baroque mourning play.116 Of baroque artists, Benjamin writes, ‘[n]ature 
was not seen in bud and bloom, but in the over-ripeness and decay of her creations. In nature 
they saw eternal transience, and here alone did the saturnine vision of this generation 
recognise history’.117 This is a conception of history defined not by nature, but ‘organic 
corporeality’, a conception in which historical catastrophe is as inevitable and unavoidable 
as natural disaster.  
While Benjamin certainly doesn’t promote this stance, it is significant because, as 
Comay notes, it ‘contests the anthropocentric optimism of the Enlightenment […] [and] 
disturbs the aesthetic plenitude of all idealism’. In other words, the historical teleology of 
the baroque era indicates the necessity of a (Benjaminian) materialist history that is, to quote 
Weber once more, ‘mindful of mortality’.118 ‘Criticism, writes Benjamin in Origin of 
German Tragic Drama, ‘is the mortification of the work.’ To ‘mortify’, or critique, a work 
is to convert the ‘material content’ into ‘truth content’.119 This mortification provides the 
‘basis for a rebirth, in which all ephemeral beauty is completely stripped off, and the work 
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stands as a ruin.’120 Here, Benjamin establishes mortification as a ‘rebirth’ – an afterlife – in 
which ‘beauty’ is eroded in order that ‘the settlement of knowledge in dead [works]’ can 
occur. Criticism arrives at knowledge by dismantling the components of a work which, when 
united, form an aesthetic experience. Put crudely, criticism ‘ruins’ literature – although it 
also occasions the satisfaction that knowledge provides. Markson’s novels are the 
‘settlement of knowledge in dead works’ – an accounting of a lifetime of reading and a 
survey of the total sum of Western literary and cultural production. Through this, Markson 
enacts a ‘rebirth’ of the novel – a genre which is consistently declared dead and reborn – as 
living on ‘after’ itself. Such an afterlife, however, follows Benjamin’s description of 
criticism as mortification. By offering up a series of novels-as-ruins, Markson offers a 
mortifying critique of the novel as such, transforming it into an object of knowledge and, in 
doing so, writes a novel ‘after’ the novel: a novel that is ‘after’ the image of the novel, ‘like’ 
a novel and as such ‘not a novel’; a novel that follows (‘after’) the novel, pursuing it but 
never reaching what is both behind (novels before it) and ahead of it (novels to come).  
Reader’s Block, the ‘first’ of Markson’s last four novels, establishes the type of 
narrator that will become a feature of the novels to follow: a lonely, isolated, elderly novelist. 
While plot and character are minimal in Reader’s Block, they feature more heavily than in 
the following novels, where literary conventions become progressively more attenuated. The 
novel introduces Reader, the eponymous narrator, as he proclaims: 
Someone nodded hello to me on the street yesterday. 
To me, or to him? 
Someone nodded hello to Reader on the street yesterday.121 
This is one of very few instances where a narrator uses the first-person pronoun, ‘me’. In 
one sense, Markson is drawing playful attention to the act of transposing the 
autobiographical ‘I’ to the impersonal fictional third-person pronoun, ‘he’; and to the 
ambiguous but productive relationship between the life of author and character. It also 
registers the narrator’s anxiety about ‘put[ting] certain things down’, committing the 
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exigencies of old age (‘I have been in hospitals. Do I wish to put certain things down?’) and 
the shame of isolation (‘Nobody comes. Nobody calls’) to print.122 
 In the following sentence, the narrator declares ‘Reader has come to this place 
because he had no life back there at all.’123 This revision of pronouns, where ‘I’ becomes 
‘he’, marks the narrator’s departure from a life that is at an end, from a life that he considers 
‘no life’ to ‘this place’, the place of literature. The living ‘I’ becomes petrified in literature 
as the subject ‘he’, inventoried like the other fragments of other lives enclosed within the 
book. It soon becomes apparent that ‘back there’ is the narrator’s past, [a] life, that was’, a 
life ‘[w]here there is no now now’.124 In the novel, the narrator uses the word ‘now’ 
predominantly in reference to the time in which the novel is being made or experienced: 
‘Well, I am completely alone here now’, ‘Does Reader yet know how long Protagonist has 
now been alone?’, ‘Does Reader now have some notion of setting his novel back practically 
a lifetime ago?’, ‘He is completely alone here now.’125 In doing this, Markson is commenting 
on the ‘now’ that is actualised in the act of writing and the act of reading, neither of which 
can occur at the same time. This structure of relation between writer and reader is one of 
delayed reaction, of belatedness – the temporality of afterlife – that follows but is not 
restricted to the obscurity and posthumous fame of artists.  
In Markson’s novels, the death and loss (of works) is explored with at times an 
‘unmetaphorical’ intensity. In the first few interpolations the narrator asks, ‘Thumbed pages. 
Read and read. Who has passed here before me?’ There is the suggestion that reading, and 
the book, are spectral sites that are ‘passed over’ and ‘passed through’ at various times by 
the writer and every reader that has come before it. This applies not just speculatively, but 
in the case of used books – which physically ‘pass hands’ and exist tangibly in multiple lives 
(and lifetimes), Reader’s question has a material dimension. As Benjamin writes in his essay 
on collection, the reader’s (or book collector’s) ‘existence is tied […] to a relationship to 
objects that […] studies them and loves them as the scene, the stage, of their fate.’126 The 
book has its own fate, its ‘encounter’ with the reader, but the book itself is a trace of previous 
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readers, and thus becomes the site or ‘stage’ of fate.127 As in Benjamin’s work, for whom 
the work of art and decay are dialectically engaged, for Markson there is a relation between 
reading and death ‘staged’ by the book that is also manifested in peculiar structure of literary 
time. Writing enables us to relate to the dead, to a dead author, in ways few other media can. 
Writing (like death) not only locates a person in a specific place – the printed page an index 
to the place where it was written – linking the reader to the body of the writer through their 
corpus; it also contains the writer’s voice, their unique linguistic signature. It encapsulates 
Benjamin’s dialectical history wherein an object from the past collides in the present to form 
the ‘now of recognisability’ which is the ‘now’ of reading. Later, the phrase is repeated with 
a slight variation: 
No life back there at all. 
What life here, now? 128 
And further on, after 3 more pages: 
Nothing now, but my books. 129 
Again, these words describe a state of melancholy absorption that reflects Protagonist’s (‘I’ 
at a further third remove) situation as a ‘guardian of the deceased’, lost in the contemplation 
of dead objects. At one point, Markson quotes a line from Schopenhauer: ‘the world is my 
idea’. He does so without attribution, without quotation marks. In the Trauerspiel study, 
Benjamin writes, ‘the theory of mourning […] can only be developed in the description of 
that world which is revealed under the gaze of the melancholy man’. It is to this world that 
Reader’s ‘idea’ for a novel belongs, a ‘world’ without time, where there ‘is no now’, only 
‘his books and the graves of strangers’.130 Graves which, as Sims has pointed out, are 
analogous to the ‘rows’ of fragments that comprise the novel. If this is so, what does this 
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analogy say about writing, about the novel? The dead objects of contemplation in Markson’s 
novels are none other than the detritus of Western civilisation itself; above all, the novel as 
such. The imagery and landscape of melancholy figure into ‘Reader and this notion of his’.131 
Having left ‘life back there’, Reader contemplates the setting of his novel, wondering how 
to convey ‘[a] sense somehow of total retreat? Abandonment?’: 
Protagonist living near a disused cemetery, perhaps? 
[…] 
Where precisely would Protagonist live, if near a derelict cemetery? Possibly some 
sort of structure just within the grounds themselves? 
That building abandoned also? 132 
The paths inside are of gravel, or were, long since thinned and scattered.133 
We can take the thinned and scattered gravel as the paths of interrupted and interruptive 
narratives. Markson’s protagonist ‘lives’ ‘within the grounds themselves’, the only stirring 
body in a field full of silent bodies. As if the decrepitude of this scene wasn’t sufficient, even 
the cemetery is ‘derelict’ and no longer in use. When the narrator contemplates the 
surrounding town, he conjures the following scene: 
[…] depressed area? Any local industry extinct, stores or even certain private 
dwellings boarded up? 
Surely then conveying a sense almost of recession into the past?134 
Retreat, abandonment dereliction, and withdrawal from life are tropes associated with 
melancholy – of medieval hermits, baroque scholar-poets, and the figure of allegorist 
Benjamin describes in the Trauerspiel book. The scene I presented earlier as an analogue to 
Benjamin’s description of the ‘unpacking’ of his library is worth reiterating, as it ties 
Markson’s Reader (and indeed Benjamin) to the figure of the allegorist: 
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Protagonist first seen poised abstractedly amid a kind of transitory disarray? 
Cartons heaped and piled? 
Innumerable books, Reader presumably means?135  
This morbid quality of Markson’s work, his obsession with death and with the gulf, much 
larger than the space between two lines, that separates the present and the past, recalls the 
contemplative melancholy of Albrecht Dürer’s allegorical scholar in his famous engraving, 
Melencolia I (1514). Dürer’s engraving, which has been the subject of countless exegeses 
and ekphrases (including Benjamin’s own), was a Renaissance portrayal of melancholy, the 
ancient humour associated with Western philosophy since Aristotle. In such a state, the 
medieval ascetic succumbs to acedia; Dürer’s angel gazes out the window, abandoning her 
tools; Hamlet suicidally ideates with a skull in the palm of his hand. So, too, do Markson’s 
melancholy narrators appear to follow this pattern, which Benjamin describes as ‘betray[ing] 
the world for the sake of knowledge’ and ‘embrac[ing] dead object [through] contemplation, 
in order to rescue them’. (Here we can also discern the prehistory of Benjamin’s mortifying, 
messianic criticism). Reader’s room is also saturated with melancholy tropes: ‘On a shelf 
beside Reader’s desk: a human skull, a reproduction of Giotto’s portrait of Dante, two small 
rough stones’. Over a hundred pages later, an image of Protagonist’s room is presented: ‘The 
cemetery framed beyond the window in January light. The skull, lower left foreground, a 
redundant nearer memento mori.’136 These portraits are charged with a paradoxically dead 
vitality, the still-life-likeness of a nature morte. But they must also be read alongside the 
contrasting images of restlessness and intellectual agitation presented by the phrase 
‘transitory disarray.’ 
Andrea Charise argues that Markson’s ‘microparagraphs’ be viewed as tableaux 
vivant, a popular theatre and parlour act in which a group of stationary players portray a 
scene; she identifies the tableau’s ‘contrast between its lively sense of play and the solemnity 
inherent in stillness.’ 137 Although Charise does not mention the scene of ‘transitory disarray’ 
quoted above, it is a perfect example of such a tableau. Like the still-life, the stillness of the 
tableau is disturbed by its modifier – vivant – its liveliness and presents an image of 
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precarious stasis vibrating with potential movement. ‘Transitory’, of course, inheres the dual 
meaning of impermanence and constant motion, a sense of perpetual arrival – a movement 
that foregrounds the intermittent structure of Markson’s fragments, always arriving at and 
departing from a new image of history. ‘Disarray’, meanwhile, indicates a state of disorder 
– again, anticipating the purposive dis-organisation of Markson’s texts. The quality of 
stillness to this transitory disarray derives from the narrator’s description of Protagonist as 
‘first seen poised abstractedly’ – like a player in a tableau vivant. As such, this ‘tableau’ is 
an image of ‘petrified unrest’, one of Benjamin’s descriptions of allegory that holds 
particularly true for Reader: ‘Whatever is struck by the allegorical intention is severed from 
the contexts of life: it is at once destroyed and conserved. Allegory holds fast to ruins. It 
offers the image of petrified unrest.’138 
It is precisely the point at which Reader is ‘severed from the contexts of life’ (‘no life 
back there at all’) that is the point at which he announces his ‘intention’ to construct his 
allegory of the derelict cemetery. Santner reads the image of ‘petrified unrest’ in similar 
terms, as a ‘paradoxical mixture of deadness and excitation, stuckness and agitation’ which, 
he writes, ‘might best by [sic] captured by the term “undeadness”.139 While this reading is 
eloquent and important, Santner’s Lacanian hermeneutics leads him to diagnose this unrest 
as ‘pertain[ing] to the dynamic of the repetition compulsion’, which he describes as ‘the 
manic side’ of melancholy.140 This interpretation is not without basis, for in The Arcades 
Project Benjamin describes ‘petrified unrest’ as ‘the formula’ for a history ‘which knows no 
development’, and as such permits a Nietzschean eternal recurrence of events.141 Santner’s 
solution to this zombified condition is to prescribe the following ‘cure’: ‘[t]he awakening at 
issue in the messianic advent should be understood not as a resurrection, an animation of the 
dead, but […] as a deanimation of the undead.’142 There is not enough space to dissect the 
complexities of Santner’s thesis, but it seems to me that messianic redemption would not 
involve killing the undead, nor would it involve the implicitly naïve act of resurrection (how 
can a being that is not dead be resurrected?), rather, it would consist in releasing the life – 
the source of unrest – contained within the petrified object. Santner’s reading of Benjamin 
is virtuosic, but it emphasises the pessimistic dimension of ‘unrest’ and elides the potentiality 
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inherent in the concept of unrest. Elsewhere in The Arcades Project, Benjamin designates 
‘petrified unrest’ as a ‘historical’ – that is, a dialectical – ‘image’.143 The image of petrified 
unrest, like the tableau, like the image of Protagonist ‘poised […] amid a kind of transitory 
disarray’ represents the moment of dialectical ‘standstill’ – as stillness ‘poised’ for action.  
The ‘compulsion’ to collect – fragments, books, quotations – dead or lost objects from 
history is a compulsion to actively ‘unpack’ memories, to break solidified narratives down 
to the points where they are most agitated and insistent. This is the same movement between 
stillness and motion organised by transience as ‘Now and again, a fragment, still, flitting 
through Protagonist’s consciousness?’ The meaning of still is left ambiguous and open to 
two interpretations: one that inheres motionlessness, even a state of arrest; but ‘still’ can also 
indicate an event that is ‘still occurring’ (‘now and again’).  Still fragments ‘still’ keep 
‘flitting’ through the narrator’s consciousness; not as a repetition compulsion analogous to 
eternal recurrence but as ‘repetition without repetition’, as Gerhard Richter characterises 
afterlife.144 Markson’s form of repetition is also ‘without repetition’ – characterised by its 
irregular, unpredictable occurrence; it happens ‘now and again’. The still fragments of 
Reader’s are memories that flash up in the moment of reading and arrested in fragments on 
the page. The petrifying gaze of melancholy is not merely a ‘manic’ symptom requiring a 
cure; rather, it is the ‘antidote to myth’ capable of turning teleological history and illusory 
linear narratives to stone. 
1.8 Mortification (II): Of Works 
It is apparent that Markson, writing at the end of one millennium – the late nineties – and 
the beginning of another, regarded the novel as a genre not ‘in bud and bloom’, to borrow 
another of Benjamin’s phrases, but in its ‘over-ripeness and decay’.145 While afterlife reveals 
a work’s continued stage of life, it is indexical of and predicated by the death and loss of 
works. This process occurs with the passing of time, a ‘transformation of material content 
into truth content […] whereby the earlier charms [diminish] decade by decade, into the 
basis for a rebirth, in which all ephemeral beauty is completely stripped off, and the work 
stands as a ruin’.146 The revelation of the work’s truth content is comparable to ‘the ruins of 
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great buildings [in which] the idea of the plan speaks more impressively than in lesser 
buildings, however well preserved they are’.147 As Ilit Ferber writes, ‘death and loss become 
conditions for the legibility of works […] [i]n states of erosion, ruin, or degradation, 
something in the material becomes exposed; such a state thus opens the work up to the 
critical gaze.’148 
Early in Reader’s Block, the narrator, sorting through ‘his mind full of clutter’ and its 
autobiographical remains, asks, ‘What is a novel in any case?’ The novel is thus the subject 
of an investigation whose method will be mortification. In order for the novel to become an 
object of knowledge, it must be mortified, its ‘ephemeral beauty […] stripped off’. The first 
phase of this mortification is the fragmented form of Reader’s Block, the preliminary novel 
in a series of novels which will grow progressively more attenuated. The hypothetical novel 
with which Reader is occupied can be defined only ‘in part’: 
A novel of intellectual reference and allusion, so to speak minus much of the novel? 
Also in part a commonplace book? 
Also in part a cento, as Burton would surely have had it? 
Also in part a distance cousin innumerable times removed of The Unquiet Grave? 149 
Also in part a distant cousin innumerable times removed of A Skeleton Key to 
Finnegans Wake? 150 
Also in part a distant cousin innumerable times removed of the Tibetan Book of the 
Dead? 
Of the cataloguing of Cairo Genizah?151 
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The very act of definition rends itself – the narrator can only describe his potential novel in 
terms adjacent to the novel: what it is ‘in part’ of and split into parts for: a cento, a funerary 
text, a commonplace book. The narrator classifies his hypothetical novel, a meta-
commentary on the novel at hand, in partite terms: the novel is part commonplace book, part 
cento, part anthology, part funerary text, part exegesis, part catalogue of ancient fragments. 
The novel’s partial resemblance to commonplace books and centos refers to its ‘collage-like’ 
collection of quotations, anecdotes, and facts. The activities of common placing and cento-
writing are rooted in scholastic and rhetorical development, both having been used as 
external mnemonic devices.152 The traditional seventeenth-century commonplace book was 
itself of indeterminate genre and ‘lay at the intersection between practices of collecting, 
reading, classifying, learning and the arts of rhetoric’, a depository of disparate material from 
recipes to proverbs and, indeed, quotations. 153 The commonplace book was, like Markson’s 
own novels, a form of writing produced from the act of reading and transcribing, many of 
which were subsequently published in print: they were principally written by readers, a 
distinction that resonates with Markson’s designation of the narrator as ‘Reader’ and the title 
of Reader’s Block rather than Writer’s Block. Furthermore, the commonplace book echoes 
literary modernism’s sense of allusiveness and intertextuality – Markson refers to Reader’s 
Block as ‘an ersatz prose alternative to The Wasteland.’154 The novel’s resemblance to 
Robert Burton’s centos is also worth noting: these, too, are difficult to classify in terms of 
recognisable and established genres. As Stephanie Shirilan writes, the cento is conditioned 
by ‘subversive miscitation and ventriloquism […] transposing a set of sentences or syntagms 
from one context to another.’155 Originating in ancient Greek and Roman poetry, the cento, 
meaning ‘patchwork garment’, was intended ‘to make something new from the authoritative 
master-text, typically Virgil […] prized for their successful redeployment of the poet’s words 
in wholly different contexts than those found in the original.’156 This certainly describes (in 
part) the ways quotation is incorporated into Markson’s late texts. Quotation appears here in 
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several forms: unattributed quotations, second-hand quotations, and reported quotations 
attributed to a speaker, rendered as dialogue: ‘Oh, isn’t life a terrible thing, thank God? Says 
Polly Garter’, and ‘One should always read with a pen in one’s hand. Says Delacroix in the 
Journals.’157 The latter quotation is attributed to the fictional character who speaks it in 
Djuna Barnes’ Nightwood; the former appropriates Delacroix’s (writing) voice, reanimating 
it through the narrator’s own voice. 
The words of fictional characters of fictional characters and those of dead authors are 
rearranged and re-vocalised in the same way, shaped by the same structure of dialogue. This 
gives the reader some clue as to the space and temporality of literature; as objects of creation, 
fictional lives shuffle between a state of life and something more like lifelessness. Similarly, 
the words of dead authors reproduced and reassembled on a new page, within the matrix of 
Markson’s novels specifically, are enlivened and re-presented in a new moment of reading; 
but this renewed presence is transient and always indexical to death, not merely because the 
writer or speaker of these words is invariably dead in Markson’s novels, but also because 
these fugitive moments of resuscitation are interspersed with fragments focused on the facts 
of death – its time, place, and cause: ‘Gilles Deleuze committed suicide’, ‘Kay Sage 
committed suicide’, ‘Walafrid Strabo drowned in the Loire’, among the 450 deaths 
enumerated in Reader’s Block. 
In the list above, Markson’s books are also considered ‘in part’ funerary text, narrating 
the journey from death to afterlife. This alternation between lifelessness and vitality is the 
nexus of Markson’s work that links ‘mortification’, melancholy, loss, quotation and the 
fragmentary. It also helps to elaborate the relationship between Benjamin’s philosophy and 
Markson’s cento-like patchwork of quotations and references. Reader’s Block focuses on 
the setting of the novel as a world under the melancholy gaze, filled with baroque signifiers 
of death and obsolescence, providing an allegory for the novel genre. Under this gaze, the 
novel becomes, an artefact – an object of knowledge that can be known only in fragments: 
‘in part’. The pensiveness with which the narrator regards this world is the defining feature 
of baroque allegory, exhuming the past for remnants and attempting to invest them with 
meaning. 
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Reader’s Block presents a fragmentary allegory of the relation between death and the 
novel, which reveals itself as an object of knowledge in decay. In his second late work, This 
is Not a Novel, ‘mortification’ is taken one step further, as the narrator (Writer) states a clear 
intention to reduce the novel to its barest components and present the novel at its zero point. 
The novel begins with the lines: 
Writer is pretty much tempted to quit writing. 
Writer is weary unto death of making up stories. 
[…] 
Writer is equally tired of inventing characters.158 
This novel (which insists it is ‘not a novel’) features, again, an elderly novelist, this time 
called Writer. This disenchantment leads Writer to ‘contrive’ ‘[a] novel with no intimation 
of story whatsoever. And no characters. None.’159 Clearly, This is Not a Novel marks a break 
with the distinct outlines of plot and character in Reader’s Block. There is no Protagonist 
manifesting from the hypothetical novel Writer is in the midst of writing, ‘simplif[ying]’, as 
Francoise Palleau-Papin notes, ‘the complexity’ of the ‘trinity formed by “I”, Reader, and 
Protagonist into the unified voice of a writing character.’160 Writer is de-composing the 
novel: 
Actionless, writer wants it. 
Which is to say, with no sequence of events. 
Which is to say, with no passage of time. 
Then again, getting somewhere in spite of this. 
[…] 
A novel with no setting. 
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With no so-called furniture. 
Ergo meaning finally without descriptions.161  
Here, Writer, the single protagonist of This is Not a Novel, finds himself at his limits with 
(the limits of) writing, unable to endure or even, apparently, outlive it. The allegorical 
landscape of Reader’s Block is gone; now, the narrator is paradoxically ‘contriving’ a non-
representational novel. Markson has thus moved from a surfeit of partial definitions of 
Reader’s Block toward the formal de-composition of the novel by stripping away its most 
communicative components. In This is Not a Novel, Markson erases all the characteristics 
of the novel that are mimetic of life – character, plot, time, setting – and emphasises the 
novel as a fundamentally lifeless, ‘contrived’ form by presenting a novel that is self-
reflexively constructed and ‘collage-like’. Yet the faint outlines of everything Writer 
prohibits protrude from every fragment in the novel, each a fugitive, miniature narrative. 
The above descriptions of Writer’s novel are all negative: ‘no’, ‘none’, ‘without’ – 
Writer never positively describes what the novel (which ‘is not a novel’) ‘is’ except to imply 
that there may be something irreducibly communicative about writing that isn’t predicated 
on traditional narrative mechanisms: ‘getting somewhere in spite of this’. But getting where? 
Like Reader’s Block, This is Not a Novel and Markson’s last two novels contain hundreds 
of discrete, but often intersecting, anecdotes, legends, historical curiosities, facts and figures, 
all of which suggest, at various points, sequences of events, the passage of time, settings and 
descriptions – though none of these elements coincide in one fragment, and the formal unity 
that characterises the novel genre remains elusive: The Novel is immanent in This is Not a 
Novel. But the transcendent unity of the novel form is prohibited. While Reader’s Block 
presented a ruined ‘setting’, This is Not a Novel reveals the novel form as a ruin, missing 
most of its distinguishing generic features and speaking only of an ‘idea for a plan’ for a 
novel. 
In her analysis of Markson’s work, Laura Sims writes that despite the narrator’s 
‘assertion that he exists as an author, Writer remains confined to the pages as a character 
thinking about writing a book’, thereby subverting ‘Writer’s genre-busting dreams’.162 
While I agree that this work does not fulfil the speculative criteria of its narrator, I do want 
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to take Writer’s attempt to subtract elements from the novel – to chip away at generic 
conventions in order to reveal its true potential – seriously. For Sims, it is the ‘emotionally 
satisfying’, ‘compulsively readable’ element of Markson’s work which ‘wisely’ avoids 
‘destroying the genre altogether’.163 However, if we take the title seriously, we must contend 
with the fact that it is not a novel, it is ‘something else’ altogether; and that what it presents 
is the other of the novel. This ‘other’ novel is both the novel at hand and the novel the 
character, Writer, is ‘writing’. Only through the mortification of the novel can the novel 
become an object of knowledge, a critical object capable of an afterlife. The novel lives on 
in Markson’s late work, but in an altered, refracted form. 
 
                                                     




Dialectic of the Valance: Aura, Trace, and Allegory in the Poetry of Susan Howe 
There is a mystic separation between poetic vision and ordinary living. The 
conditions for poetry rest outside each life at a miraculous reach indifferent to 
worldly chronology. 
Trust absence, allegory, mystery – the setting not the rising sun is beauty. 
– Susan Howe, My Emily Dickinson1 
‘The task of criticism is not to lift the veil but rather, through the most precise 
knowledge of it as a veil, to raise itself for the first time to the view of the beautiful. 
To the view that will […] only imperfectly open itself to the view of the beautiful of 
that which is secret. Never yet has a true work of art been grasped other than when it 
is ineluctably represented itself as a secret’  
– Walter Benjamin, ‘Goethe’s Elective Affinities’2 
In the preceding chapter, I read Markson’s late novels as a literary account of the concept of 
Nachleben, or afterlife, the term Benjamin gives to the form of survival of an original 
moment, object, or work as it passes away into and is transformed by history. By the same 
turn, I argue that Markson’s novels can themselves be considered as literary afterlives of 
Benjamin’s unfinished The Arcades Project and emphasise the textual terms with which 
Benjamin constructs his philosophy of history. Markson’s account of ‘the afterlife of works’ 
is organised around the form and content of the fragment whose restlessness – oscillating 
between the two poles of destruction and survival – posits a messianic structure of literary 
time, capable of bringing the reader to a dialectical standstill. At the same time, this formal 
fragmentation entails an active ‘mortification’ of the novel form itself. Markson’s novels 
discard the ‘furniture’ of the novel as such – description, plot, and character – focusing 
instead on errant anecdotes, facts, quotations, and references, just as Benjamin’s Arcades 
Project dispenses with commentary and ‘ingenious formulations’ in favour of ‘the rags [and] 
the refuse’ of history.3 The fragment acknowledges loss but holds open, through its cracks 
and ruptures, the possibility of redemption through remembrance and survival through the 
                                                     
1 Susan Howe, My Emily Dickinson (New York: New Directions, 1985; repr. 2007), p. 13. 
2 Benjamin, ‘Goethe’s Elective Affinities’, SW 1, pp. 297-360 (p. 351).  
3 Markson, NN, p. 5; Benjamin, AP, [N1a,8], p. 460.  
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transfiguration, or translation, that memory enacts. By reducing the novel to something other 
than it once was, Markson’s late work provides one iteration of the novel’s own afterlife: a 
novel that is ‘not a novel’ – a novel ‘after’ the novel. This ‘mortification’ of the novel results 
in a series of ‘perilous critical moment[s] upon which’, Benjamin writes, ‘all reading is 
founded.’4 The interruptive, disjunctive structure of Markson’s novels conforms to the 
temporality of authentic time and demands a correlative model of reading with which history 
might be properly recognised, or ‘read’. Markson’s works highlight the fundamental 
belatedness inherent in the act of reading and accentuate the critical moment of recognition 
that occurs ‘after’ reading. This model of reading both produces and is required by 
Benjamin’s idiosyncratic materialist historiography. Put more simply, one must read this 
way in order to write history and to interpret it.  
 In this chapter, I want to follow through this idea of reading, its asynchronous 
structure, and its distinctive relation to disintegration, destruction, revelation and survival. 
Susan Howe, a poet whose work spans over forty years, is equally, if not more, fascinated 
by the ‘afterlife of works’. Many of my observations about Markson’s work obtain for Howe. 
I will not rehearse these except to demarcate points of difference between each writer. Both 
Howe and Markson are methodologically propelled by reading: they are collectors of source 
material that is inextricably linked to the production of their works. This production is always 
associated with mortality and forms of loss. Loss precipitates and is mediated by the desire 
to connect the stray histories and disparate narratives that populate their works; yet 
brokenness remains, and nothing can be said to have been strictly repaired – the damage 
cannot be erased, and any attempt to do so would be a lapse in ethical judgement. The 
recognition of this brokenness, of the gaps and fractures in intellectual, artistic, and 
historiographical traditions, provides the very conditions under which author and reader (and 
these terms are not absolutely discrete) may both testify to this damage and – at least partially 
– re-collect and re-connect memories in a more redemptive configuration.  
However, it is in their approaches to these gaps that Howe and Markson can be 
distinguished. Whereas Markson installs his fragments in rigid rows demarcated by blank 
spaces (like gravestones, to cite Laura Sims once more), Howe is much more dynamic in the 
way that she uses the space of the page: her work is often a mixture of essayistic prose, 
traditional verse formats, photographs, and, often, lines of text that intersect one another in 
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a meticulously chaotic arrangement. Both authors utilise fragmentation, unusual line breaks, 
collection and collage techniques to figure the discontinuity of history (and history’s 
discontinuities). Like Markson, Howe is interested in forgotten texts and writers, cultural 
amnesia and the material fragment. Unlike Markson – who, for all his concern for what is 
lost and erased by history, predominantly engages with great works by great men – Howe is 
emphatically fixated on narratives that are subordinated by colonial violence and the 
gendered erasure of women’s voices. Thus, while Markson’s rich and affective work is a 
remarkable formulation and elaboration of the concept of afterlife, Howe’s work explicitly 
responds to the ethical demands posed by Benjamin’s historical materialism, which 
maintains that ‘even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins.’5 In this chapter, I 
seek to uncover the messianic dimensions of language, reading, and the material object in 
Howe’s poetry, which I understand as a redemptive but critical project. For Howe, poetry is 
both of mode of transmitting history in a way that attempts to counteract the erasures of the 
archive and a form that is receptive to transmissions from ‘outside of worldly chronology.’ 
Poetry, for Howe thus occupies a space between scholarly and prophetic forms of historical 
understanding.  
2.1 The Task of Transmission 
When Susan Howe writes in The Birth-mark (1993), a poetic-critical investigation of early 
American literature, ‘I know records are compiled by winners, and scholarship is in collusion 
with Civil Government’ she is suggesting an ethics of historical inquiry that Walter 
Benjamin’s own, much-cited words in ‘On the Concept of History’: 
There is no document of civilisation which is not at the same time a document of 
barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of barbarism, barbarism taints 
also the manner in which it was transmitted from one hand to another. The historical 
materialist therefore dissociates himself from this process of transmission as far as 
possible. He regards it as his task to brush history against the grain.6 
I am not the first to link this quotation to Howe’s work. Mandy Bloomfield and Rachel Tzvia 
Back both draw a connection between Benjamin’s exhortation to ‘brush history against the 
grain’ and Howe’s poetic project. Back writes that Howe and Benjamin share a ‘passionate 
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interest in history, the insistence that the past must be read and written differently – must be 
“brush[ed] against the grain” – the understanding of one’s own world through its figurative 
and literal topography, and the refusal to conform to genre limits and genre norms.’7 
Alluding to Back, Bloomfield notes that it is ‘not just to read the past differently but to 
engage with history in all its materiality’ and emphasises the ‘mode of physical engagement 
[that] is played out quite literally in many of Howe’s poems.’8 However, neither critic 
provides a sustained examination of the similarities (or differences) between Howe and 
Benjamin beyond remarking on their joint assault on positivist history, and their shared 
desire to rescue or redeem it through motifs of interruption and discontinuity. This, too, is 
my starting point, but I wish to unpack it further with reference to Benjamin’s concept of 
nonsensuous similarity, aura, and allegory. Benjamin’s rightly famous passage, quoted 
above, crosses several reference points for Howe’s poetry: first, it figures history in terms of 
textuality, that is to say, history can (potentially) be read; second, it is concerned with the 
transmissibility of history, the possibility of communicating the past – and of receiving the 
past – in language; third, it emphasizes the materiality of history – the task of the historian 
is to ‘brush’ it ‘against the grain’.9 I want to focus on the first two terms, textuality and 
transmissibility, before turning the status of materiality in Howe’s work later in this chapter. 
In doing so, I hope to provide a clear, though not systematic, account of Howe’s poetic 
method. 
As Drake Stutesman writes, Howe’s work is intensely engaged with ‘the nature of 
documentation, of documents themselves and how history is configured in our imaginations 
by documents (or lack of them).’10 Howe’s poetry is generated from material in the archive, 
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from the ‘tainted’ documents of civilisation/barbarism. Her work is always ‘ground[ed]’ in 
the ‘particulars’ of the archive: 
In my case this usually means a material object such as a book, or a manuscript […] 
Often a historical moment, or a specific person […] [such as] Esther Johnson, Emily 
Dickinson, Mary Rowlandson, Hope Atherton, Anne Hutchinson, Thomas Shepard, 
Clarence Mangan, Herman Melville, Charles and Juliet Peirce—the only way for me 
to reach them, or for them to reach me, is through the limited perspective of 
documents.11 
In her introduction to The Birth-mark, Howe writes: ‘I am drawn toward the disciplines of 
history and literary criticism but in the dawning distance a dark wall of rule supports the 
structure of every letter, record, transcript.’12 The ‘document universe’ of the archive is thus 
‘tainted’ by ‘the manner in which it was transmitted’.13 Benjamin and Howe are thus faced 
with the same difficult ‘task’: to develop an alternative mode of transmission for history that 
no longer empathises with ‘the victor’ when the documents are ‘tainted’.14 One such mode, 
Howe suggests, is poetry: ‘[if] history is a record of survivors, Poetry shelters other voices’.15 
Bloomfield aptly observes that Howe’s decision to capitalize ‘Poetry’ and to leave ‘history’ 
in lowercase letters ‘amounts to a challenge to the authority of history and a claim for the 
value of a specifically poetic mode of historical investigation.’16 Howe suggests that, in 
contrast to the discipline of history, poetry (with a capital ‘P’) is able to circumvent some of 
the ‘barbarism’ that ‘taints’ historical discourse. Yet Howe also acknowledges the 
impossibility of rescuing everything that is occluded by the historical record, or of redeeming 
history in any absolute way. In an essay from The Birth-mark entitled ‘Incloser’, Howe 
writes anxiously of her poetic method: ‘by choosing to install certain narratives somewhere 
between history, mystic speech, and poetry, I have enclosed them in an organization, 
although I know there are places no classificatory procedure can reach, where connections 
between words and things we thought existed break off.’17 This account foregrounds the 
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central characteristics and concerns of Howe’s work. First, it demarcates the generic 
heterogeneity of Howe’s poetry, which is situated at the crosscurrents of historical practice, 
mysticism and theology, the lyric, and prose. Second, it registers the dialectical tension 
between acts of rescue and entrapment: plucking ‘certain narratives’ from within (and 
without) the archive and inserting them into a text ‘lift[s] them from the dark side of history’, 
but also restricts them to a singular form of ‘organization’.18 Commenting on the same 
passage, Stephen Collis adeptly notes that ‘every writer does enclose and print binds and 
limits at the same time as it preserves and bestows.’19 Howe writes: ‘Knowledge, no matter 
how I get it, involves exclusion and repression. […] When we move through the positivism 
of literary canons and master narratives, we consign ourselves to the legitimation of power, 
chains of inertia, an apparatus of capture.’20  
Yet, Howe adds, ‘there are places no classificatory procedure can reach’ – this is the 
third movement of her poetics of enclosure.21 It is not just that systems of knowledge exclude 
objects that are not easily assimilated into their structures, but that these marginal objects 
actively resist this assimilation. In doing so, these objects attest to the limits and fragility of 
repressive epistemologies. As Norman Finkelstein writes, ‘the site of [this] struggle is the 
archive, where conflicting ideologies are expressed both in the texts, often antique and 
obscure, and as texts, born again into new poems from the suppressions and detritus of the 
past.’22 Furthermore, the ‘places’ ‘no classificatory procedure can reach’ are those ‘where 
connections between words and things we thought existed break off.’23 This last clause 
reflects the account of language that informs Howe’s richly polysemous and associative 
work. If, as Will Montgomery remarks, the ‘places’ Howe speaks of here ‘are the places of 
her poems too’, then we must also regard them as the place of language.24 According to 
Howe, language itself holds something unassimilable at its core: ‘[…] at the heart of 
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language lies what language can’t express.’25 The moment that eludes the ‘classificatory 
procedure’ – which Howe associates with the entanglement of the archive, historical 
positivism, patriarchy, and American colonialism – is the moment where the signifying 
power of language breaks off. But this breakage cannot be considered as the suspension of 
language (a sort of linguistic state of emergency), for it occurs within language and through 
the poetic text. Therefore, we must not read Howe as iconoclastically breaking or breaking 
free of language, although this is a credible and tested interpretation: Ming-Qian Ma deftly 
asserts that Howe’s is ‘an iconoclastic rescue mission […] to break free from grammar as 
“repressive mechanism,” and to resist being captured and silenced by meaning.’26 Similarly, 
Back suggests that Howe ‘enacts language’s liberation, its release from the bonds of syntax, 
word units, and normative use of page space.’27 Like Montgomery, who reads Howe’s 
writing ‘to be greatly colored by forms of constraint’, I do not believe Howe’s poetry 
performs the wholesale liberation of language.28 As Howe states in her interview with 
Edward Foster, ‘I think a lot of my work is about breaking free […] Starting free and being 
captured and breaking free again and being captured again.’29 While Montgomery suggests 
that ‘Howe’s own accounts of her writing, particularly in interviews, can sometimes hinder’ 
the analysis of her poems, I believe Howe’s statement here is instructive of the dialectical 
movement between breaking free of language and being ‘captured’ by it which informs the 
account of language that her poetry embodies.30 I understand her poetry not so much as 
obliterating the constraints of language as making visible the inherent brokenness of 
language by attending to moments where language – and the archive – exceeds itself.  
Howe examines and is fascinated by the poetry of Emily Dickinson, largely unknown 
in her own lifetime and whose outsider status, to a certain extent, still remains; the transcripts 
of the trial of Anne Hutchinson, a Puritan whose religious enthusiasm threatened the social 
order of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and which led to her banishment and exile; Mary 
Rowlandson, author of the first ‘captivity narrative’ in the United States, and whose 
ambiguous and highly edited account of capture and ransom during King Phillip’s War 
                                                     
25 ‘Scare Quotes I’, TM, p. 70. 
26 Ming-Qian Ma, ‘Articulating the Inarticulate: Singularities and the Counter-Method in Susan Howe’, 
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28 Montgomery, p. 81. 
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30 Montgomery, p. 80. 
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(1675-1678) Howe reads as a contradictory document of American exceptionalism; the 
existential graphs of the pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce; and the silent or 
silenced wives of canonical authors like Stella Swift, Juliet Pierce, Elizabeth Shaw Melville, 
or Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s daughter Sarah, each of whom occupies a space in the margins 
or footnotes of their husbands’ and fathers’ archives. Howe is very much aware of her 
complicity in the ‘barbarism’ of which Benjamin speaks by her perusal and production of 
‘documents of civilisation’: ‘Predominance pitched across history/ Collision or collusion 
with history’.31 As a white woman writing about American history, Howe is conscious that 
‘I am/ Part of their encroachment’, ‘My ancestors tore off/ the first leaves/ picked out the 
best stars’.32 Rather than fully ‘dissociate’ from the archive, however, Howe attempts to 
detect the signals transmitted from elsewhere, to find the shape of a mode of transmission 
that does not favour ‘the winners’. While the authority of the archive and systems of 
knowledge is powerful, it is also mutable within its own context. Howe is interested in the 
residuum left over from the ‘classificatory procedure’ because it disrupts the notion that all 
knowledge can be contained in a totality; her poetic project is concerned with inscribing 
those singularities of the archive – these are both points of divergence from classificatory 
logic, and the experience of history as an actuality – as she does with James Clarence 
Mangan and Melville’s Bartleby in ‘Melville's Marginalia’. Howe translates these 
singularities into her poetic syntax, focusing on hesitations, stutters, illegible marks and 
dashes on the graphic surface of the page.33 One prototype for this typographic arrest is 
Emily Dickinson’s unusual punctuation, particularly the dash, which has famously 
befuddled her editors. Howe interprets these dashes as a ‘hush of hesitation for breath and 
for breathing’, investing silence with expressive potentiality.34  
This also takes the form of unfinished sentences, as well as fragments of text taped 
over one other so that only a portion of the text can be read, leaving the rest is illegible. 
These arrests the hold of sequential, progressive thought and foreclose the possibility of a 
universal, univocal interpretation. On one hand, the dash gestures towards the mystery of the 
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34 Howe, My Emily Dickinson (New York: New Direction, 1985; repr. 2007), p. 23 
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unspoken and unutterable; it attests to the fact that not everything can be contained in 
language. On the other hand, it can indicate the pause before the breaking of silence, the 
breath taken in before speaking. The dash provides the space for multiple attachments and 
connections even as it fractures discourse. The idea of the dash is one way of seeing the two 
poles at work in Howe's poetry, which open up a space ‘between’ articulation and 
inarticulation. Howe describes this as ‘the instance of balance between silence, seeing, and 
saying: the moment before speech’.35  
In the dedicated body of Howe criticism, nearly every scholar and reviewer remarks 
upon the ‘strangeness’ of Howe's work. Charles Bernstein’s review describes That This as a 
‘characteristically strange and unsettling volume’; Rebecca Ariel Porte draws a comparison 
between Howe's ‘strange poetics’ and the filmmaker Chris Marker, the subject of Howe's 
Sorting Facts (1996).36 In his study of Howe’s poetry, Montgomery describes Howe’s work 
as strange several times, from the ‘strangely textured poetic landscape of The Midnight’ to a 
more general ‘quality of strangeness that pervades Howe’s poem[s] and the way it articulates 
literary relationships’.37 In each case, and in its general usage, ‘strange’ designates 
something unknown, unfamiliar and undefinable and, again, unassimilable into critical 
exegesis. Howe's project is paradoxical in that it attempts to represent absence and articulate 
silence – not through ventriloquism or an inflated sense of speaking ‘for’ the dead – but by 
seeking to find the sounds and forms that absence paradoxically takes. In an effort to wrench 
power from the ‘winners’, she invests silence with a certain expressive agency, even if that 
silence only expresses the fact of its suppression in the archive. The ‘absolute absence’ of 
the dead is inexpressible.38 There is a certain consonance in Howe’s work between the 
silences in the archive (particularly women’s absent voices) and the constitution of the 
artwork itself, which at its core holds something that is also inexpressible and strange. In his 
discussion of Goethe’s Elective Affinities, Benjamin defines the caesura (borrowed from 
Hölderlin) as ‘the expressionless power in all media’ as the interruption of the onrush of 
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significance and symbolisation in artwork; the caesura is the interruption the brings forth the 
secret meaning of the work that cannot, after all, be represented.39 
Indeed, it is the strangeness of coincidence and ‘poetry telepathy’ that, even when 
inscribed into a poem, cannot be conveyed.40 The caesura calls attention to the work as a 
work, to representation as such; it reinforces Howe's words in That This, an elegy to her 
husband: ‘Art is a mystery; artifice its form’.41 Form, or artifice, is all that is available to us 
in order to perceive or recognise an object. ‘Mystery’ as such is unknowable, unspeakable, 
and abstract. The artifice that covers and veils the mystery is the allegorical image, in which 
an ‘absent and unrecoverable meaning is joined to an excessive and overdetermined 
language […] incomplete and imperfect, because it evokes some meaning […] some 
“otherness” that it can designate but not join’.42 The allegory, as ‘the trope of death’, unites 
the converging insights of Howe's poetry into loss, the material object, the inexpressible, the 
Dickinsonian/Hölderlinian caesura, and the alterity of history.43  
As Montgomery notes, and as the many articles and monographs dedicated to Howe’s 
work continue to show, ‘there are numerous contexts in which Howe’s work can be read’.44 
Her early career as a visual artist, her association with Lyn Heijinian and other 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets, her matrilineal links to Irish modernism, her assimilation of 
American poets from Dickinson to Stevens, and, not least, her recurrent interest in the 
religious topography of colonial New England – all mark possible lines of enquiry into 
Howe’s work.45 Isolating these influences is probably impossible, a fact that, on its own, 
reveals a great deal about Howe’s work: the associational logic with which it barely – 
tangentially – touches its subject ‘matter’ before it moves on or through to yet another, 
equally embedded, relation. This is not to say that Howe’s attention to her material is 
superficial, but that her attention to surfaces (pages, curtains, images) enables the paratactic 
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arrangement of their similarities. In ‘Bed Hangings II’, Howe describes how her mother 
‘hung Jack’s [Jack Yeats, W.B. Yeats’s brother] illustrations and prints on the walls of any 
house or apartment we moved to as if they were windows. Broadsides were an escape 
route.’46 This quotation may describe the structure of Howe’s work: the point at which the 
print on the wall resembles a window, when one thing is perceived in another thing, an 
‘escape route’ is opened. Howe’s material dissolves into its similarities. In the next section, 
I want to explore this interplay between strangeness and similarity as a way of understanding 
a term that Howe uses in The Nonconformist’s Memorial: poetry telepathy. 
2.2 Howe’s Archive of Nonsensuous Similarities  
The form and structure of relation is one point at which I read Howe in dialogue with Walter 
Benjamin. Although Howe’s work explores the many manifestations of relation – family 
relations and family resemblances; it is not characterised by unity but by a tendency of 
similarities to disjoin, to fall apart the moment they are perceived as such. This suggests that 
fragmentation both precedes and proceeds from moments of similarity, an insight that can 
also be found in Benjamin’s thought: ‘The perception of similarity is in every case bound to 
a flashing up. It flits past, can possibly be won again, but cannot really be held fast as can 
other perceptions. It offers itself to the eye as fleetingly and transitorily as a constellation of 
stars.’47  
By ‘similar’, Benjamin does not mean ‘identical’, and it is because of this distinction 
that mimesis becomes the bearer of all that is ‘nonidentical’ between a concept and the image 
that is meant to represent it, the thought and the word that expresses it, language and the 
script that translates it: ‘everything mimetic in language is an intention which can appear at 
all only in connection with something alien as its basis: precisely the semiotic or 
communicative element of language’.48 But, as Benjamin’s example of children ‘becoming’ 
trains or windmills is meant to demonstrate, mimesis is not only the perception and 
generation of similarities but the capacity to ‘become’ similar. In other words, no similarity 
can be discerned in language without the simultaneous recognition of the mimetic object’s 
difference from its predicate – indeed, ‘something alien’ is the sole signatory of the ‘doctrine 
of the similar’, a concept that foregrounds some of Benjamin’s key formulations on language 
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and mimesis, and anticipates the dialectical image while also elaborating the alterity that 
structures similarity. The very basis of similarity, then, is found in the dissimilar, as 
Benjamin attests: 
‘Every word – indeed, the whole language – is onomatopoeic.’ The key which finally 
makes this thesis fully transparent lies concealed in the concept of a nonsensuous 
similarity. For if words meaning the same thing in different languages are arranged about 
that signified as their centre, we have to enquire how they all – while not having the 
slightest similarity to one another – are similar to the signified at their center.49  
‘Nonsensuous similarity’ is the relation between things that are ‘often […] not the slightest’ 
bit similar.50 Whether any object is actually ‘similar’ to another – and the arbitrary 
relationship between signs and signifiers suggests that perfect similitude is unobtainable – 
is not one of Benjamin’s concerns. Instead, what he is driving toward is similarity as a mode 
of perception. But as ‘nonsensuous’ indicates, this mode of perception (what Benjamin will 
call in a later essay the ‘mimetic faculty’) since it evades the sensuous and escapes rationale, 
actually eludes the traditional model of perception; it is a situation where, as Brian Massumi 
writes, ‘nothing actually given to our senses corresponds […] to the similarity that is 
nonetheless perceived.51 This is why it ‘cannot be held fast as can other perceptions’.52  
  Of course, Benjamin is less interested in ‘demonstrating found similarities’ than the 
‘processes which generate such similarities.’53 The first example Benjamin provides is 
‘nature […] one need only think of mimicry’. It is clear from the start, then, that the 
perception of similarity falls under the rubric of mimesis. Benjamin’s concept of mimesis 
diverges from its classical conception as mere imitation; indeed, Benjamin finds the origin 
of nonsensuous similarity in the more ancient, pre-philosophical practice of astrology and 
clairvoyance, in which the moment of interpretation – of reading the similar – is tied to the 
‘moment of birth, which is […] but an instant’. Astrologers used the position of the stars to 
describe the character and fate of the newborn; yet because this hypothetical newborn is in 
effect a ‘tabula rasa’ without any material experiences, he or she is inimitable, which is why 
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Benjamin characterises this scenario as the ne plus ultra of nonsensuous similarity. The baby 
cannot yet be compared to anything – except something ‘other’ than itself.  
At this point in Benjamin’s essay on similarity, as in his other work, the distinction 
between image and word becomes confused, a ‘confusion’ in the Babelian sense which 
marks language itself, a subject he explores at length in the 1916 essay ‘On the Language of 
Man and Language as Such’.54 I do not wish to linger too long on this essay, but will attempt 
to briefly summarise Benjamin’s argument, which is mobilised through a close reading of 
Genesis. God’s Word, which is creative, does not ‘refer’ to a concept as does the human 
word; for example, ‘Let there be light’ coincides immediately with the creation of light. 
God’s ‘word’ is identical to the thing it calls forth; the distinction between signifier and 
signified, referent and reference, does not exist in this ‘pure’ language which is 
simultaneous, total, and unified. In paradise, communication is unmediated. It is only after 
the expulsion from Eden that the mediacy of language, that is, language as a medium or 
means, came into being. As S. Brent Plate succinctly remarks, the ‘arbitrary split between 
signifier and signified’ occurred.55 The consequence of this split is the impoverishment of 
language, now partial and finite, where ‘the word must communicate something (other than 
itself). In this fact lies the true Fall of the spirit of language’.56  
The word’s obligation to communicate something ‘other’ than itself recalls the 
structure of the Vexierbild, an image in which the picture of a duck ‘means’ the picture of a 
rabbit; in both cases, ‘other’ has a double meaning. In the first case, ‘other’ merely connotes 
the disparity between the word and its referent; and, relatedly, in the second case, ‘other’ 
comes to mean ‘something alien’ and this ‘something’ is language itself. Benjamin conceives 
of (fallen) language as a kind of picture-puzzle, in which the ‘imparting of the impartable 
[Mitteilung des Mitteilbaren], is at the same time Symbol of the non-impartable [Symbols 
des Nicht-Mitteilbaren].57 The ‘non-impartable’ (or ‘non-communicable’) component of 
language is not the impossibility of communicating or ‘imparting’; neither is it simply the 
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‘opposite’ of communication; rather, it is the ‘ability to stay with that from which it parts’.58 
What this tells us is that the linguistic schism initiated by the Fall does not cause ‘pure 
language’ to disappear from sight; rather, it is retained in the ‘un-impartable’ element of all 
languages as the ‘residue of the creative word of God’.59 In other words, following Samuel 
Weber, the non-impartable is that which cannot be mediated and which is therefore im-
mediate, ‘that which is defined by the potentiality of taking leave of itself, of its place and 
position, of altering itself’.60  
Similarity, I am trying to suggest, is constituted not by ‘sameness’: rather, things 
become similar precisely because they are non-identical. The incongruity between a word 
and its object is the defining characteristic of human language, according to Benjamin. This 
incongruity subsequently provides the grounds for similarity that he outlines in ‘Doctrine of 
the Similar’. The ‘alien’, ‘other’ quality of similarity (its uncanniness, in other words) – the 
‘difference’ in the ‘familiar’ – is none other than the strangeness of language itself. Language 
is strange to itself because it can only refer to its object by way of similarity:  
It is thus nonsensuous similarity that establishes the ties not only between what is said 
and what is meant, but also between what is written and what is meant, and equally 
between the spoken and the written. And every time, it does so in a completely new, 
original, and underivable way. The most important of these ties may, however, be the 
one mentioned last – between what is written and what is said. For the similarity which 
reigns here is comparatively the most nonsensuous. It is also the one which takes the 
longest to be reached.61 
This is why Benjamin writes that language, and no more so than in ‘script’, has become ‘an 
archive of nonsensuous similarities, of nonsensuous correspondences.’62 In the latter 
statement, taken together with Benjamin’s earlier account of language, nonsensuous 
similarity is the basis of reading. Although Benjamin does not explicitly discuss the tendency 
of similarities to proliferate at the point of their dispersion (the moment after they ‘flit by’) 
that I have described in Howe’s work, it can nonetheless be discerned in the phrase ‘archive 
of nonsensuous similarities’: language is an archive from which any number of 
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configurations can be fashioned because of the non-identity of what is said (in language) and 
what is meant; its arbitrary signification recalls Benjamin’s pronouncement on baroque 
allegory, where ‘any thing, person, or relationship can mean absolutely anything else’.63 Like 
Benjamin, Howe is acutely alert to the insufficiencies of language, particularly written 
language, and the lyric poem, which hovers ambiguously between its sonic origins and its 
modern ‘enclosure’ within the pages of the book. The potential disjuncture between ‘what is 
written and what is said’ is as deeply determined in Howe’s work as it is in Benjamin’s. 
Howe’s work explores language and script as ‘an archive of nonsensuous similarities’ 
situated in the archive as such. In what follows, I analyse ‘Melville’s Marginalia’, a poem 
sequence from The Nonconformist’s Memorial which establishes Howe’s dialectical 
disruption of the archive (which holds the documents of barbarism and the records of the 
‘winners’), and where, through ‘shock of poetry telepathy’, she ‘brushes history against the 
grain’ (to quote Benjamin once more) by uncovering a history that appears to undermine 
linear chronology.64  
Howe’s archive is an ‘archive of nonsensuous similarity’, a product of what Benjamin 
calls ‘magical reading’.65 The ‘shock’ Howe experiences is the flash of a dialectical 
encounter between past and present which appears as ‘the caesura in the movement of 
thought’.66 While in ‘Melville’s Marginalia’ this caesura occurs phenomenologically (within 
the ‘movement of thought’), in The Midnight, Howe uses the image of the tissue interleaf – 
a piece of tissue paper that was used in bookbinding until to 1914 – to signify the dialectical 
arrest of history. In contrast to Chapter 1, where I located Markson’s late work in relation to 
Benjamin’s Arcades Project, in this chapter I situate Howe’s poetry in relation to Benjamin’s 
early work on the German Trauerspiel and his mystical theory of language.   
‘Melville’s Marginalia’ can be seen to develop Benjamin’s notion of nonsensuous 
similarity and the theologically inflected theory of language that underpins it. It begins with 
an extract from Herman Melville’s Journal where the author of Moby-Dick parenthetically 
describes his tour of Roman ruins and his pilgrimage to Keats’s and Shelley’s graves: ‘Went 
to Baths of Caracalla – Wonderful. Massive. Ruins form, as it were, natural bridges of 
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thousands of arches. There are glades, & thickets among the ruins – high up. – Thought of 
Shelley. […] Read Keats’ epitaph. Separated from the adjacent ground by trench. – Shelley 
in the other ground.’67 Howe thus frames her archive encounter with Melville, one of her 
idols, with a letter describing his own pilgrimage. This framing also suggests that the archive 
transforms from an oppressive epistemological regime to a grave-site where authors and the 
afterlife of their works might be interred. This transformation, of course, is actualised by the 
poet and her incursion into the archive as a renegade outsider.  
Following this quotation, Howe recalls ‘the spring of 1991’ when ‘I was teaching Billy 
Budd for a graduate seminar in Philadelphia’.68 While ‘searching through Melville criticism’, 
Howe ‘notice[s] two maroon dictionary-size volumes, lying haphazardly, out of reach, 
almost out of sight on the topmost shelf. That’s how I found Melville’s Marginalia or how 
Melville’s Marginalia found me.’69 The aleatory nature of Howe’s discovery is paramount 
here, and even more so is the inaccessible, ‘almost out of reach’ location of the volume that 
will become the driving force behind the poem: does it ‘find’ her or does she ‘find’ it? I have 
been using the word ‘discovery’ to describe Howe’s encounter with the marooned volume, 
but perhaps ‘stumbles’ is more accurate; Howe empties ‘discovery’ of its intentionality – the 
volume ‘finds her’ –  fully aware of the historical implications of ‘discovery’ as domination. 
Even so, Howe ‘meets’ the book halfway between intention and accident, stressing the forms 
of marginal, medial contact that proliferate in this poem.70  
Wilson Walker Cowen was the compiler of Melville’s Marginalia, a book that 
‘collected and transcribed every page from every known volume of Herman Melville’s 
library’ whom Howe describes in Bartleby-like terms as a ‘sub-sub-graduate student in a 
time before librarians.’71 Because it only reproduces the pages Melville annotated from each 
book, Cowen’s text has ‘little forward trajectory’; as a ‘literal transcription’ using ‘each 
original’s type-set line lengths, [his] prose often looks like poetry.’72 Cowen’s literal 
transcription functions here as Hölderlin’s ‘literal translations’ of Sophocles do for 
Benjamin.73 A literal translation disregards the coherence of the sentence in favour of each 
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discrete word. The sentence, in Benjamin’s analogy, ‘is the wall before the language of the 
original’ while the word is ‘the arcade’.74 These transparent, monadic arcades recall Howe’s 
mother’s ‘escape route’ that appears when Jack Yeats’s illustrations suddenly resemble 
windows. For Howe, that which covers also reveals and opens. Thus oriented toward the 
word, the literal translation/transcription opens a way out of the circumscribed meaning of 
the original. Like the relationship between the word and what is meant, translation lays bare 
the discrepancy between an original and its translation; a ‘perfect’ translation is no more 
attainable than ‘pure language’. As Bettine Menke writes, literal translation ‘dis-places the 
word (to be translated) [which] becomes doubled and disintegrates within that turning 
(away) through which it directs itself towards an other (the translated) word’.75 Menke’s 
description of literal translation unearths the structure of relation that I have been attempting 
to delineate: similarity requires fragmentation in order to ‘survive’. Cowen’s literal 
transcription does not distinguish between Melville’s marginal notes and the text they are 
written on; the transcription thus becomes something ‘other’ than either of them; as Howe 
remarks, his ‘prose often looks like poetry’, calling it what Howe describes as a ‘synthesis 
of attraction and withdrawal’.76  Both Benjamin’s Hölderlin and Howe’s Cowen underscore 
the media of translation and manuscript. Indeed, one might approach Howe’s assimilation 
of others’ work into her own as a ‘word-for-word’ translation into poetic language. These 
structures of translation and similarity are at play when Montgomery writes that ‘Melville’s 
Marginalia’ ‘uproots Mangan from his minor place in literary studies and inserts him into an 
alien [American] tradition’.77 In doing so, Mangan ‘becomes doubled’ in the fictional figure 
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of Bartleby, and vice versa.78 He also doubles Howe’s own mother’s double or rather triple 
identity as an Anglo-Irish woman who became an American, and her ‘insertion’ into an 
‘alien’ country.  
James Clarence Mangan was a nineteenth-century Irish poet, scrivener, ordnance 
surveyor, translator, and political writer admired by Yeats and Joyce, but who in his (and 
Melville’s) own time was fairly obscure. In this volume Howe finds ‘a newspaper clipping 
about the poet […] pasted to the inside cover under the first owner’s name’ which Melville 
had ‘lined out’.79 Also in the margins is a calculation: Melville ‘has worked out the poet’s 
dates’ of birth and death, the sum of which is only forty-five. Mangan died in 1848.80 
‘Bartleby’, as Howe notes above, was published in 1853. Moreover, Melville’s copy of 
Mangan’s work was published in 1859. Origins and originality are concepts that Howe 
interrogates across her work, across the whole of The Nonconformist’s Memorial but 
particularly in ‘Melville’s Marginalia’.81 The book belonging to Melville that Howe is most 
intrigued by is Poems by James Clarence Mangan: 
On a January morning, in the hushed privacy of the Anglo-European-American 
Houghton Library, I opened Poems by James Clarence Mangan, with Biographical 
Introduction by John Mitchel (New York: Haverty, 1859). I saw the pencilled trace of 
Herman Melville’s passage through John Mitchel’s introduction and knew by shock 
of poetry telepathy the real James Clarence Mangan is the progenitor of fictional 
Bartleby.  
The problem was chronology. 
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Melville wrote ‘Bartleby, The Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street’ during the summer 
of 1853.82  
It is here that the dialogue between Howe and Benjamin finally becomes clear. The archive 
thus becomes a medium consisting in ‘a movement that separates from itself, and yet – here 
the paradox of what Benjamin himself […] calls the ‘magic’ of language – in so doing 
establishes a relation with itself as other.’83 In ‘Melville’s Marginalia’ language takes on a 
more mystical role than Benjamin probably would have liked (although the role of mysticism 
in his work should not be underestimated). Howe writes of Melville’s marginal notes, ‘Marks 
he made in the margins of his books are often a conversation with the dead’.84 Benjamin 
defines divinatory practices of antiquity, such as astrology or haruspicy, the reading of 
entrails, as the origins of ‘reading per se’.85 Through ‘magic reading’ – which obtains from 
the ‘clairvoyance [that] has over the course of history yielded its old powers’ to ‘script and 
language’ – Howe establishes the ‘real’ Mangan as the ‘progenitor’ (i.e., the ‘original’) to 
‘fictional’ Bartleby.86  
The problem is chronology.  
According to the dates Howe provides, the chances of Melville coming into contact 
with Mangan’s work before writing ‘Bartleby’ are slim indeed. This is not as much of a 
‘problem’ as Howe might initially lead the reader to believe. The kind of biblio-
chronological evidence required to empirically install Mangan as Melville’s model for 
Bartleby would neither generate nor necessitate the ‘shock of poetry telepathy’ that Howe 
describes. However, Howe does later manage to establish that Melville, through a 
subscription to a literary magazine United States Magazine and Literary Review, which in 
1851 published an issue ‘entirely devoted to Mangan’: ‘Mangan already had American 
readers during the 1850s, though it would be hard to know’, she writes. Howe finds a 
reference to an article by Francis J. Thompson called ‘Mangan in America: 1850-1860’ 
wherein the author ‘demonstrates persuasively that Mangan’s reputation was legendary 
among writers in New York City’.87 Although Howe determines that ‘Melville […] was 
already familiar with the poet’s life and work’ prior to 1859, the nonsensuous similarity 
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between the real Mangan and the fictional Bartleby still obtains.88 I am interested in the 
initial ‘shock of poetry telepathy’ that leads Howe to intuit a relation that evades chronology 
and interrupts the linear temporality of (literary) historicism.89 Shock belongs to a specific 
structure of temporality: time’s singular arrest.90 The ‘shock’ in ‘Melville’s Marginalia’ is, 
on the one hand, the ‘shock’ of recognition that enters Mangan and Bartleby into 
nonsensuous similitude; one the other hand, it is the ‘shock’ of the chronology that forces 
them to withdraw their momentary affinity – an affinity whose imperfect, incomplete residue 
endures in the text as a historical and linguistic afterlife.  
The line break before and after the ‘[t]he problem was chronology’ is significant. 
Typographically set off from the previous paragraph, it demarcates Howe’s telepathic 
‘shock’ that leads her to relate Mangan and Bartleby and the subsequent research which 
seems to contradict her visionary discovery. As a linguistic unit, ‘the problem was 
chronology’ mediates the paragraphs that border it; the content of this sentence rends them 
asunder. The placement of ‘chronology’ (as a word and as a concept) at once establishes the 
relation that emerges outside of time – and also ‘breaks’ that relation, preventing it from 
yielding to perfect or complete accordance. Nothing could better describe the attenuated 
sentence presented by ‘the problem was chronology’ than the prosodic figure of the caesura 
I mentioned earlier, an intervening ‘cut’ in the poem that forces a metrical hesitation. For 
Benjamin, it marks the ‘moments of arrest’, the ‘standstill’ that is required ‘in order to give 
free reign to an expressionless power inside all artistic media’.91 In other words, the 
momentary silence enforced or enjambed by the caesura stands in for the meaning that words 
cannot – but nonetheless aspire to – bear. Analogous to the linguistic Fall, which splits pure 
language into immanent fragments, the caesura occurs when ‘something beyond the poet 
interrupts the language of the poetry’.92 
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The relation Howe perceives in Mangan and Bartleby lies at the margins of experience; 
they are, as Howe writes, ‘names who are strangers out of bounds of the bound margin’.93 
When one thing turns toward the other in relation, both break apart, a movement replicated 
in the embodiment of Howe’s research: ‘Pages of “Fragments From an Unfinished 
Autobiography” are so brittle pieces break off when I turn’.94 This (in turn) returns us to 
Benjamin’s rhetoric of translation which involves the simultaneous breaking away (from the 
original) and breaking into (the translation) that characterises the afterlife. Howe’s poetry 
yields the structure of the afterlife which is based not on continuity or sameness but 
interruption and alteration. Mangan becomes something ‘other’, placed outside of his 
original context and oriented towards Bartleby and vice versa – neither can be fully separated 
into the other; each retains something that cannot be imparted and speaks to the incomplete, 
partial nature of relation that Benjamin variously ascribes to translation and mimesis.  
What is at work is a kind of negative theology of relation where what is missing from 
relation, the ‘un-impartable’ content of an object that cannot be assimilated, reveals its 
(absent) presence in what has been imparted. The caesura thus prevents the poet/reader from 
interpreting the relation between Mangan and Bartleby as mere resemblance, an affinity 
based on appearances but alerts the reader to their alterity. As Howe’s ‘shock of poetry 
telepathy’ attests, their true, ‘secret’ relation is inarticulable because it occurs outside of 
ordinary perception and within an arrested, traumatic temporality. But this is also, as we 
have seen, the temporality in which Benjamin’s concept of nonsensuous similarity emerges 
(‘flitting by’, unable to be ‘held fast’) and ‘grasps’ Howe’s own maxim that ‘perception of 
an object means loosing it and losing it.’95 This is reflected in the arrangement of the text, 
which is intercut with caesural fragments of text, excerpts, and typographical interventions 
which present sentences as mirror images. Montgomery describes what, alongside Barbour, 
I am calling the caesura in Howe’s work, as ‘a moment of arrest that prevents language 
flowing through the normal syntactical routes, from one thing to another’.96 While I agree 
that, in general in Howe’s work, the ‘moment of arrest’ stalls language and distorts its ‘flow’, 
it does not prevent her from carrying ‘one thing’ over ‘to another’. It is this stuttered 
movement that characterises the associational dis-order of her texts. In fact, as I have been 
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arguing, the caesura that fragments relation is a cut through which new attachments can be 
– momentarily – formed. As Barbour writes in her discussion of the dash, the  ‘caesura-
image’ both ‘interrupts and conjoins’.97 
Benjamin regards the similarity between the written word and the spoken word as 
‘comparatively the most nonsensuous’ because the written word is the most ‘distant’ from 
the embodied voice: sound is translated into script and enclosed on the page. While writing 
is an embodied act, the printed word is detached not only from the author’s hand, separated 
from her written signature, but also from her voice, even as the word acts as an index to that 
voice. This applies particularly to lyric poetry’s spoken, even sung, origins. If this suggests 
that textuality takes precedence over aurality and orality, Howe is often at pains to insist 
otherwise: ‘in spite of all my talk about the way a page looks […] strangely, the strongest 
element I feel when I am writing something is acoustic’.98 Howe conceives of script in terms 
almost identical to Benjamin: ‘I never really lost the sense that words, even single letters, 
are images […] The look of a word is part of its meaning – the meaning that escapes the 
dictionary definition.’99 While she emphasises the visual, ‘hieroglyphic’ quality of the 
letters, Howe also recognises the sonic connotations attached to ‘script’, which designates a 
system of writing and playscripts from which actors read their lines aloud. The act of reading 
script aloud is itself the mimetic embodiment of another body’s voice. What Howe seems to 
be suggesting is that the written word preserves some vestiges of the voice it once belonged 
to. There is an obvious delay, however, between the moment a thing is written and the 
moment it is ‘sounded out’ – suggesting, again, the element of belatedness that is often at 
work in Howe’s and Benjamin’s own overlapping understanding of similarity. Howe further 
probes the dialectic nature of the spoken and the written word in ‘Melville’s Marginalia’ 
during her characteristic meta-poeitic commentary: ‘I thought one way to write about a loved 
author would be to follow what trails he follows through the words of others’.100 These 
‘trails’ are by no means clear and unambiguous, precisely because the voices Howe looks 
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for in the margins are elusive and incomplete, for as soon as Howe ‘grasps’ one voice, it  
disappears through another ‘escape route’ of association and she must ‘grasp’ once again.  
Howe views poetry as that ‘which brings similitude and representation to 
configurations waiting from forever to be spoken’.101 The distance between written words 
and the voice is often longer than a lifetime; they appear to ‘wait forever to be spoken’: the 
relationship between the poetic voice and these ‘waiting’ voices is a relationship between 
the living and the dead.102 Through recollections written by Mangan’s contemporaries and 
his own autobiographical writings, Howe draws a portrait of a man ‘roosting on a ladder/ for 
several months/ even several years/ […] in a brown garment […] which lasted until/ the day 
of his death’.103 Howe quotes John Savage, one of Mangan’s contemporaries, who writes 
that the poet ‘glides rather than walks’ and describes his ‘silver white locks surround[ing]’ 
his face ‘like a tender halo’.104 Mangan, Howe records, died of starvation in Dublin after 
contracting cholera. Joyce, whom Howe also quotes, echoes this sentiment: ‘is it not perhaps 
a profound sense of sorrow and bitterness that explains in Mangan all the names and titles 
that he gives himself, and the fury of translation in which he tried to hide himself?’105 David 
Lloyd pronounces this as the ‘death of the author’ avant la lettre. Howe takes this notion to 
its extreme, underscoring the dual meaning of corpus within her bibliographic poetics: 
Wearied human language 
take me so that I am no longer dispersed  
and appear not to know 
When I wander off 
roughened and wrought human 
to the matter of fact106  
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Human language is ‘wearied’ because it must always refer to what it means in a grasping 
gesture. It is unclear whether the lyric ‘I’ pertains to Howe, who ‘appears not to know/ when 
[she] wanders off’ or to Mangan, whose potential immortality as Bartleby (but whose ‘fate’ 
he shares) is ‘roughened and wrought human/ to the matter of fact’. A persistent figure in 
Howe’s work is the ‘library cormorant’ (Emerson and the minister John Edwards), a creature 
of the archive.107 But Mangan is the most ‘creaturely’ of these, a being whose mortality is 
so concentrated that even his friends describe him as a ‘spectral looking man’, leading Howe 
to imagine him as a ‘spectral creature on a ladder/all his soul was in the book/ in his arms’.108 
In the ‘translation’ between life and death, what is left are words, like any other translation. 
Above all, this emphasises, in extremis, the materiality and contingency of the word, not 
only in the linguistic sense discussed above, but as the ‘bodily trace’ left by the writer or – 
in the margins – the reader. Benjamin defines ‘trace’ as ‘the appearance of proximity, 
however distant what it left behind may be,’ while the ‘aura is the appearance of distance, 
however close what it conjures up may be.’ Howe’s poetry complicates this notion. In the 
following sections, I want to investigate this materiality, and the significance of both aura 
and trace in The Midnight. 
2.3 Microfilm and Interleaf: The Afterlife of the Aura 
Before aura is mentioned by name in Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay, it is defined negatively 
as ‘the one thing [that] is lacking [from] the work of art’.109 When the term is finally 
introduced it is as ‘what withers in the age of the technological reproducibility of the work 
of art’.110 The aura’s negative constitution in the essay will become important for reasons I 
will introduce presently. Benjamin’s most characteristic description of the aura, as ‘the 
apparition of a distance, however near it may be’, is posed against ‘the desire of the present-
day masses to “get closer” to things spatially and humanly, and their equally passionate 
concern for overcoming each thing’s uniqueness by assimilating it as a reproduction’.111 
Benjamin associates the constitutive ‘distance’ of the aura with the ‘cult value’ of religious 
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art, providing examples of prehistoric cave drawings, ancient Greek temple statues, and 
images of the Madonna.112  
Benjamin’s central thesis in the ‘Work of Art’ essay, is that, with the introduction of 
intensive methods of technical reproduction, the original work of art (conceptually and in 
actuality) loses its unique situation in time and place.  The aura is secured by the art object’s 
material history – the ‘changes to the physical structure of the work over time’ – and its 
singular location in place, its ‘provenance’, so to speak. Auratic objects can be placed in a 
chain of ownership based on the structure of tradition in which things and knowledge are 
‘handed down from the past’.113 The concept of aura that Benjamin explores in this text is 
rooted in the ‘observance’ of religious art rooted in a specific time and place: ‘the unique 
value of the “authentic” work of art has its basis in ritual, the source of its original use value’; 
this ‘cult value’ persists ‘however mediated it may be […] as secularized ritual in even the 
most profane forms’.114 While artworks have, Benjamin asserts, always possessed a certain 
‘reproducibility’ (‘in principle, the work of art has always been reproducible’), the rapid 
escalation of technical modes of reproduction (as opposed to still-manual methods such as 
lithography or woodcut) ‘detaches the reproduced object from the sphere of tradition’.115 
Before the advent of photography, the aura’s distance was not only maintained between an 
object and its beholder, but extended to the relationship between original and copy. Indeed, 
before the aura’s decline, there were no ‘copies’ to speak of, only ‘forger[ies]’ whose 
incongruousness from the original could be readily discerned.116 With the intensification of 
reproductive technologies came mass reproduction, and, so the story goes, the aura of the 
work of art faded away. The disappearance of the aura inaugurated a transformation in the 
way art was perceived and made: as Jan Mieszkowski writes, ‘[t]echnical reproduction 
[became] an artistic process in its own right’, citing Benjamin’s assertion that ‘the work of 
art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility’.117 By making works 
of art accessible to the masses, the distance between a work and its beholder which 
constitutes the aura is significantly diminished. The aura of an artwork also depends on its 
materiality, its ‘physical duration’ in the course of its existence in time. If the work of art is 
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being constantly reproduced, the original not only loses its ‘authority’ and ‘authenticity’, it 
becomes less valuable in the sense that it can be substituted with a copy, which is not subject 
to decay.118 In what follows, I want to suggest that Howe’s poetry offers a re-evaluation of 
the aura through two poems in The Midnight that revolve around reprography and print 
technology: the first is the prose poem, ‘Scare Quotes II’, in which Howe meditates on her 
‘contact’ with the microfilm copies of Charles Sanders Peirce’s manuscripts; is bifurcated 
poem in two parts, spread across the recto and verso sides of a page just after the book’s title 
page.119 Both, I argue, suggest that the aura does not disappear with the advent of 
technological reproduction, but that it can reappear when certain modes of reproduction fade 
away. Furthermore, I suggest that Howe’s own use of technology is a means of interrogating 
the divide between original and copy. 
Throughout her work, Susan Howe foregrounds the materiality of both text and 
textile by utilising forms of reprography: x-rays, electrostatic reproduction, photocopying, 
and photography. This slightly paradoxical relationship – between the materiality of the book 
form and the intangibility of the copy and its distance from the original – is played out and 
redoubled in work particularly in works such as Souls of the Labadie Tract, The Midnight, 
and That This. Howe’s exploration of the dynamic between original and copy encompasses 
aesthetic, theological, and historical categories (though these categories are by no means 
rigidly discrete). Howe asks why, and how, certain images, including images of texts 
survive, while others become extinct. The highly contingent and perilous process of archival 
conservation mediates our ‘contact’ with historical documents. In archives and libraries, 
‘copies’ – such as microfiches and, more recently, digitisation – have become instrumental 
not only to the accessibility of these resources, but also to the preservation of fragile 
documents whose pages or plates may be damaged by physical consultation. This highly 
mediated relationship between scholars, such as Howe, and the documents they consult, 
generates an otherworldly, cthonic experience which Howe describes in The Midnight: 
Most of my contact with Peirce manuscripts has been via microfilm. It is a retrograde 
medium doomed by computers to extinction. Microform machines are hypnotic, 
pale-eyed, anonymous […] As I scroll a spool of film up and down, forward and 
back, across the mechanical apparatus, various embedded characters, cryptic lists of 
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numbers, erasures, questions, miniscule messages, shifting shapes, excesses and 
defects, strange survivals, and rhetorical effects can be reeled or rotated each into 
each. The film on the spool is frozen yet unapologetically even rhythmically various. 
I am a detective, an editor, a director, a watching eye. I work in a zone of colorless 
absence. The original is untouchable, what I see before, incorporeal.120 
It is an obvious but notable point that, compared to immediacy, which connotes 
instantaneity, mediacy designates some form of duration and indicates a distance that can be 
traversed. Howe’s encounter with microfilm in ‘Scare Quotes II’ lays bare the fact that the 
experience of history, if it can be called that, is always already mediated: one only comes to 
know it at various degrees of remove, an orientation which is governed by a temporality of 
belatedness. Any ‘historical’ insight must occur after the fact, or ‘lately’. Indeed, the 
microfilm, the tool used by Howe to make ‘contact’ with Peirce’s manuscripts, is on its way 
toward obsolescence, a ‘retrograde medium doomed by computers to extinction’.121 Even 
so, the microform machine allows the reader to magnify and focus certain aspects of the 
manuscript which are less visible, if not inaccessible, in the consultation of the original, 
physical papers. At the same time, the microform machine (commonly and intriguingly 
called a microform reader) has an inevitably ‘mechanical’ effect on Howe’s perception of 
the text, whose contents can be ‘reeled or rotated each into each’. In The Midnight, the 
microfilm/microform reader represents the recurring overlap between text and textile. Part 
sewing machine, part camera, the microform reader requires the film ‘spool’ to be carefully 
loaded into the machine’s ‘spindle’.  
Microfilms are photographic reproductions of texts that have been miniaturised in a 
process called micrography; the ‘original’ that it reproduces cannot be seen without the 
magnifying apparatus provided by microfilm machine. Microfilm marks a certain 
democratisation of rare and often fragile manuscripts; it provides the possibility of 
dispensing with (often-costly) pilgrimage to the archive where originals are held. Even so, 
these copies can result in restricted access to the original, as Howe discovers in Harvard’s 
Houghton Library. Looking to consult the Emily Dickinson Room, where the poet’s 
manuscripts, letters, and personal library, Howe is instead met with an acerbic note from the 
library’s curator: 
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To Whom It May Concern: 
The books in the Emily Dickinson Room have been repeatedly studied and examined 
with the hope of finding annotations in the handwriting of Emily Dickinson. After 
years of study, no one has found a single mark that could be possibly assigned to her.  
In the process of this fruitless examination the books have suffered, and many of them 
have been transferred to the repair shelf. In order to avoid more useless wear and the 
shattering of 19th century publisher’s cloth cases, we have closed the Emily Dickinson 
Room Library for further examination.122  
Howe’s work repeatedly concerns itself the politics surrounding the accessibility of archives 
and other academic institutions. It would not be unfair to point out the conservative (and this 
word crosses many connotations) bent of the above-quoted note. The preservation of rare 
documents is, of course, vital to their future consultation, indeed, to their survival; but to 
deny access to such documents on the grounds of ‘fruitless examination’ and ‘useless wear’ 
implies are a hierarchical arrangement of scholarly consultation which values ‘results’ over 
inquiry as such, particularly the type of poetic scholarship practiced by Howe. Like the 
microfilm, the archive itself acts as mediator between the reader and the original text. 
Although the microfilm is a tangible object, its contents are virtual, which is to say 
‘untouchable’, separated by glass. Howe cannot reach into the screen to handle the pages or 
hear them rustle as they turn; the materiality characteristic of the manuscript disappears. The 
microfilm thus marks an unusual incursion into the structure of Benjamin’s aura. It is a copy, 
a reproduction, but it maintains both the physical and metaphysical characteristics of the 
aura: it has ‘the apparition of a distance, however near it may be.’123  
  The first page of The Midnight is a facsimile image of the interleaf that shields the 
title page of Robert Louis Stevenson’s The Master of Ballantrae, which Howe inherited from 
her maternal uncle, John Manning.124 Immediately after this image, on an unnumbered page, 
Howe offers a meditation on the interleaf, a piece of tissue paper that was once commonly 
used in bookbinding: 
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There was a time when bookbinders placed a tissue interleaf between frontispiece and 
title page in order to prevent illustration and text from rubbing together. Although a 
sign is understood to be consubstantial with the thing or being it represents, word and 
picture are essentially rivals. The transitional space between image and scripture is 
often a zone of contention. Here we must separate. Even printers and binders drift 
apart. Tissue paper for wrapping or folding can also be used for tracing. Mist-like 
transience. Listen, quick rustling.125 
The interleaf thus becomes a vestigial part of the book’s materiality; it is ‘rendered […] 
obsolete’ (under the inauspicious sign of the First World War) by industrial technology. 
From the interleaf’s design, which prevented illustration and title page from smudging each 
other, Howe adumbrates the ‘rivalry’ between ‘word and picture’, drawing on the theological 
and aesthetic forms of iconoclasm (and, in turn, forms of iconography). Its purpose is to 
preserve the ‘boundaries’ between text and illustration, to prevent ink from transferring. And 
yet because it occupies an interstitial space between the pages, it necessarily and 
significantly blurs those boundaries. Howe ‘folds’ the interleaf’s purpose onto itself: it 
becomes a ‘transitional space’ and a ‘zone of contention’, strongly suggesting more intricate 
and entangling relations between text and image, and, through her use of the facsimile image, 
challenges the injunction to ‘separate’ notions of original and copy. For Howe, the interleaf, 
like the margin, is a material component of the book that, despite its original purpose, offers 
paradigms of reading that resist the sequential, linearised, ‘progressive’ physical ordering of 
pages.  
Rather than reproduce the image of the interleaf as I have done below [Fig. 2], as a 
flat image in the middle of the page, Howe re-presents the interleaf in its three-dimensional 
entirety, taking up both sides of the page; on the verso the text can be seen fairly clearly 
through the covering of the interleaf (its wrinkles and creases are clearly visible), while the 
recto is a mirror-image of the same. The grainy, ‘mist-like’ quality of the page visually 
suggests two forms of ‘transience’: the opacity of the page suggests the sudden 
materialisation of the interleaf and its vanishing into obsolescence. 
                                                     




Figure 2. Interleaf from The Midnight 
On the verso side of this page, Howe offers a companion text to her initial discussion of the 
interleaf: 
The counterfeit presentment of two papers. After 1914, advances in printing 
technology rendered an interleaf obsolete. Mischief delights in playing with surfaces. 
Today each spectral scrap intact in a handed down book has acquired an enchanted 
aura quite apart from its original utilitarian function. Wonderfully life-like, 
approaching transparency, not shining; this pale or wanly yellow, tangible intangible 
murderously gentle exile, mutely begs to be excused. Superstition remains – as 
spiritual hyphen. Listen, quick rustling.126 
It may be clear by now that describing contours of this text involves the language of the 
manuscript: verso, recto, frontispiece, interleaf. The emphasis on the materiality of the book 
is paramount in these passages, which nevertheless pass into the immaterial. Investing a 
material object with ‘life’ may seem consonant with the commodity fetish. Such a reading 
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is possible, but I would suggest that Howe’s project can be conceived as a materialist one in 
the sense that it draws attention to the book (rather than the text) as an object, invoking its 
production and circulation. However, as David Ayers points out, ‘it is […] problematic to 
conceive of the book as a material object, since writing itself cannot be straightforwardly 
conceived as a material thing.’127 Ayers writes that although ‘the cognate terms material and 
materialist […] can[not] unproblematically converge’, the book-as-object further 
problematises any strict separation between them.128 At the same time, this attention to the 
material inevitably introduces a paradox that Ayers also succinctly raises: ‘to evoke the 
material is always at the same time unavoidably, hazily, to evoke the immaterial – some 
contrasting essence or quality excluded from materiality.’129 The interleaf becomes 
paradigmatic of this ‘dual optic’, a chiasmus-like reversal of the material and the 
immaterial.130 It is ‘tangible intangible,’ simultaneously, without a conjunction but separated 
by a blank ‘space of relation’. Howe’s formal configuration of her ‘material,’ adapted from 
collage and early modern textual practices, is likewise concerned with the ‘relational space’ 
– ‘the thing that’s alive with something from somewhere else’ – that produces coincidences 
and affinities, based not on identicality but on similarity, as I discussed in the previous 
section. 131  These ‘spaces’, both textual and virtual, represent instants of arrested articulation 
also disturb the continuum of past and present, allowing ‘configurations waiting from forever 
to be spoken’; they are spaces in which the dialectical image can emerge.132  
I have tarried with the im/material aspects of the interleaf in order to frame an 
argument I wish to propose about the status of aura in Howe’s work. I want to return to two 
phrases in the above quotation: the ‘spectral scrap’ and its possession of an ‘enchanted aura’. 
Aura, of course, traces its etymology back to the Greek and Latin word for ‘breath’ and ‘air’; 
only later, during the advent of Spiritualism in the nineteenth-century, did it come to denote 
supernatural emanations from people and objects. In her brilliant essay, ‘Benjamin’s Aura’, 
Miriam Bratu Hansen observes Benjamin’s curious disavowal of the esoteric context of the 
aura, which he would have been familiar with, even though these properties come to the fore 
in his writings on photography, where ‘he was able to think [the] salient features of auratic 
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experience – temporal disjunction, the shock-like confrontation with an alien self – as 
asymmetrically entwined, rather than simply incompatible with technological 
reproducibility.’133 Later in The Midnight, Howe returns to the interleaf in ‘Scare Quotes II’. 
Howe writes, ‘[t]he tissue's impalpable nature is uncannily perverse’: ‘in one position the 
filmy fabric takes on the properties of the title page, in another the properties of the 
frontispiece. Added to this change in particulars, what I see has the sense of touch’.134 Here 
the interleaf has a hallucinatory effect (or affect) confusing to the senses; it is an almost 
photo-sensitive medium that can ‘[take] on the properties of the title page’ in one 
configuration and ‘in another the properties of the frontispiece.’135 Howe’s interleaf thus has 
three highly significant qualities: first, it is an obsolete remnant from a prior mode of 
technical reproduction; second, it is a photograph taken by a Xerox machine; third, from 
Howe’s later description, the interleaf is itself ‘photographic’. The interleaf is overwritten 
by its technical reproducibility. Strictly speaking, Howe’s interleaf cannot be said to possess 
an aura in the sense that Benjamin describes in ‘The Work of Art’ essay. Yet, Howe writes, 
it has ‘acquired an enchanted aura’.136 Of course, Howe is not deploying the term in strict 
accord with Benjamin’s essay, but her assertion that it has acquired an aura evokes new 
possibilities for Benjamin’s concept. If an aura can be acquired, then it cannot be said to 
have died with the onslaught of technological reproduction. The survival of the aura in 
Howe’s text perfectly accords with Benjamin’s notion of the afterlife as I have described it 
earlier in this study. How, then, is an aura acquired? Howe writes that it is ‘acquired […] 
quite apart from its original utilitarian function’, suggesting that an object might obtain an 
aura once it has lost its use-value. What Benjamin did not fully account for in the ‘Work of 
Art’ essay was that technologies of reproduction advance so rapidly that previous 
technologies are ‘rendered obsolete’ almost as quickly as they emerge, and are replaced by 
some newer, more ‘technological’ technology. If the aura faded with the advent of 
photography and mass reproduction, it also returns in the becoming-obsolete of certain 
reproduced objects. If, as Benjamin writes, every work of art – even auratic ones – has an 
inherent reproducibility, then it might be said, at least in the context of Howe’s work, that 
every work possesses a certain inherent ‘auraticity’, the potential to impart an aura at some 
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place or time. The reproduced work acquires an aura under two conditions that Howe 
describes: first, when it departs from its ‘original utilitarian function’; second, when the 
object, and the technologies that reproduced it, have faded into the distance – the very 
distance that constitutes the aura. 
2.4 Lace and Allegory 
The interleaf cannot be photographed in isolation: without the pages that surround it, the 
interleaf would be absorbed onto a grainy but blank page. Howe makes visible the interleaf's 
transparency, its approach toward absence, by photographing it alongside (on top of) the title 
page. It gives the impression of temporal distance, a fading into and out of visibility, exactly 
as Benjamin defines aura in ‘Little History of Photography’: ‘a strange weave of space and 
time: the unique appearance [Gespinst, also apparition or semblance) of a distance, however 
near it may be’.137 This echoes his earlier description of beauty, in his essay on Goethe's 
Elective Affinities, which is ‘neither the veil nor the veiled object but rather the object in its 
veil’.138 The interleaf thus not only has an aura, it is also a figure of aura itself, an alternate 
‘veil’ with ‘mist’ instead of ‘breath’. As one reads further into The Midnight, however, the 
interleaf also becomes analogous to the curtain, the bed hanging, and lace, each of which 
provide their own modes of visuality and correlative obscurity. I have already discussed the 
interleaf, which in its ‘mist-like transience’ intimates materialisation and dissipation, a 
double movement in Howe's lyric compositions. It foreshadows disappearance and intimates 
a future distance in which the object may vanish out of sight. In Howe's poetic exploration 
of lace, however, she shows how poetry can incorporate absence into its weave.   
For all its pronounced metaphysical qualities, it is by now apparent that Howe’s work 
demonstrates a preoccupation with materiality. I have discussed some aspects of this focus 
on the material in the previous section, but I also want to explore Howe’s use of literal 
material: fabric – for example, William of Orange’s bloody shirt in The Midnight, or a scrap 
of Sarah Pierpont Edwards’s dress in Souls of the Labadie Tract and That This. From the 
outset of The Midnight, Howe establishes an analogue between swathes of cloth used in early 
modern bed hangings, and the book. The etymological connection linking text and textile, 
the Latin texere, is well known and by now ubiquitous in the vocabulary and practice of 
criticism, perhaps most recognisably in Roland Barthes’ ‘Death of the Author,’ which 
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famously asserted that ‘the text is a tissue of quotations drawn from innumerable centres’.139 
Howe’s tissue-text certainly has certainly absorbed Barthes’ dictum. Howe takes this shared 
etymology so seriously that it is difficult to unravel one from the other. Texts can be worn – 
Jonathan Edwards, a recurring figure in Howe’s work, pinned notes for his sermons, written 
on scrap paper, to his clothes – and textiles can be read. Books are like garments for Howe: 
they contain the material traces of those who ‘wore’ them. The materiality of the book is 
also intimately linked to the materiality of language: ‘there’s a level at which words are spirit 
and paper is skin. That’s the fascination with archives. There’s still a bodily trace.’140 The 
material trace is thus a kind of silent language for what – what Benjamin might call the ‘mute 
language of things’: like writing, the material object provides a site of contact between the 
past and the present.141 Unlike the aura, which maintains the appearance of a distance, the 
trace ‘is [the] appearance of a nearness, however far removed the thing that left it behind 
may be. […] In the trace, we gain possession of the thing’.142 
 Arranged in an alternating sequence of diptych-like poems, ‘Bed Hangings I,’ ‘Scare 
Quotes I,’ ‘Bed Hangings II,’ ‘Scare Quotes II,’ and a final section, ‘Kidnapped,’ The 
Midnight goes beyond the confines of structuralist intertextuality. Indeed, as critics such as 
Barbara Clayton, Nancy Miller, and Kathryn Sullivan Kruger suggest, text and textile are 
more interwoven than even Barthes indicates, conjoined by mythic origins found in Greek 
figures such as Ariadne (Kruger, Miller), Penelope (Clayton), and Helen of Troy (Kruger).143 
These feminist readings trace female cultural and material production through different 
poetics of weaving, a creative act punitively thought of as ‘women’s work.’ In a section titled 
‘The Age of Resplendent Lace’, a fragmentary poem in the stream of ‘Bed Hangings I’ Howe 
incorporates allusions to Penelope’s work, a shroud for Odysseus’s father, Laertes, which 
she weaves during the day and unravels at night, as an index to the unfinished work of 
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mourning, in addition to wider references to female weavers. Under a section called 
‘Cutwork’, Howe introduces ‘the earliest account of bed hangings’:  
The earliest account of bed hangings is in a legend from the 11th century. After a run 
of bad luck a seamstress named Thorgunna got fed up and left her home somewhere 
in the stormy Outer Hebrides. In England it didn’t take long for special notice of the 
immigrant’s fantastically embroidered needlework to get around. Soon she was in 
danger of being promoted to the witch category. Trouble followed trouble until she 
warned that ownership of her hangings could mean curtains. Coulds are iffy. Throwing 
caution to the winds, she either burned or tossed her tapestries out. It’s an aesthetics 
of erasure.144  
Weaving and needlework appear here as a distinctly female art form and, therefore, a 
supposedly dangerous and suspect one twinned with the supernatural. The anecdote of 
Thorgunna and Howe’s ‘aesthetics of erasure’ calls to attention the ways in which women’s 
creative output has been met with distrust and censorship, but also how silence can be used 
as an aesthetic means of expression – a prime example of this would be one of Howe’s 
avatars, Emily Dickinson her stuttering poetics of the dash.  
By placing her motivic focus on textile material, Howe establishes a view of the 
materiality of the text which emphasises its sensuous qualities. The text begins to take on 
the visual qualities of fabric, so that text and textile supersede their shared linguistic roots 
and become analogous. Howe’s reading of objects gestures toward a communication beyond 
language whose transmission can only ever be partial. Howe presents lace as the painstaking 
construction of gaps where the indeterminacy between absence and presence is inherent to 
its form. In lacemaking these gaps are called ‘eyelets’, an indication of the intricate networks 
of association in Howe’s texts. The Midnight presents lace as an enigmatic substance that is 
both natural and artificial, mimetic of spiderwebs in both its appearance and its vocabulary, 
as with ‘gossamer’, a fine, gauzy silk lace also used to describe the filmy silk of spiderlings. 
Such a substance recalls the descriptive terms of the interleaf in Howe’s interleaf-preface as 
‘tangible intangible’ and ‘approaching transparency’. Lace is emblematic of Howe’s 
preference for rich, refractive imagery that seems to ceaselessly coincide with their mode of 
representation. First, I want to take a look at a poem in ‘Bed Hangings II’ called ‘The Age of 
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Resplendent Lace’, in order to adumbrate an ‘anatomy of lace’ as it relates to the construction 
of Howe’s poetic language:  
Penelope is presented as  
working a shroud for Laertes  
the father of Ulysses  
Cobweb gossamer ephemera  
miscellaneous bundle 34  
The shirt worn by William  
the Silent when he fell by  
an assassin is still preserved  
at the Hague145   
Howe links lace to an always deferred work of mourning. As I alluded earlier, the 
etymological overlap of text and textile has led to a critical interest in figures of weaving 
and the practice of writing. For Howe, whose source material comes from the fringes of 
institutional archives and family (specifically maternal) inheritance, the slippage between 
text and shroud becomes more apparent. ‘Ephemera’, which appears in the second stanza, is 
yet another multivalent, chiral word, a category that names itself: it can mean documents, 
usually printed matter or notes, ‘miscellaneous bundle[s]’, whose use is temporary, but, of 
course, it also shares a linguistic origin with the ‘ephemeral,’ denoting a state of 
impermanence and transitoriness.146 Caught again in the cobweb gossamer, it may do us well 
to recall that cobwebs are the products of temporal accretion and abandoned, uninhabited 
corners where ‘bundle 34’ might be waiting. Howe links the moment ‘when he fell by/ an 
assassin’ to the shirt, which, we are informed, ‘is still preserved at the Hague’; this 
juxtaposition traces the moment where historical actuality is uncovered in the ‘matter’ of 
fact and where poetry captures the instant where an event ‘[becomes] historical 
posthumously [...] through events that may be separated from it by thousands of years’.147 
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Like the interleaf, the lace shirt also has an aura, the same aura as Schelling's coat that 
Benjamin describes in ‘Little History of Photography’ which will ‘pass into immortality […] 
the shape it has borrowed from its wearer’.148 The interleaf and William the Silent’s shirt 
mark the point where aura (the appearance of a distance) and trace (the appearance of 
nearness) vanish into one another.  
The final stanza quoted above presents a historical encounter through a properly 
material object. With this in mind, Howe’s impression of William I’s doomed shirt is of a 
temporary and temporal shroud (recalling Penelope and Laertes in the first stanza) 
suggesting a moment of time compressed in an image. The ironic hesitation that precedes 
the final line ‘at the Hague’ indicates another category of the material as mere information 
or data. This, juxtaposed with the catalogue entry, ‘miscellaneous bundle 34’ invites the 
reader to speculate on the archival designation that lies in store for each of us like a citational 
memento mori. As Howe shows us, however, every inscription bears a trace, even if, ghost-
like, it can’t be seen. This is no better illustrated than by the poem quoted at length above. 
‘The Age of Resplendent Lace’ is a found poem, taken from a volume by Fanny Bury Palliser 
called A History of Lace, published in the nineteenth century, whose description of William 
of Orange’s (also known as William the Silent) shirt ends with a detail that one would expect 
of Howe herself. It appears as follows:  
The shirt worn by William the Silent when he fell by the assassin is still preserved at 
the Hague; it is trimmed with a lace of thick linen stitches, drawn and worked over in 
a style familiar to those acquainted with the earlier Dutch pictures.149  
Unstitching the fabric of her ‘reference material’, Howe grafts its quotations onto her poems, 
or rather her ‘strapwork trellis sentence[s]’.150 Like Dutch lace, Howe ‘draw[s] and work[s] 
over’ the material of the past and the charge of immediacy contained therein. Like Benjamin, 
she tears historical objects from their context and resituates them in the present, but her 
‘historical materialist’ practice is framed within a feminine practice of ‘cutwork’ and 
‘scissorwork’. As Howe writes of her mother, actress and playwright Mary Manning, ‘she 
loved to embroider facts’, suggesting that the imaginative act, of writing in particular, can 
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be seen as a form of precision ‘needlework’.151 In ‘Bed Hangings I’ Howe presents an 
incantatory list of fabrics: ‘Alapeen Paper Patch Muslin/ Calico Camlet Dimity Fustian’, 
names that in their obsolescence are no longer readily recognisable, reduced to unfamiliar 
sound textures.152 In particular, Howe chooses textiles that are highly intricate and 
ornamental, popular in the seventeenth century from which she pulls much of her poetic 
material, such as turkeywork, arras and the ‘opus scissum’ lace favoured by Elizabeth I.  By 
now it may be apparent that Howe focuses mainly on Dutch and English forms of lace and 
its influence on the new vernacular of American textiles that drew on both traditions. 
Beneath the surface image of lace is a material history of material that tells of the Dutch and 
English colonisation of the Americas. The silk and lace trades were some of the very first 
industries established in early seventeenth-century America. Raw silk would have been 
imported from China by the English, French, and Dutch East India companies, which would 
be spun into thread required for the warp.153 Howe also acknowledges the influence that 
indigenous styles of needlework had on colonial settlers: ‘Perilous quillwork needlework’ 
refers to the use of porcupine and bird quills as embroidery needles. As Montgomery points 
out, Howe ‘makes use of specialist vocabulary drawn from […] the material culture of New 
England […] “Quillwork” applies to […] Native Americans; needlework is part of the 
Western tradition.’154 The nature of this encounter between these two styles is ‘perilous’ for 
the people violently displaced by colonial conquest and incoming settlers.155 Fabric, and the 
fabric of our vocabulary to describe it, is rooted in place, and can, more than other artefacts, 
attest to its history and production. Howe shows that even the flimsiest of material is the 
expression of a site-specific dialect. But this language is ‘half-/ articulate’ and ‘specular as 
morning’, a fragmented medium. ‘Every mortal has a non-communicating material self – a 
waistcoat or embroidered doublet folded up, pressed down, re-folded to fit snugly inside. 
Incommunicado.’156 Howe’s description of ‘non-communicating material’ recalls 
Benjamin’s mystical language writings on ‘the language of things’ and ‘mute nature’. In The 
Midnight, the anatomy of lace intersects with Howe’s own poetic practice. The evocative 
vocabulary of lacemaking and needlework provides the material for the multiplicity of 
                                                     
151 ‘Scare Quotes II’, p. 76.  
152 ‘Bed Hangings I’, p. 4. 
153 See Natalie Rothstein, ‘Silk in European and American Trade before 1783: A Commodity of Commerce 
or a Frivolous Luxury?’ Textiles in Trade: Proceedings of the Textile Society of America Biennial Symposium 
(September 1990), pp 1-14. 
154 Montgomery, p. 158. 
155 ‘Kidnapped’, TM, p. 158. 
156 ‘Scare Quotes I’, p. 60.  
114 
 
meanings such as ‘pattern’, which refers to both an instructive ‘exemplar’ and the 
arrangement of recurrences and coincidences in Howe’s texts. Lace is revealed to be the 
painstaking construction of gaps, ‘eyelets’ that provide access to kaleidoscopic perspectives. 
Such gaps are interlinked by multiple narrative threads:  
Counterforce bring me wild hope  
non-connection is itself distinct  
connection numerous surviving  
fair trees wrought with a needle  
the merest decorative suggestion  
in what appears to be sheer white  
muslin a tree fair hunted Daphne  
Thinking is willing you are wild  
to the weave not to material itself157  
We find, again, the pattern of ‘pattern,’ used repeatedly in poems throughout the text. This 
time, Howe describes her outsider position as ‘wild/ to the weave,’ that is, the dictates of the 
pattern, working outside the textual line with ‘material itself’.158 Daphne is the Greek nymph 
transformed by Apollo into a tree, a plant that can itself be transformed into paper; 
coincidence or not, this allusion (‘a mere decorative suggestion’) reveals the protean nature 
of Howe’s shifting text whose legibility is constantly woven up to a point of interruption and 
is undone again, only to be taken up by another thread. When a gap is encountered, language 
exceeds itself, oversignifying. The model of negativity hinted at in the preface to The 
Midnight fully emerges here, identifying absence as negative presence, ‘non-connection is 
itself distinct/connection,’ from which the logic of Howe’s aesthetic unfurls, recalling the 
previous section’s discussion of Benjamin’s concept of nonsensuous similarity, which 
‘connects’ two objects through their uncanny distinction from one another.159 In an 
interview, Howe adumbrates her method. I have quoted parts of this elsewhere, but it bears 
repeating in full:  
                                                     





So I start in a place with fragments, lines and marks, stops and gaps, and then I have 
more ordered sections, and then things break up again […] you try to order them and 
to explain something, and the explanation breaks free of itself. I think a lot of my work 
is about breaking free: starting free and being captured and breaking free again and 
being capture again […] the content is the process […]160  
Content, typically conceived as the ‘material’ produced by a work and bounded by form is 
here far more dynamic and mutable. If the content – the only thing empirically accessible to 
the reader –  is also the ‘process’, then the resultant work remains open, active, unfinished, 
unfinalized. This ‘process’ consists in the poet’s encounter with something other and her 
attempt to inscribe this encounter which is always somehow incomplete, full of ‘stops and 
gaps’. In this sense, Howe’s work, constantly ‘in process’, resembles the shroud Penelope 
continually begins in the day and unravels at night; the shroud will never be the same each 
time, it will always be altered by its unravelling and its re-working. As I mentioned earlier, 
the semiotics of weaving is incredibly important to the construction and understanding of 
Howe’s work. If, as we have had many occasions to observe, the appearance of textiles, 
especially diaphanous, semi-translucent ones, is analogous to the highly articulate networks 
of association that characterise the structure of Howe’s work, then the trope that corresponds 
to and facilitates her linguistic embroidery is the allegory. Although allegory has recently 
seen a surge in critical interest, it has for many decades been regarded a form as obsolete to 
literature as the interleaf is to print technology. The appearance of curtains, lace, and the 
theatrical scrim are all consonant with the privileged figure of the allegory, which has, almost 
since its conception, been associated with the veil, from St Paul to Dante and, more recently, 
Suzanne Conklin Akbari:  
[…] allegory conveys meaning that cannot be expressed directly through ordinary 
language. That is, by avoiding the limitations inherent in literal language, allegory 
creates meaning within the reader, bypassing the inevitable disintegration of meaning 
as it passes through the obscuring veil of language. The paradox, of course, is that the 
veil which makes the transmission of meaning – the revelation – possible.161  
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Gerald L. Bruns develops a similar image of allegory that recalls the language of The 
Midnight:  
We may figure allegory as the curtain that conceals (in order to be made radiant by) a 
sanctuary. The curtain mediates the light of what is hidden […] without the curtain we 
would be unable to see anything at all: it would be as if nothing were there. Allegory 
is an instance of darkening by means of words […] we cannot assimilate the light, only 
dissimulate it, or enlighten ourselves as to what is present by darkening it […]162  
Not only is allegory commonly ‘allegorised’ by the veil or curtain, it also posits the notion 
of ‘darkening’ as a medium of visibility. Within the description of allegory, allegory itself 
must take place: this is the aporia of allegory which calls representation itself into question. 
Howe’s use of fabric imagery can consequently be said to be the imagery of allegory, the 
imagery of representation as such. The images of this fabric, some of them visual images 
taken from archives, are unfinished, broken off, frayed, or folded [Fig. 4].  
In The Midnight, Howe’s images of material reach a certain multivalent density which 
occludes traditional methods of analysis, to the point where even the word ‘multivalence’, 
which indicates many meanings, cannot be used without noticing that it also contains a deep-
pleated decorative drape: the word ‘valence’. In her brilliant essay on The Midnight¸ Kate 
Lilley remarks that in ‘sacred contexts both ‘veil’ and ‘valance’ are often used to intimate 
divine mysteries and life after death, beyond the vale of tears’.163 Lilley further draws 
attention to the play on the words ‘valence and valance’, noting that the former, according 
to the OED, is defined as:  
[S]ignifying the “emotional force or significance, specifically the attraction or 
repulsion with which an individual invests an object or event,” as well as “valour, 
courage, especially Irish” and “some thin woven fabric”, while the latter, “valance”, 
also spelled “vallains”, is glossed as a “border of drapery hanging round the canopy 
of a bed or veil”’.164  
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The Midnight is, in many senses, a sort of rebus of the connotations of ‘material’, using 
verbal and visual images of fabric to poetically interrogate the meaning of materiality and 
map the organic traces of history in objects: the ‘matter’ of fact. Lilley observes how bed 
hangings ‘metonymically indicate the richness and value of what is contained within book, 
bed, stage, mortal life.’165 I read this astute inventory of The Midnight as a supremely 
Baroque symbolic landscape, supported by the Shakespearean epigraphs and images of 
Elizabethan ruff collars. England, and, more emphatically, colonial New England, which 
provides a historical locus for many of Howe's works, may not seem to harbour any features 
of the Baroque, which is normally considered to be a Catholic idiom beginning with the 
Council of Trent. However, Austin Warren proposes the term ‘colonial Baroque’ for both 
English and colonial North American poets normally cited under the stylistic or period terms 
as metaphysical, ‘cavalier’, Elizabethan and Jacobean. Warren describes the characteristics 
of the ‘colonial Baroque’ as follows:   
It subsumes the prose of Andrewes, Burton, and Brown, the poetry of Quarles, 
Benlowes, Cleveland, Crashaw, and Donne. Its philosophy is Christian and 
supernaturalist and incarnational, a philosophy which admits of miracle and 
transcensions [sic] of common sense, hence of surprise; its aesthetic, by appropriate 
consequence, endorses bold figures, verbal and imaginal, such figures as the pun, the 
oxymoron, the paradox, the metaphor which links events from seemingly alien, 
discontinuous spheres. It likes audacious mixtures, – the shepherds and the magi; the 
colloquial and the erudite. If it provides ecstasies, it allows also of ingenuities: 
anagrams and acrostics and poems shaped like obelisks or Easter wings. […] The 
baroque […] is not absent from – but only restricted by – Puritanism and 
Nonconformity […]166  
Warren, whose description quoted above could just as easily apply to Howe’s oeuvre, writes 
that elegy was the chief poetic form used by New England poets. Such elegies made used of 
‘incise[d] skulls, skeletons, and cherubs; and funeral verse was requisite not only for addition 
to the memorial slate but, at more ambitious length, for printing as a black-bordered 
broadside’ [Fig. 3].167 Here the iconoclastic allegory of New England’s early colonial settlers 
dovetails with Walter Benjamin’s concept of German baroque tragedy or Trauerspiel.  In 
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brief, the Trauer- (mourning) -spiel (play) is both a mourning play and a ‘play’ of mourning 
(this double meaning holds true in both English and German). The excessive, often 
gratuitous lamentations, martyrdoms, assassinations, interminable death scenes, the 
proliferation of skulls and corpses (Benjamin mentions Hamlet) – are all explicitly staged 
and draw attention to themselves as such, underlining the ‘artifice’ of the work of art and its 
utter ephemerality. The mourning play emerges out of the ruins of ancient tragedy and 
medieval mystery plays whose ritual significance and transcendent culmination are 
evacuated by secularisation and can only appear as fragmentary emblems. While classical 
tragedy’s structural imperative is catharsis, a purging of emotion, and a restoration of 
knowledge (anagnorisis), nothing could be further from the Trauerspiel and baroque 
allegory in general, which introjects everything it encounters. Similarly, although baroque 
allegory incorporates the codified imagery of Christ’s Passion, the mystery play’s narrative 
of redemption is at best regarded with ambivalence in the shadow of the Thirty Years’ War. 
Without going too deeply into the Counter-Reformation, tragedy and the Christian mystery 
play can be said to differ from Trauerspiel on the point of sacrifice and the structures of 
history they respectively engender. Christine Buci-Glucksmann summarises the 
Trauerspiel’s incompatibility with its antecedents: ‘Whereas in Greek tragedy the sacrifice 
of the hero – his act of seeing fate – permits the reconstitution of order, Trauerspiel represents 
‘a history of the sufferings of the world’, a decadent, Saturnian history of mourning and 
melancholia’.168 I suggest that ‘order’ here is meant not only in the sense of a re-stabilised 
structure of sovereignty (classical tragedy) but also the ‘order’ of meaning issued from 
figurative language; the meaning that metaphor commands to be seen. In baroque tragedy, 
meaning is dispersed, it ‘falls from emblem to emblem’, and order is not so much 
reconstituted (into a unity) as it is re-collected (in fragments). This movement of dispersal 
and re-collection is allegorical.  
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Figure 3. George Whitefield's Burial. Woodcut from Phillis [Wheatley], An Elegiac Poem on the Death of that celebrated 
Divine and eminent Servant of Jesus Christ, the Reverend and learned George Whitefield (Boston: Ezekiel Russell, 1770). 
Reprinted in The Midnight. 
 
Figure 4. Cover illustration, The Midnight. 
The elegy is the poetic form of mourning par excellence. The memento mori of incised skulls 
and black-bordered broadsides are characteristic of the general temper of the Baroque, 
including Benjamin's analysis of the German Trauerspiel, whose authors were also working 
within the context of the Reformation: Howe mentions George Whitefield and Jonathan 
Edwards at the outset of ‘Scare Quotes I’ as major figures in the Second Great Awakening, 
a movement of ‘intercolonial religious revival’ which emphasised a strict Calvinist dialectic 
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of ‘ecstatic union and the law’.169 Howe quotes the definition of ‘AWAKE’ and 
‘AWAKENING’ as they appear in Noah Webster's An American Dictionary of the English 
Language.170 Buoyed by associative relation, Howe suggests that this spiritual awakening 
permeated early American settlers’ understanding of language: ‘When Europe enters the 
space of its margin, the “Kingdom of God in America” receives European memory into 
itself’. America here is figured as an afterlife of ‘European memory’; settlers and religious 
dissidents broke away from their native countries only to produce new, intermingling echoes 
and reverberations of what they thought of as the past. Though it was called the ‘New 
World’, the colonial project was, in fact, a collision between the native population, who had 
been there for thousands of years, and white settlers who brought the European past with 
them.  
The Calvinist doctrine (‘law’) of predestination that occluded salvation for all coincided with 
an obsession with death. One of Jonathan Edwards’s sermons is exemplary of the Puritan 
iconography of death:   
Death temporal is a shadow of eternal death. The agonies, the pains, the groans and 
gasps of death, the pale, horrid, ghastly appearance of the corpse, its being laid in a 
dark and silent grave, there putrefying and rotting and becoming exceedingly 
loathsome and being eaten by worms is an image of hell. And the bodies continuing 
in the grave, and never rising more in this world is to shadow forth the eternity and 
misery of hell.171 
In The Arcades Project, Benjamin writes that ‘Baroque allegory sees the corpse only from 
the outside, Baudelaire evokes it from within.’172 Edwards’s description of death is surely 
such an allegory that ‘sees the corpse from within’ and which predates Baudelaire 
considerably. Despite the ghoulish image of bodily decomposition, Edwards impresses on 
his audience an even less agreeable alternative: the eternal miseries of hell. There is a deep 
ambiguity in this comparison, however. On the one hand, the gruesome portrait of ‘death 
temporal’ is contrasted with the infinite suffering of hell; yet in this contrast is also a 
comparison by which the death of the body is quite literally an ‘image of hell’. Put simply, 
hell is eternal death and death is temporal hell. Indeed, the misery of hell lies not simply in 
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the experience of death but more specifically a continual state of bodily decay – of the 
decaying body or flesh as a prison in contradistinction to spiritual and mortal union of the 
elect on Judgement Day.173 The union of body and soul is the union of opposites, a 
relationship of nonsensuous similarity.    
The ornamental, highly stylised religious art typical of the Catholic Baroque was, for 
the New England Puritan, concentrated in the ‘image’ of the word. Not just the word, 
however, but especially the name. Anagrams were not just composed by an elegist after a 
person’s death but were frequently written by the individuals while they themselves were 
alive. This practice was not only a creative, ludic pursuit in a culture that restricted (but did 
not, as Warren crucially notes, forbid) artistic expression, it was also linked to the 
contemplation of mortality encouraged by ministers like Edwards and Mather. One of the 
most popular modes of elegy at the time was the anagram, in which the name of the deceased 
was rearranged to spell out a secret, hidden meaning communicated to the living. In The 
Birth-mark Howe presents the ‘auto-elegies’ of Thomas Shepard, a seventeenth-century 
Evangelical minister, anagrams composed of the letters in his own name (inscrutable ciphers 
bordering on the nonsensical: ‘O, a map's Tresh’d’, and ‘Arm’d as the shop’).174 It is an 
instance of ‘the widespread Puritan trope of the soul as a “text” to be read for signs of 
conformity with other pious texts deriving from the Bible’.175 Anagrams also provided the 
framework for the sanctification of the deceased.176 The iconoclastic culture of Puritan 
settlers in colonial New England, which forbid ‘graven images’ (especially the theatre), 
turned to the written word whose seeming austerity belied its iconic potential.  
In her essay on Chris Marker written three years later, Howe comments at greater links 
on the anagram, writing that the ‘American Puritan theologians and historians […] were 
obsessed with anagrams’. The anagram is one locus of what Howe sees as a North American 
literary tradition from Cotton Mather to Emerson and Dickinson through to William Carlos 
Williams, Charles Olson and John Cage: each, Howe explains, has ‘inherit[ed] this feeling 
for letters as colliding image-objects and divine messages’.177 Howe subsequently declares 
                                                     
173 ‘Scare Quotes I’, p. 43.  
174 Howe, The Birth-mark, p. 45. 
175 Jeffrey Hammond, ‘Friendly Ghosts: Celebrations of the Living Dead in Early New England’, Jeffrey 
Andrew Weinstock, Spectral America: Phantoms and the National Imagination (Wisconsin: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2004), pp. 40-56 (p. 53).  
176 For further discussion, see Jeffrey A. Hammond, The American Puritan Elegy: A Literary and Cultural 
Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 




an affinity with Walter Benjamin, who ‘was also attracted to the idea that single letters in a 
word or name could be rearranged to cabalistically reveal a hidden purpose’.178 In other 
words, ‘the entrance of the messianic into the material object’ and an allegorical secret to be 
unveiled.179 Like William I's shirt, the anagram-elegy becomes an icon, but here it is 
arranged from fragments of the name – ‘the language of language’, writes Benjamin – whose 
letters spell out an image. The elegy as relic in a time of iconoclasm thus refigures Edwards’s 
corpse, a corpse in pieces at that. In the anagram, writes Benjamin, ‘word, syllable and sound 
are emancipated from any context of traditional meaning and are flaunted as objects which 
can be exploited for allegorical purposes’.180  
The Baroque allegory does not prove, however, that there is no meaning or that 
expression is futile, as it would be easy to glean from a cursory reading of Benjamin's text. 
Allegory, deriving from the Greek words allos (‘other’) and agoreuein (‘to speak’), is a 
speaking ‘otherwise’; it incorporates something other in place of another, a concrete image 
for a concept that cannot be spoken of directly, but ‘outside’ the agora or marketplace. 
Because the concept – love, death, and so on – cannot be expressed because it is abstract and 
affective, the allegory further incorporates the absent other, the lost object of the 
melancholic. In a prose-poem titled ‘Dark Day of Words’, Howe writes:     
‘Park: Originally in England a portion of forest enclosed for keeping deer, trapped or 
otherwise caught in the open forest, and their increase.’ This is the first sentence of 
Frederick Law Olmsted's essay titled ‘Park’ in the New American Cyclopedia; A 
Popular Dictionary of General Knowledge (1861). Somewhere I read that when he 
was sent away from home as a small child and took long solitary walks as a remedy 
for sadness, he particularly enjoyed the edges of woods. So much for the person. He 
started out a few pages ago. Now no one living remembers the fall of that voice from 
sound into silence. Who can tell what empirical perceptions really are? Veridical and 
delusive definitions shade into one another. All words run along the margins of their 
secrets.181      
In ‘Scare Quotes I’, Howe follows the life of Frederick Law Olmsted, the landscape architect 
responsible for Central Park. We later learn that his mother, Charlotte Olmsted, died ‘in 1826 
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[when] her first-born six-year-old son was sent away to various locations around the 
Connecticut countryside.’182 Howe quotes ‘a brief autobiographical fragment’, written by 
Olmsted ‘as a remedy for insomnia’:     
My mother died when I was so young that I have but a tradition of memory rather than 
the faintest recollection. […] if I was asked if I remembered her I could say: ‘Yes; I 
remember playing on the grass and looking up at her while she sat sewing under a 
tree.’ I now only remember that I did so remember her, but it has always been a delight 
to see a woman sitting under a tree, sewing and minding a child.183 
In the midst of this biographical narrative Howe reveals that ‘[Olmsted’s] first 'thoroughly 
rural parish' was in Guildford where I live but in 2002 it’s a suburb.’184 After reproducing 
Olmsted’s ‘memory’ of his mother, Howe inserts of a photograph of her grandmother with 
her mother, aunt and uncle (John Manning – Howe discovers the interleaf in his copy of 
Master of Ballantrae) in a park. Through this juxtaposition Howe substitutes her own 
deceased mother (‘she loved to embroider facts’) for Olmsted’s (his delight in women at 
needlework), a connection also imbued by Guildford.  In the same section, Howe writes, 'my 
mother's close relations treated their books as transitional objects (judging by the few 
survivors remaining in my possession)’.185 Later, Howe psychoanalytically wonders if 
Olmsted's ‘love for nature split off from his relation to his mother’, casting his mother as the 
lost object of Olmsted's melancholy, the source of his ‘solitary walks’ and ‘sadness’.186 
Taken together, it becomes clear that for Howe, too, the book is a ‘transitional object’, in the 
sense of the interleaf, the ‘transitional space,’ the ‘zone of contention’ in the text, in addition 
to the autobiographical context out of which Howe writes. It is clear that Howe had 
Winnicott in mind, who conceptualized the transitional object as a blanket or stuffed toy 
through which a child copes with the absence of their mother. Santner incisively recognises 
the work of the allegorist at play in the child's selection of transitional objects, remarking 
that ‘the infant at play begins to look more like Dürer's allegorical figure of Melancholia 
surrounded by stranded props and artifacts’.187 Howe interweaves her epigraphic references 
to Lady Macbeth with a Kleinian memory of her own mother: ‘Search forever, you'll never 
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scratch this one's grave innermost surfeit. [...] The good mother (drop of rosewater) and her 
coeval ties to the murderer (bowl of poison) this is the way you splinter things when you're 
in a position of abject melancholia.’188 This ‘splitting’ is the characteristic of Melanie Klein’s 
so-called ‘paranoid-schizoid position’ as well as is the defining characteristic of the 
allegorist189. Howe ‘introjects’ and ‘projects’ (as poetic montage/collage) the vast 
corpus/corpse of the books, narratives, and signatures of an other, whether that other is a 
family member or a stranger from the past. Fragmentation, as a form of breaking things 
apart, is also a form of Kleinian projection, by which the allegorist frantically tries to rescue 
by putting the pieces into some kind of meaningful, revitalising and redeeming, but utterly 
‘other’ order.  
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Trompe-l’oeil: Genre, Flânerie, and Perspective Teju Cole’s Open City  
Viewed from a certain distance, the great, simple outlines which define the storyteller 
stand out in him – or rather, they become visible in him, just as a human head or an 
animal’s body may appear in a rock when it is viewed by an observer from the proper 
distance and angle. This distance and this angle of vision are prescribed for us by an 
experience which we may have almost every day.  
– Walter Benjamin ‘The Storyteller’1 
Death is a perfection of the eye. 
– Teju Cole, Open City2  
Wandering into Wall Street Station, Julius, the narrator of Open City, ‘suspect[s] for a 
moment that the grand hall now confronting me […] was a trick of the eye’.3 In Open City, 
monuments, extant and ruined, confront and intimidate the viewer; they appear and 
disappear according to the narrator’s perspective. The reader who approaches this novel is 
inclined to look from the same perspective, only to find that such a view is indeed a ‘trick of 
the eye’.4 This ‘trick of the eye’ points toward the many configurations of seeing and vision 
that run through the novel, beginning with the novel’s first epigraph: ‘Death is a perfection 
of the eye’. Despite Cole’s background as an art historian specialising in Netherlandish art 
with an emphasis on the work of Bruegel the Elder (1529-1569), to my knowledge no critic 
has remarked extensively on its relevance to Cole’s fiction.5 With this in mind, I wish to 
draw a connection between Cole’s epigraph and the anamorphic skull in The Ambassadors 
(1553), Hans Holbein’s painting from the same century. Only from a peculiar, singular, and 
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unnatural vantage point can the viewer see the skull in its legible dimension. At first glance 
Cole’s epigraph may appear obscure, but in Open City, as in Holbein’s painting, the 
conditions of such legibility are predicated on reading the encoded configuration of an image 
that can be recognised only from a particular and distorted perspective.6 Open City is a novel 
that initially appears to consolidate three emergent genres: the post 9/11 novel, the 
cosmopolitan novel, and the ‘Sebaldian novel’. Each genre is concerned with the method 
and ethics of representing relations – political, historical, and global; each also experiences 
a tension between aesthetics and the ethics of form. Yet there is an anamorphic figure of 
violence stretched beneath Cole’s narrative that troubles and challenges the ethical aesthetics 
of the genres Open City appears to represent. This violence is hidden from the reader until 
the novel’s final pages, where the narrative, up to that point, is revealed to be a ‘trick of the 
eye’ which urges the reader to interrogate their identification with and empathy for the 
unreliable narrator, a task that demands no less than a reorientation of perspective. In setting 
this challenge, Cole’s novel itself provides a radical perspective that envisions the limits of 
an uncritical cosmopolitanism that exists in largely liberal discourses, the problematics of 
memorialisation, and the difficulties of transposing Sebald’s aesthetics of history into a post-
millennial American context.  
In painting, trompe-l’oeil is a technique by which an optical illusion of depth and three-
dimensionality is created through a forced perspective. Though it originated in ancient Greek 
and Roman murals, trompe-l’oeil reached its height in the Baroque period, when 
developments in science and subsequently philosophy gave prominence to the empirical 
practice of direct observation. The Baroque trompe-l’oeil, as Susan Merriam writes, was 
‘part of a broad phenomenon that indicate[d] a widespread cultural suspicion of vision’s 
reliability’ that asked the viewer ‘to question the reliability of all images.’7 Open City is an 
intensely visual novel, but one which constantly interrogates the limits of vision as well as 
how vision can be distorted on several layers: the narrator’s often hallucinatory and disturbed 
optics – which I will explore in detail later – and the narrator’s unreliable ‘vision’ of his own 
story which, consequently, raises questions of ethical representation in the novel, particularly 
the genres with which it is associated. While the trompe-l’oeil exposes the fabricated nature 
of representation, its success, according to Rolando Perez, depends on the conventional 
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perspective of the viewer which ‘limit[s] perception to frontal viewing’.8 When viewed from 
‘front’, Open City is a poetic exploration of historical contingency that reveals submerged, 
marginalised pasts that form the foundations of national myths, as when Julius describes the 
African Burial Ground that lies beneath lower Manhattan ‘under office buildings, shops, 
streets, diners, pharmacies, all the endless hum of quotidian commerce and government’.9 
As Pieter Vermeulen observes, this is an example of ‘[o]ne of the novel’s signature gestures 
[which] consist[s] in sudden shifts from the contemplation of a monument of civilization to 
the imagining of the violated life buried underneath.’10 These ‘sudden shifts’ are motivated 
by moments of disturbed, anomalous vision: ‘[i]t wouldn’t have drawn my attention at all, 
if I hadn’t seen a curious shape – sculpture or architecture, I couldn’t tell at first – set into 
the middle of it.’11 The ‘curious shape’ ‘turn[s] out to be’ a monument marking the site as a 
burial ground for enslaved Africans, whose history is routinely buried by the uncritical and 
compromised narratives of the formation of the United States. 
Like the texts studied in the first two chapters of this thesis, Julius possesses a deep 
awareness of orthodox histories as the purview of ‘the victors’ and an ethical attentiveness 
to marginalised narratives. But the author is also alert to the dangers of an oblique and 
melancholy approach to narratives in which, to borrow Benjamin’s phrase, ‘history merges 
into setting’.12 In the previous chapters I have touched on Benjamin’s early writings on 
allegory, which Benjamin sees dialectically as both politically unproductive (for it regards 
catastrophe as a natural inevitability) as well as capable of revealing ‘hidden knowledge’. 
That is, allegory always exposes itself; it discloses the knowledge it hides. As Petra Halkes 
observes, allegory – both medieval and postmodern – ‘provides sites for the continuing 
evaluation of representation.’13 The textual death’s head provided by Cole’s epigraph signals 
this allegorical tension wrapped up in the ‘modes of viewing and knowing’ that recur 
throughout Open City.14 The first half of the novel, I argue, is configured like a trompe-l’oeil 
made up of generic signifiers which mark the post-9/11 novel, the cosmopolitan novel, and 
the ‘Sebaldian’ novel. The second half of the novel, introduced by what will become the 
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ironic epigraph, ‘I have searched myself’, disturbs the illusion of Julius as an ethical narrator. 
This disturbance is no less than a textual anamorph that demands a radical reorientation of 
perspective on behalf of the reader. Elizabeth Edwards provides the following description of 
an anamorph which, I want to suggest, speaks directly to the narrative field of Open City:  
[t]he anamorph […] ‘hides’ an image in an alternative perspective to the main one given 
by the painting, as in Holbein’s The Ambassadors, or that hides the image in a mess of 
distortion […] In the Holbein painting, the anamorph appears as a blob or rent in the 
lower part of the canvas. Once the anamorph is seen as a skull, the most remarkable thing 
about the painting is the way in which one did not see it in the first place, for some 
reason, one can gaze at this painting in the usual contemplative immersion and not ask 
oneself why there is a rending blob in the lower foreground.15 
Each of Julius’s historical insights is predicated on an anomalous form of vision that 
reproduces the anamorphic effect on the viewer/reader described above; the sites/sights of 
the city that Julius confronts are already present in the landscape, but they require a skewed, 
sometimes hallucinatory perspective to become fully legible; and this becoming-legible 
depends on the realisation that ‘one did not see it in the first place’. Readers of Open City 
find themselves in this precise predicament – where insight is the realisation of a form of 
hermeneutic blindness – when Julius is confronted by Moji Kasali, the sister of his childhood 
friend, whom he raped at a party when he was fourteen.16 When Moji delivers her testimony, 
she asks Julius to ‘say something’, giving him an opportunity to provide witness to his own 
act of violence.17 Instead, the narration switches abruptly to an anecdote about Nietzsche and 
Scaevola, a legendary Roman assassin – in short, Julius resumes his given mode of 
contemplative, detached narration which, up to his encounter with Moji, signified an ethical 
form of narrating and relating to the world. These revelations of hitherto-unseen histories, 
                                                     
15 Elizabeth Edwards, ‘The Banal Profound and the Profoundly Banal: Andy Warhol’, Between Ethics and 
Aesthetics: Crossing the Boundaries, ed. by Dorota Glowacka and Stephen Boos (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2002), pp. 255-274 (pp. 267-268). Original emphases.  
16 Ibid.  
17 I use the term ‘testimony’ throughout this chapter in pointed contrast to ‘accusation’. While the term 
‘accusation’ may be a functional designation, its meaning is not neutral and its synonymousness with 
‘allegation’ introduces an element of ambiguity that cannot and should not be maintained. Testimony, a 
declaration of lived experience, is more appropriate here. Nearly every critic who has discussed Open City 
uses the term ‘accusation’ to describe the moment in the novel when Moji tells Julius he raped her. See, for 
example, O’Gorman, p. 59, p. 60, and p. 64. See also Vermeulen, Contemporary Literature at the End of the 
Novel, p. 101; Rachel Sykes, The Quiet Contemporary American Novel (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2018), p. 180; Anna Thiemann, Rewriting the American Soul: Trauma, Neuroscience and the 
Contemporary Literary Imagination (London: Routledge, 2017), p. 168; Kristian Shaw, Cosmopolitanism in 
Twenty-First Century Fiction (Cham, CH.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 127.  
129 
 
which are prompted by moments of anamorphic vision – instances in which the almost-
overlooked suddenly comes into focus – have a dual significance. First, they reinscribe 
narratives that have been erased and/or neglected, and as such they constitute an ethical 
representation of the histories that are attached to places and objects; at the same time, these 
anamorphic images testify to the dangers of overlooking marginalised stories. Consequently, 
they subtly instruct the reader to apply the anamorphic gaze to the novel itself, to images and 
encounters which the narrator overlooks.  
Open City appears on the literary landscape at the intersection of post-9/11 discourse, 
cosmopolitan theory, and a renewed attention to the ethics of narration. The immediate 
critical responses to Open City framed the novel as, variously, a post-9/11 novel, a 
cosmopolitan novel, and as an homage to the novels of W.G. Sebald. In the following 
sections, I will provide an account of these responses and the political and literary contexts 
from which they emerge, starting with the post-9/11 novel, a genre of representational crisis 
which, I argue, turns toward cosmopolitan strategies to reconcile the binaries between the 
self and the ‘other’ and distortions that characterised post-9/11 discourse; the cosmopolitan 
novel appears to avoid the perceived inadequacies of much post-9/11 literature and rhetoric, 
but, as critics such as Madhu Krishnan and Pieter Vermeulen rightly assert, traditional 
cosmopolitanism contains serious blind spots that Open City both stages and critiques.18 
Finally, I note how Cole’s novel is almost without exception deemed ‘Sebaldian’ by popular 
and academic critics alike, and explore how Cole both adapts and modifies Sebald’s 
narrative strategies in ways that require us to rethink narrative ethics.  
It should be noted each of these generically unstable ‘genres’ are interrelated in their 
attempts to secure ethical forms of representation and/of relation. As such, they are certainly 
not mutually exclusive: Sebald’s work has been recognised by several critics as 
cosmopolitan, for example. This comparison also hinges on the highly significant figure of 
the flâneur, but is also related to forms of aesthetic or cultural cosmopolitanism that Open 
City reveals to be utterly unsustainable. In problematising the flâneur, Cole also discloses 
the limits of a ‘Sebaldian’ narrator and Sebald’s oblique ethics of narration. Open City draws 
out the interrelatedness of the generically unstable ‘genres’ by foregrounding a common 
visual rhetoric of relation that is structured by disparities of perspective. As I hope to 
demonstrate, Open City is a literary response to each of these political-aesthetic debates, but 
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the novel also anticipates and resists its own framing within the very discourses with which 
it became associated.  
3.1 ‘A New ‘Angle of Vision’: The Perspectival Politics of 9/11 
Benjamin’s essay ‘The Storyteller’ (from which I take this chapter’s epigraph) describes 
how the First World War caused a traumatic rupture in narration, bringing about the demise 
of the traditional figure of the storyteller. No traditional experience could be drawn upon to 
understand the unassimilable experience of destruction that the war had caused; the 
storyteller was left empty-handed. Although the essay is ostensibly about language, 
Benjamin articulates the loss of the storyteller through spatial and perspectival rhetoric from 
the beginning: the storyteller has ‘become something remote from us and is moving ever 
further away.’ For Benjamin, the trauma of World War I caused ‘our image not only of the 
external world but also of the moral world [to undergo] changes overnight, changes which 
were previously thought impossible.’19 This new world was one of impoverished experience 
where ‘the wish to hear a story expressed’ was met with ‘embarrassment all around’, a 
discomfited reticence about recounting the horrors of trench warfare – stories that did not 
correspond to the heroic tales associated with epic (Homeric) storytelling. After all, 
Benjamin rhetorically asks, ‘[w]asn’t it noticeable at the end of the war that men who 
returned from the battlefield had grown silent – not richer – but poorer in communicable 
experience?’20 
Far from communicating experience, Benjamin contends, ‘what poured out in the flood 
of war books ten years later was anything but experience that can be shared orally.’21 To 
narrate the experience of the war was to narrate the loss of experience, and this narration 
could only take place in the silence of the printed page. As Shoshana Felman superbly puts 
it, ‘[s]omething happened, Benjamin suggests, that has brought about the death – the agony 
– of the storyteller, both as a literary genre and as a discursive mode in daily life’.22 The 
trauma of war thus inheres a dual loss: ‘the art of storytelling […] [and] the ability to share 
experiences.’23 The war not only changes how stories are told, but also brings about a new, 
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terrifying way of seeing the world, an ‘angle of vision’ predicated on disproportion and 
disparities of scale: 
For never has experience been more thoroughly belied than strategic experience was 
belied by tactical warfare, economic experience by inflation, bodily experience by 
mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in power. A generation that had gone to 
school on horse-drawn streetcars now stood under the open sky in a landscape where 
nothing remained unchanged but the clouds and, beneath those clouds, in a force field of 
destructive torrents and explosions, the tiny, fragile human body.24 
Open City was written in 2011, ten years after 11 September 2001, but is set during 2006, 
five years after the attacks. It provides a related but very distinct view that considers the 
advancement and intensification of suicide terrorism, drone warfare, global flows of capital 
(and subsequently of labour), and punitive restrictions on freedom of movement – the factors 
that ‘belie’ experience today. Where Cole’s novel takes up the thread of Benjamin’s 
‘Storyteller’ lies in its organisation around various forms of distance and perspective. The 
narrator, a resident psychiatrist, is characterised by a detached affect that dissociates him 
from his own impressions and encounters. Images of aerial views and long-distance 
perspectives recur throughout the novel, as do miniaturised images, such as a scale model of 
the pre-9/11 skyline or Julius’s meditation on bedbugs. There is also the form of distance 
involved in looking away from memories of violence, of using psychic ‘screens’ to put 
distance between oneself and a traumatising event. Furthermore, there is the studied distance 
associated with the flâneur; on his walks, Julius interprets the city as a ‘counterpoint’ to his 
psychiatry work where he interprets dreams. In between these extremes of vision are 
anomalous, anamorphic perspectives where what is seen is not immediately apprehended 
until the narrator arrives at a sudden ‘new angle’ of vision where the images come into full 
resolution. But there is one particular passage in Open City that reinscribes Benjamin’s 
image of the ‘tiny, fragile human body’ dwarfed by the sky; during one of his walks, Julius 
observes the ‘brightly colored advertisements for various tourist sites in lower Manhattan’ 
(‘RELIVE THE DAY AMERICA’S TICKER STOPPED’, reads an advertisement for the 
Museum of American Finance) before noting: 
But atrocity is nothing new, not to humans not to animals. The difference is that in 
our time it is uniquely well organized, carried out with pens, trains, ledgers, barbed 
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wire, work camps, gas. And this late contribution, the absence of bodies. No bodies 
were visible, except falling ones, on the day American’s ticker stopped. Marketable 
stories of all kinds had thickened around the injured coast of our city, but the 
depiction of the dead bodies was forbidden.25  
The presiding image of the ‘falling man’ here corresponds to the ‘tiny, fragile human body’ 
in Benjamin’s account of post-WWI experience. Images of World Trade Center workers 
jumping from the buildings in an attempt to escape the flames were so upsetting that they 
were pulled from media circulation: ‘they don’t want to be reminded that someone might 
have jumped’.26 In the post-9/11 imaginary, this traumatic image of creaturely vulnerability 
is not a body on the ground, but a body that falls through the sky ‘in a force field of 
destructive torrents and explosions’. In terms that echo Benjamin’s depiction of the remote 
body as ‘moving ever further away’, Jennifer Good writes of Richard Drew’s notorious 
‘Falling Man’ image, ‘[i]f DaVinci’s drawing shows the Vitruvian ideal – the human body 
inscribed and centred as the organizing principle of the built environment – Drew’s picture 
[…] shows the body and building as incompatible. If the photographer had zoomed out far 
enough to picture the tower in its entirety, the falling figure would be all but invisible.’27 
Susan Lurie makes a similar observation, noting that images of falling bodies ‘emphasize[d] 
the fatal height of the towers and show the trapped people as tiny figurines leaning and 
climbing out of windows.’28 Good continues: ‘And so, he has had to reduce the building to 
an abstracted series of Op-Art style geometric forms that assault and confuse the eye. 
Vitruvian man is grounded, centred […] the ‘jumper’ […] has an equally striking but 
completely different relationship to the geometry of space. His space has been, to say the 
least, “rendered strange.”’29 If the strange, ‘incompatible’ relation between the human figure 
and the building (or indeed the sky) proposed questions about looking – where (not) to look, 
how we look, and how we should be looking – the skewed angles of these images also 
corresponded to distorted forms of relation as such. This visual reorientation emerges 
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alongside a precarious set of political, economic, embodied and ethical relations. It is clear 
that the central issue faced by authors writing after 9/11 was how to think, and represent, 
relationality at a time when orientations toward the state, globalisation, media (including 
literature) and ‘the other’ were in flux.30  
3.2 Deutsche Bank 
Not only did a shift in perspective occur after 9/11, but a bifurcation of perspective occurred 
two opposing directions. On the one hand, Daniel O’Gorman and Ruth Franklin both 
describe the post-9/11 novel as defined by an ‘inward gaze’. As O’Gorman rightly observes, 
Open City ‘uses tropes of solitude and memory’ to ‘frame’ ‘post-9/11 reality […] in a deeply 
“inward-gazing” way.’31 At the same time, however, the novel allows ‘the intricate 
connections between the United States and the rest of the globe […] to filter both in and out 
of its narrative to such a disorienting extent that the narrator loses sight of his own place in 
the history of the world.’32 In this sense, Cole’s novel represents what Arin Keeble describes 
as ‘the real crisis in representation’ post-9/11, that is, ‘the fundamental conflictedness of the 
texts […] [between] notions of epoch, trauma and the personal against history, context, 
politics and continuity.’33 
 Through the palimpsestic structure of Open City, Cole layers these two approaches 
and mobilises then through the narrator’s gaze. As Katharina Donn observes, after 9/11, 
‘[t]he relation between image and reality, representation and experience, is […] 
fundamentally redefined’.34 When vision is disoriented, the reliability of the image’s 
mimetic ability to represent reality is called into question, as is the efficacy of perception. 
The image in the ‘Storyteller’ and Cole’s ‘falling bodies’ are not, strictly speaking, 
anamorphic images, but, like anamorphs, they ‘thematize the incapacity of a representation 
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to be a substitute of that which is forever lost.’35 In what follows, I will trace examples of 
Julius’s ‘anamorphic gaze’ and its spatial reordering of the city as he retraces the sites of 
9/11. The sites not only reveal their own repressed histories, but act as substitutes for Julius’s 
own memory. Julius’s narration of the site shows it to be a ‘palimpsest’ of ‘written, erased, 
rewritten’ narratives inscribed in the landscape, but which also retroactively stand in for, or 
screen, Julius’s own implication in the violence in and of history. I want to return to Julius’s 
impression of Wall Street Station [Fig. 7], with which this chapter began. Julius first notices 
the great contrast of the station’s ‘grandeur’ from the other ‘perfunctory […] tiled tunnels 
and narrow exits’ of other stations in Lower Manhattan. First, the station appears as a 
nineteenth-century arcade [see Figure 5]:  
The hall had two rows of columns running along its length, and there were sets of glass 
doors on either end. The glass, the dominance of white […] made me the room feel like 
an atrium or greenhouse […] but the tripartite division of the space, with the center aisle 
broader than the two to either side of it, was more reminiscent of a cathedral. The vaults 
strengthened this impression, and what came to mind was the florid Gothic style of 
England, as exemplified in buildings like Bath Abbey or the cathedral in Winchester 
[Fig. 6] in which their colonnades spray up into the vaults. Not that the station replicated 
the stone tracery of such churches. It evoked the effect, rather, by means of its finely 
chequered or woven surface, a gigantic assemblage of white plastic.36  
This is not merely an ekphrasis on postmodern corporate architecture; it shows Julius in the 
mode of the flâneur, experiencing the city as an assemblage of esoteric signifiers; these 
signifiers are arranged in such a way to trick his perception. The building’s shroud doubles 
as a mask, recalling Rem Koolhaas’s description of Manhattan’s skyline: ‘Only in New York 
has architecture become the design of costumes that do not reveal the true nature of repetitive 
interiors, but slip smoothly into the subconscious to perform their roles as symbols.’37 The 
Deutsche Bank building, already monumental, becomes, to Julius’s eyes, obelisk-like. Not 
only does this cast the building as a lost object, but an object from a civilisation ‘lost’ to 
outsiders. Furthermore, obelisks are often presented as pure symbols of imperial power, but 
at the same time inscrutable and enigmatic, bearing an indecipherable history. Although the 
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text doesn’t reveal it, the station Julius describes is actually a station entrance that connects 
Wall Street Station with Deutsche Bank. An ‘assemblage’ of different period styles – from 
Classical and Gothic to fin-de-siècle, the lobby is constructed from artificial materials which 
‘evoke the effect’ of such buildings. 
 
Figure 5. Paris Arcades, cover photo, The Arcades Project 
Only from a distance can the columns and vaults replicate a natural surface, while its 
‘grandeur’ is due to its ‘gigantic’ scale alone. The atrium is an example of the somewhat 
contradictorily phrased ‘privatised public buildings’, open to the public only on certain days. 
Spaces such as these complicate the perambulations of the flâneur, but they are also 
curiosities to those who know how to look. While details of the lobby and its attachment to 
Deutsche Bank aren’t included in the text, Julius describes it as a strangely dehumanised 
space: 
My original impression of the grandeur of the space, though not of its size, quickly 
changed as I walked through the hall. The columns could have been wrought from 
recycled plastic chairs, and the ceiling seemed to have been carefully constructed out 
of white Lego blocks. This feeling of being in a large-scale model was only increased 
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by the lonely palm trees in their pots […] a pair of men […] [who] did nothing to 
correct my impression of being among life-size mannequins.38 
 
 
Figure 6. Winchester Cathedral, ca. 1865-189539 
The large scale of the lobby and the scarcity of human beings populating it makes them 
seem, to Julius, like mere props in an architectural rendering. However, this synthetic, 
postmodern interior gives way to strange, anachronistic details: for example, a stranger’s 
coat is described as ‘oversize, mouse-coloured’ that falls ‘like a Victorian dress around 
him’.40 Through such details, Cole builds up a picture of distorted space containing multiple 
temporalities whose fleeting legibility is contingent on the viewer’s given perspective. Once 
he emerges from Wall Street Station, Julius enters a ‘small alley’ wherein ‘it was as though 
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the entire world had fallen away. I was strangely comforted to find myself alone in this way 
in the heart of the city.’41 The alleyway (which Julius notes is ‘no one’s preferred route to 
any destination’) is an unconventional route set off from the widened streets which regulate 




Figure 7. 60 Wall Street Lobby, photograph by Ray Weitzenberg 2010.43 
The alley is also a passageway (like the nineteenth-century Parisian passages or arcades 
Benjamin discusses throughout his late work) through and between multiple discrete spaces, 
a zone of connection and detachment. Looking through the frame of the alley, Julius sees ‘a 
great black building [ahead]’ [Fig. 8]: ‘Ahead of me was a great black building. The surface 
of its half-visible tower was matte, a light-absorbing black like that of cloth, and its sharp 
geometry made it look like a freestanding shadow or cardboard cutout.’44 Throughout the 
text, and particularly in this chapter, Julius includes each street and landmark he sees in his 
narrative walk through New York. Yet he does not name the black, cloth-covered building, 
which is the ruined tower once occupied by Deutsche Bank. The building was not a direct 
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target of the 9/11 attacks but was seriously damaged when it was hit by debris from the South 
Tower. 
 
Figure 8. Deutsche Bank, photograph by Elisabeth Robert, 200145 
When he exits the alley, and comes to Albany Street, he is able ‘to see the tower more clearly, 
although still at some distance’: ‘[i]t was completely veiled in a densely woven black net. 
Where that narrow, quiet street met Washington, I saw to my right, about a block north of 
where I stood, a great empty space. I immediately thought of the obvious but, equally 
quickly, put the idea out of my mind.’46 The netting is both a burial shroud and a veil that 
conceals the extent of the damage. It also has a practical purpose that designates the building 
as a toxic object in the fullest sense: it held in asbestos, silica, and lead, among other toxic 
substances, ‘containing’ the traces of destruction (bone fragments were later found in the air 
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ducts) that threatened to spill out.47 Julius describes the tower as a negative object: an 
unnamed void that absorbs all light. In contrast to the reflective surfaces of extant 
skyscrapers, the black netting is deflective, and can be seen to stand in for the ‘screen 
memories’ that, as Lucy Bond argues, emerged from the hermeneutic quagmire of political 
and literary discourse after 9/11.48 Indeed, it actively repels memory: when Julius sees the 
building, he ‘immediately [thinks] of the obvious’ (a distancing euphemism) before 
‘put[ting] the idea out of [his] mind’.49 As Krishnan further highlights:  
[T]hinking of “the obvious” would require that Julius confront the enormity of the 
violence marking the site, both in the events of 9/11 and in the site’s position within a 
global system of iniquity, fuelled by international division of labour […] [i]n an effort 
to supress its material history, Julius instead focuses upon the site as “empty”, removed 
from the violence of the regulatory space in which it played a central part.50  
However, as Julius continues to walk, he reaches Ground Zero: ‘the empty space was […] I 
now saw and admitted, the obvious: the ruins of the World Trade Center.’51 From this site, 
Julius encounters the Deutsche Bank building from a farther vantage point: ‘[b]eyond the 
site [of the World Trade Center] was the building I had seen earlier in the evening.’ Julius 
describes the building as ‘mysterious and severe as an obelisk.’52 Instead of an object that 
short-circuits memory (Julius never identifies the building), the Deutsche Bank site becomes 
highly significant, if enigmatically so. This connects to Bond’s theory that post-9/11 
analogical memory actually precludes recognition. Julius adjusts his first viewing of the 
Deutsche Bank building as ‘freestanding shadow’ without a source and an unreflective place 
of forgetting without a source to that of an ancient monument engraved with a script he 
cannot decipher.53 By comparing the site to an obelisk, the narrator draws an analogy 
between 9/11 and the decline of an entire ancient civilisation; a hyperbole which displaces 
the present into the past. Unlike Susan Howe’s open, lace-like texts, which allow a virtual 
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conversation between memories, the ‘text’ of the Deutsche Bank building is ‘densely woven’ 
and actively eludes the observer’s perception. As Julius’s visual analogy attests, the ‘great 
black building’ attracts analogical meaning, but, as with light, the black netting absorbs this 
meaning into the weft of forgetting and disavowal. This is indicative of a wider cultural act 
of displacement that Julius himself observes: ‘[t]he place [the site of the World Trade Center] 
had become a metonym of its disaster: I remembered a tourist who once asked me how he 
could get to 9/11; not the site of the events of 9/11 but to 9/11 itself, the date petrified into 
broken stones.’54 Ariela Freedman reads this anecdote as a ‘strategic’ ‘evasiveness’ that 
‘resist[s] turning the event into a fetish’ because, ‘instead of seeing the sublime in the site’, 
the narrator abruptly directs his gaze toward ‘the mundane, marking the restaurant on the 
corner [and] the lonely men dining behind large glass windows like a Hopper painting’.55 
Yet this shift in attention is surely a further act of evasiveness. In reading the site as identical 
to its disaster, the tourist performs an act of displacement that imitates Julius’s earlier 
circumlocution of 9/11 as ‘the obvious’. Through this metonym, the tourist anchors the 
actuality of 9/11 in a concrete space that is traversable. By identifying the site as 9/11 itself, 
the event becomes an object that can be managed, observed, contained, and, importantly, 
viewed from a distance, as Julius does. Time is domesticated through space: as Benjamin 
says, history merges into setting, ‘petrified into broken stones’.56 Julius views the site from 
various points of distance, first through the alleyway and then from the site of the Twin 
Towers, observing the ruins of the Deutsche Bank building from afar, like the romantic New 
Zealander of Gustave Doré’s engraving. The novel pivots around this melancholy, 
observational distance, drawing out its potential for insight while forcefully underscoring 
the fatal limits of such a perspective.  
The ‘obelisk-like’ Deutsche Bank building signifies the monolithic narrative by which 
9/11 was rendered a singularity, an interruption that split history and temporality into pre- 
and post-9/11, where every image and ruined building became an inscrutable but highly 
significant symbol: the post-9/11 landscape is an allegorical one that ‘speak[s] of something 
other than it represents.’57 The allegory of the black netting is no less than an allegory of 
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allegorical operation: the act of concealment. As the narrator’s walk concludes, he observes 
the commercialisation of memory that the site of the World Trade Center represents, a site 
that is also a metonym for global capital, has come to represent: ‘marketable stories of all 
kinds had thickened around the injured coast of our city’.58 Like the black netting, the 
marketisation of Ground Zero represents (and misappropriates) catastrophe. To identify the 
site solely with 9/11 is to erase other (often intertwined) histories that lie beneath its 
foundations, as Julius remarks at the conclusion of the chapter’s walk: 
This was not the first erasure on the site. Before the towers had gone up, there had 
been a bustling network of little streets traversing this part of town. Robinson Street, 
Laurens Street, College Place: all of them had been obliterated in the 1960s to make 
way for the World Trade Center buildings, and all were forgotten now. […] And, 
before that? What Lenape paths lay buried beneath the rubble? The site was a 
palimpsest, as was all the city, written, erased, rewritten. There had been communities 
before Columbus ever set sail, before Verrazano anchored his ships in the narrows, or 
the black Portuguese slave trader Esteban Gómez sailed up the Hudson; human beings 
had lived here, built homes, and quarrelled with their neighbors long before the Dutch 
ever saw a business opportunity. […] Generations rushed through the eye of the 
needle, and I, one of the still legible crowd, entered the subway. I wanted to find the 
line that connected me to my own part of these stories.59  
This passage, which is crucial to the novel’s philosophy of history, requires some unpacking. 
First, as the narrator makes clear, the site where the World Trade Center once stood does not 
exclusively ‘belong’ to ‘9/11’, but, as Krishnan aptly contends, is ‘written over by the power 
of international finance’ alongside displaced indigenous communities, the slave trade, and 
the Dutch East India company, one of earliest transnational corporations.60 It is clear, as 
Freedman writes, Cole does not wish ‘to use 9/11 […] as a metonym for a unique, exclusive, 
or singular event but as a way to expose earlier traumas’.61 Secondly, the narrator’s 
meditation on the palimpsestic nature of history and place prompts Julius to seek ‘the line 
that connected me to my own part of these stories’ which indicates a commitment to reading 
the ‘still legible’ traces of erased histories. The unmistakably Benjaminian image of 
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‘generations rush[ing] through the eye of the needle’ like commuters hurrying through the 
subway entrance emphasises the past as something that ‘flits by’ and threatens to ‘disappear 
irretrievably’.62 Though the traces are ‘still legible’, marking their survival in the text of the 
city, they, too, threaten to ‘disappear irretrievably’ in the onslaught of erasure and 
reinscription. The ‘eye of the needle’ has a dialectical structure, as the point through which 
histories disappear, and as the messianic entrance through which history may be redeemed. 
In order for the latter to occur, the historian-as-reader must not only seize an image of the 
past but ‘recognise the present as intended in that image’.63 Krishnan notes how Julius’s 
historical meditation on Ground Zero ‘div[es] into a temporal sequence attuned to the 
unmasking of an alleged truth for the site’ that simultaneously constructs an ‘illusion of 
multiplicity’ and ‘dissociate[s] its violence and its metonymic implication in […] an 
eradication of difference’ through ‘an enforced teleological ordering’.64 Julius is turned so 
far to the past that he reaches the very limit of history through the regressive repetition of 
‘before’. He does not recognise himself as ‘intended’ in the images of erasure and 
revisionism that appear to him on his walks. On the level of narrative, Julius’s seizure of the 
past itself constitutes a ‘moment of danger’.65  
Julius’s reading of the Deutsche Bank building and of Ground Zero itself as sites of 
forgetting, which conceal memory – even as they nominally inscribe it – initially endow him 
with an ethical gaze determined from the standpoint of a cautious distance that is both 
hesitant (to avoid being caught up in the spectacle) and respectful. However, it is important 
to focus not only on the method through which Julius arrives at these insights, but the content 
of the insights themselves, which tells a story of disavowal and displacement, of ‘covering 
up’ inconvenient memories. Every major insight Julius reads into the landscape has a dual 
significance that both propels and implicates his narrative in the very erasures it is intent on 
uncovering.  In Julius’s reading of the Deutsche Bank building, the curious black netting that 
seems to deflect memory is a visual and psychological production of forgetting; a sort of 
negative trompe-l’oeil – an illusion of the absence rather than the presence of space. In the 
wider context of the novel, however, this postmodern obelisk is an allegory of Julius’s own 
work of forgetting (which constitutes the narrative). To uncover suppressed histories and 
suppressed voices is to acknowledge the violence that threatens to destroy them. Encoded in 
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the narrator’s recuperation of histories is an urgent demand to look for omissions, gaps and 
wounds in any given narrative, but most essentially in Open City.  
3.3 Displacement: Lagos and New York 
The black netting that enshrouded the Deutsche Bank building reflects a more general 
impulse in post-9/11 discourse to ‘screen’ elements of U.S. history that could not be 
assimilated into monolithic narratives in which the country was a martyr for freedom and 
democracy. According to John N. Duvall and Robert P. Marzec, these discourses were 
characterised by a ‘failure to imagine the terrorist attacks as a part of a history of unequal 
relations and unequal distribution of power and wealth, unequal access to global resources, 
and unequal representations’.66 Instead of critically examining the ‘history of unequal 
relations’, however, attempts to contextualise 9/11 often positioned the events in (uncritical) 
relation to other traumas from the past. As Bond writes, ‘not all manifestations of 
comparative memory are as transcultural, multidirectional, or cosmopolitan as they first 
appear’, citing Gary Suson’s Ground Zero Museum Workshop (GZMW), which modelled 
itself on the Anne Frank Museum, drawing a spurious analogy between 9/11 and the 
Holocaust.67 Such incommensurable comparisons are perhaps generated from the search for 
‘route[s] to making sense of what happened’: unable to secure a meaning for what happened, 
a frantic and uncritical search for meaning in other histories might anchor the event in a 
familiar historical framework, even if that framework is an deeply devastating one. Bond 
writes: ‘the apparent inability to situate 9/11 within any readily available interpretive 
framework’ results in an ‘analogical impulse’ to ‘[substitute] a pre-digested past for the 
unexplained present.’68 Although, as Bond acknowledges through her reading of A. Dirk 
Moses, this ‘analogical’ impulse is a feature of traumatic memory, she contends that drawing 
an analogy between 9/11 and events like the Holocaust ‘often operate as a screen memory 
that can be mobilised to preclude recognition of America’s historical shortcomings.’69 In an 
account of the intersection of traumatic discourses in post-9/11 fiction and its reception by 
literary critics, Richard Crownshaw writes that ‘9/11 trauma could be more productively 
defined as the puncturing of the national fantasies of an inviolable and innocent homeland, 
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fantasies which themselves rest on the (failed) repression of foundational violence in the 
colonial settler creation of that homeland, and on subsequent notions of American 
exceptionalism at home and, in the exercise of foreign policy, abroad’.70 Taken together, 
Bond and Crownshaw suggest that in order to ‘work through’ its own trauma, America 
would have to examine its implication in other traumatic histories. The protagonist’s 
narrative reproduces the oscillation between disavowal and the desire to honour the ethical 
claim the past holds on the present by recognising the memory of the oppressed in historical 
narratives. This ethical imperative would involve a form a self-reflexive (dialectical) 
introspection that should entail the consideration of one’s own relation to these narratives.  
While Daniel O’Gorman has commented on the use of screen memory in Open City, 
he has so far only focused on one example at the end of the novel, where Moji confronts 
Julius about the rape. At a dinner party, on the terrace of a high-rise apartment, Moji delivers 
her traumatic testimony to Julius, who gives no indication of a response. Instead, the 
narrative suddenly shifts from the action as Julius remembers an anecdote from Albert 
Camus’s journals, which Julius calls a ‘double story’:  
Scaevola had been captured while trying to kill the Etruscan king Porsenna and, rather 
than give away his accomplices, he showed his fearlessness by putting his right hand in 
a fire and letting it burn. […] Nietzsche, according to Camus, became angry when his 
schoolmates would not believe the Scaevola story. And so, the fifteen-year-old Nietzsche 
plucked a hot coal from the grate, and held it. Of course, it burned him. He carried the 
resulting scar with him for the rest of his life.71   
As Vermeulen writes, this response is ‘startling in its inadequacy’ and is indicative of 
Julius’s ‘failure to engage with trauma’ throughout the novel.72 Vermeulen suggests that the 
‘double story’ of Scaevola and Nietzsche stands in place of Julius’s response and reaction to 
Moji, which ‘converts the spectacle of traumatic suffering into an assertion of the heroism 
of inexpressiveness.’73 This is partially correct, but I would add that Julius does engage with 
trauma (he is, after all, a psychiatrist), but only on a macro, world-historical level. Julius 
fails when he is called upon to engage with the specific trauma of an individual, an act that 
would require him to relate to other people, to the ‘other’ of his aesthetic milieu. Vermeulen 
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further asserts that this anecdote ‘implicitly declares [Moji] guilty of a failure to feel the 
appropriate ‘contempt for pain’; this may be true, but it also suggests Julius finds the trauma 
he inflicted on Moji as difficult to recognise as grasping a hot coal.  The detail that stands 
out most from the anecdote is not Scaevola’s ‘contempt for pain’ (the first part of the ‘double 
story’), but the child Nietzsche’s anger at being disbelieved, an encounter that scars him 
(whatever the anecdote’s significance, it is incommensurable with the trauma of rape, an 
experience that cannot be given any just representation through the oblique, referential 
aesthetics performed by the novel, no less the perpetrator/protagonist through which this 
aesthetics is focalised). It also raises serious questions about the ethics of rape as a fictional 
device. This is not to say that literary representations of rape are unethical, but that, following 
Anne Reef, ‘writing about rape […] is […] an ethically complex action.’74 Even if Julius 
does not respond, I do not believe there is an implication of Moji’s ‘guilt’; in fact, it seems 
to further indict Julius, his version of events, his memory and, as Vermeulen further notes, 
reveals Julius’s inadequate response to traumatic testimony. If it is a double story, it also 
redoubles Moji’s anger – and agency: Julius, she says, ‘had been ever-present in her life, like 
a stain or a scar.’75 It soon becomes clear that Julius’s technique of evasion really refers to 
the mark or wound of Moji’s unacknowledged (by Julius, at any rate) trauma. 
O’Gorman reads the Scaevola/Nietzsche anecdote as ‘the very definition of a “screen 
memory”, providing a comforting cover to the trauma of the event in question’; this screen 
memory, O’Gorman adds, is ‘multidirectional’ in the sense of the term used by Michael 
Rothberg to designate a model of comparative memory that is ‘subject to ongoing 
negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; as productive, not privative.’76 O’Gorman 
interprets Julius’s lack of response and his anecdotal screen memory as a tacit 
acknowledgment of his guilt (‘if he is guilty’, O’Gorman somewhat flippantly qualifies): 
Julius’s ‘very inability to think multidirectional is itself rendered multidirectional.’77 
However, I do not believe this screen memory is as multidirectional as O’Gorman suggests, 
since, as Rothberg himself writes, ‘multidirectional memory functions at a level of the 
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collective as a screen memory does at the level of the individual’.78 Though multidirectional 
memories abound in Open City, Julius’s anecdotal screen memory is firmly an individual 
one that conceals his repressed memory of violence, not a dialogue between collective 
histories. Ethically speaking, Moji’s memory should not be up for ‘negotiation’. While the 
Scaevola/Nietzsche anecdote constitutes a screen memory, it does so in line with Freud’s 
original account in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. While this particular screen 
memory (which provides a decisive break with the novel’s surface narrative) displaces 
Moji’s confrontation of Julius in New York, there is a series of screen memories in the 
preceding chapter that connect Julius’s early life in Lagos to details of Moji’s memory, 
constituting a further displacement of Julius’s own repressed memory of the rape.  
The chapter begins, ‘I needed clothes for the ceremonies of my father’s burial in May 
1989’.79 The date is significant because, as Moji will relate in the next chapter, the rape 
occurred ‘in late 1989 […] when she was fifteen and [Julius] was a year younger.’80 Julius 
continues to describe his trip to the tailor’s shop to be fitted for a suit (for the burial) and a 
buba and sokoto, traditional Nigerian clothes (for the wake). The details of the funeral are 
perfunctory, and Julius’s main impression is of ‘unfunereal’ weather, which he contrasts 
with Gustav Mahler’s funeral – during which, he notes, ‘it rained all the way through […] 
until […] the body was interred and the sun came out.’81 One paragraph later, Cole writes, 
‘[…] as soon as my father was interred that afternoon, I thought of someone else who had 
died, or had probably died’.82 Julius describes how his driver (Julius’s grandfather was 
involved in politics, his family is affluent) collided with a young student. The narrator’s 
cohort drove the girl to the hospital, where Julius entreats the nurses to ‘please save me’, one 
of many details that acquire greater weight after Moji’s testimony.83 Julius admits that he 
protected the driver and ‘didn’t talk about her’ to anyone about the incident. After years of 
forgetting, the girl ‘[comes] back to mind only four or five years later’, at his father’s funeral: 
‘by then it was as though the little girl […] dead on a cool morning, a funereal morning, was 
something I had dreamed about, or heard in a telling by someone else.’ Julius never discovers 
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whether the girl survived or died, and his obstinate silence transforms the real memory into 
dream-content. When he describes his father’s burial, Julius makes an unusual statement: ‘I 
was already fourteen, not all that young, when my father was buried’, noting that ‘the 
memory of the day wasn’t secure’.84  
Through this strange disclosure, Julius further locates his memory in an exact time and 
place before equivocating that very memory. Julius’s description of himself at fourteen as 
‘not all that young’ indicates the sober maturity of a teenager faced with life-altering loss; it 
is also subtly endows him with the capacity to be morally culpable for his actions. The 
narrative then shifts to a memory of the memory of the funeral: ‘[…] on May 9 of this year, 
I was on the I train on the way to work when it came to mind that he had been committed to 
earth for exactly eighteen years.’85 ‘In that time’, Julius explains, ‘I had complicated the 
memory of the day, not with other burials, of which I had attended only a few, but with 
depictions of burials.86 He cites El Greco’s Burial of the Count of Orgaz (1586) and 
Courbet’s Burial at Ornans (1850), adding that ‘the actual event had taken on the 
characteristics of those images, and in doing so had become faint and unreliable. I couldn’t 
be sure of the color of the earth, whether it really was the intense red clay I thought I 
remembered, or whether I had taken the form of the priest’s surplice from El Greco’s 
painting or from Courbet’s.’87 The metonymic displacement of Julius’s personal memory to 
an aesthetic one – artistic representations of burials – can be situated within the traditional 
framework of screen memory as Freud conceives it, but with certain qualifications. Freud’s 
conception of the screen memory falls into three categories: a ‘retroactive or retrogressive’ 
screen memory, a screen memory that is ‘pushed ahead or displaced forward’, and 
‘contemporary or contiguous screen memories’.88 In the first instance, a later memory 
screens an earlier one; in the type of memory that is ‘displaced forward’, or progressive 
screen memory (as John Fletcher neatly terms it), an early memory is screened off by a later 
one; finally, the third type of screen memory is the ‘contemporary or contiguous’ screening, 
where the memory of one event is concealed by another, contemporaneous memory.89  
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All three types of screen memory are at work in Julius’s recollection of his father’s 
burial. Julius’s memory of taking the I train on the anniversary of his father’s burial 
retrogressively displaces the original memory. Second, the memory of burial itself screens 
the earlier memory of his father’s death: ‘it was the date of the burial, not that of the death 
that I marked as an anniversary.’90 This is an instance of progressive screen memory. A 
further instance of progressive memory can be found in the displacement of father’s burial 
to artistic ‘depictions of burials’. But the memories that screen the narrator’s memory of his 
father’s burial aren’t memories grounded in any particular experience; the painted burials by 
El Greco and Courbet in his mind’s eye aren’t derived from a specific experience (these 
images are not memories of to a visit to a museum, or a print in a book he once read, for 
example). Finally, taken as a whole, the memory of the burial, which is characterised as both 
‘[in]secure’ and ‘complicated’, acts as a (near-)contemporaneous screen memory of the rape: 
the funeral occurs in 1989, the year in which Julius was fourteen and raped Moji.  However, 
like every screen memory, this crucial contemporaneous screen memory is apprehended 
belatedly.  
   I want to briefly return to the Scaevola/Nietzsche anecdote that O’Gorman 
introduces as a screen memory. This scene definitively situates Julius as a dissociated 
observer rather than a witness. The ‘line that connect[s]’ Julius to his ‘own part in [the] 
stories’ violence and historical erasure and revision – the destructive element that hangs over 
every palimpsest – is directly articulated by Moji, the victim and the survivor of his violence, 
but he refuses to recognise it and, through his narrative circumlocution, attempts to make 
this line illegible. Julius’s encounter with Moji is the ‘moment of danger’ in which an image 
of the past intrudes on the ‘secure version’ Julius ‘had been constructing since 1992’, when 
he arrived in New York.91 This moment clarifies the dialectical, meta-hermeneutic structure 
of Cole’s novel whereby the narrator’s failure to comprehend history within the interpretive 
framework of his own narration requires the reader to apply these ethical ideals to the text 
itself.  
3.4. Cosmopolitan Flight 
In 9/11 Fiction, Empathy, and Otherness, Tim Gauthier notes that the literary response to 
the ‘“us” and “them” narratives [that] proliferated after 9/11’ resulted in a ‘renewed 
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emphasis on cosmopolitan values […] to counterbalance an apparent movement towards 
increased polarization, encapsulated in the oft-mentioned “clash of civilizations”’.92 Like the 
post-9/11 novel, the cosmopolitan novel demands a radical adjustment to our imaginative 
‘angle of vision’. In his book-length study of the cosmopolitan novel, Berthold Schoene 
recalls Timothy Brennan’s pivotal essay ‘The National Longing for Form’ (1989), in which 
Brennan asserts that the novel form ‘accompanied the rise of nations […] by mimicking the 
structure of the nation.’93 Brennan’s thesis prompts Schoene to ask ‘whether, in our 
increasingly globalised world, the novel may already have begun to adapt and renew itself 
by imagining the world instead of the nation […] and what might be the impact of these 
characteristics’ on the novel form.94 If, as the critics discussed so far suggest, the post-9/11 
novel often reproduces American exceptionalism – and if, following Brennan, the traditional 
novel form simulates the structure of the nation-state – then the cosmopolitan novel appears 
to provide a suitable alternative through its emphasis on multiple (inter)connections across 
and beyond nation-states. Read along these lines, Open City offers an example of the 
cosmopolitan turn in post-9/11 fiction, one that turns away from the domestic, ‘inward-gaze’, 
toward a more open, globally-oriented perspective.  
Since its publication, Open City has been acclaimed as one such cosmopolitan novel, 
and it is unsurprising that scholarly discussions of Open City (including my own) tend to 
focus on the ways Cole engages with and interrogates cosmopolitan discourse. Giles Foden 
contends that narrative ‘action is the wrong spoor by which to pursue this book’, citing the 
novel’s ‘cosmopolitan range of reference’ as its clearest route.95 This ‘cosmopolitan range’ 
can be detected not only by the diverse high-cultural markers that swirl around Julius – 
Mendelssohn, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Velazquez and Roland Barthes are all woven into 
the his thoughts and conversation – or the narrator’s traversal of three countries, but also in 
the novel’s highly mobile, perambulatory mode of narration that is structured by the 
narrator’s ‘aimless wandering’. Julius resides in New York, a global power city whose 
transnational networks are tightly woven and highly visual; like many Americans, Julius is 
an immigrant, is invested with an outsider’s view of American society, a perspective that is 
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not wholly domestic (one of the criticisms of post-9/11 literature) but which is nonetheless 
situated from within the United States. Thus, as Claire Messud writes, Julius has ‘a 
cosmopolite’s detachment from his American experience’.96 
Two types of mobility, predicated on distance, dominate the cosmopolitan imaginary 
of Open City: flight and walking. Open City begins at the confluence of these two modes of 
transport and their attendant perspectives. Julius introduces the narrative by describing a 
route he discovered the previous year when he ‘began to go on evening walks last fall’. The 
walks, he explains, provided ‘a counterpoint to my busy days at the hospital’ as a resident 
psychiatrist, and ‘steadily lengthened, taking me farther and farther afield each time, so that 
I often found myself at quite a distance from home late at night’.97 Julius’s newly-acquired 
custom of ‘aimless wandering’ emerges around the same time as the ‘habit of watching bird 
migrations from my apartment’; ‘and’, he adds, ‘I wonder now if the two are connected.’98 
Though walking and flight are modes of transport with very different perspectives, they 
overlap in the figure of the flâneur. Although the flâneur is firmly planted on the ground and 
in the streets, he is defined by what Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson calls a ‘disengagement that 
[…] depends upon the marked social distance which reproduces the physical distances of the 
bird’s-eye view and panoramas in which contemporaries so often indulge.’99 While Julius 
walks, his gaze is directed skyward and inclined to flight, including flights of fancy, as when 
he imagines a ‘bird’s-eye view’ of New York: 
[…] I used to look out the window like someone taking auspices, hoping to see the 
miracle of natural immigration. Each time I caught sight of the geese swooping in 
formation across the sky, I wondered how our life might look from their perspective, 
and imagined that, were they ever to indulge in such speculation, the high-rises might 
seem to them like firs massed in a grove. Often, as I searched the sky, all I saw was 
rain, or the faint contrail of an airplane bisecting the window, and I doubted in some 
part of myself whether these birds, with their dark wings and throats, their pale bodies 
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and tireless little hearts, really did exist. So amazed was I by them that I couldn’t trust 
my memory when they weren’t there.100  
While walking presents a way of reading the palimpsestic human history of the city, for 
Cole, birds are ‘a different form of life which has as little understanding of what it’s about 
as we do, and the fact that they’re aerial, so have a different point of view.’101 Birds not only 
represent a wholly other experience of the world; the bird’s eye view (or rather, from Julius’s 
imagination of their perspective), provides a perspective through which human life would 
appear alien. This passage registers Julius’s radical attempts to think empathetically – to 
imagine the perspective of an other form of life – and carries a dialectical complexity: on the 
one hand, the narrator ultimately arrogates wings to speak for birds only to invoke an 
anthropocentric understanding of the geese he observes; on the other hand, while Julius 
obviously cannot truly see as a bird, either visually or ontologically, his ground-level 
observations of their flight affords him (and the reader) an entirely different, more direct and 
encompassing view. In this opening passage, then, the ground and aerial views operate in 
exchange, each imagining the other as other. This is a sublime, even miraculous form of 
distance that allows the ground and aerial view to operate in exchange, each imagining the 
other as other: from his position on the ground looking upward, Julius imagines birds in 
flight looking toward the ground, wondering at the ‘tiny, fragile human bod[ies]’ (to quote 
Benjamin one more) of the humans below.102 
Julius’s imaginative exercise situates the novel within the cosmopolitan perspective of 
distance. From Greek antiquity through to Kant and beyond, cosmopolitan detachment is, as 
Amanda Anderson explains, structured by a ‘cultivated’ and ‘reflective distance’ from the 
‘restricted perspective[s] and interest[s] of the polis […] religion, class, and […] the 
absolutist state’.103 Quoting George Eliot, Anderson asserts that distance ‘helps us rise to a 
lofty point of observation, so that we may see things in their relative proportions’.104 Yet, as 
Benjamin’s ‘Storyteller’ attests, a distanced perspective may enable a more encompassing 
view where the ‘great, simple outlines’ of the storyteller are perceptible, but it also objectifies 
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the human figure, rendering it ‘tiny’ and ‘fragile’.105 As much as a detached view can provide 
a less solipsistic approach to global relations, Anderson qualifies, ‘distanced viewpoints 
elsewhere permit only broad outlines that obscure the crucial realities of lived experience.’106 
In other words, the cosmopolitan ethos of openness to difference often erases difference 
through its framework of detachment. 
Near the end of the novel, the image of birds in flight recurs in a more disturbing context: 
Although it [the Statue of Liberty] has had its symbolic value right from the 
beginning, until 1902, it was a working lighthouse, the biggest in the country. In 
those days, the flame that shone from the torch guided ships into Manhattan’s 
harbour; that same light, especially in bad weather, fatally disoriented the birds. The 
birds, many of which were clever enough to dodge the cluster of skyscrapers in the 
city, somehow lost their bearings when faced with a single monument. A large 
number of birds met their death in this matter. […] one particularly stormy night, 
more than fourteen hundred dead birds were recovered from the crown […] and […] 
sold […] to New York City milliners and fancy stores.107  
This strikingly brutal image exposes the contradictions of the statue’s ‘symbolic value’. As 
Nasi Anam writes, the ‘magnanimous gesture of welcoming’ that the Statue of Liberty 
appears to incarnate becomes, in this passage, ‘a rich metonym of the grand American 
experiment’s collateral damage’ (the bird’s quasi-suicidal flight into a building rich in 
American symbolism is also a kind of metonymic analogue for images of planes flying into 
the World Trade Centre). 108 The statue’s guiding light ‘disorients’ the birds to such an extent 
that it ‘guides’ them toward destruction. This disorienting view problematises the 
cosmopolitan perspective of flight by condensing the statue’s contradictory symbolism, 
which connotes a place of refuge but also constitutes a border. In the novel, then, flight is 
dialectically constructed as both a ‘miracle of immigration’ and as a fatally disorienting 
concept that problematises the foundations of such cosmopolitan notions as hospitality, 
global citizenship, and ‘cultivated detachment’. In the first image of flight, Cole presents an 
ideal image of cosmopolitan intersubjectivity; and in the last, he offers an utterly distorted 
but critical image of fatal disorientation. On the one hand, as Zlatko Skrbis and Ian 
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Woodward write, ‘[t]here is something curiously cosmopolitan about seeing the world from 
above, flying well above land but gaining a new perspective on patterns of human and natural 
landscapes’; on the other hand, ‘the perspective of flight is possibly both alienating and 
objectifying.’109  
Taken together, the presentation of transcendence and catastrophic flight form the 
novel’s downward arc from a celebration of cosmopolitanism to a much more pessimistic 
approach. Clearly, Julius fails to fulfil the aesthetic promise of cosmopolitan attachment his 
narrative attempts to perform – precisely because of his detached stance. Though he is 
presented with numerous opportunities to engage in a genuinely cosmopolitan encounter, 
these possibilities remain unfulfilled. Julius fails to offer his intellectual and perspectival 
hospitality towards the other, often marginalised, lives of the people he meets, and 
consequently fails to be ethically transformed or altered by their voices. One example of this 
failed cosmopolitanism appears early in the novel, when Julius recounts a visit to a detention 
facility run by a private security firm contracted by the Department of Homeland Security, 
a reminder of a less liberatory global confluence of migration, capitalism, and the security 
state whereby the refugee is both reviled as a criminal or a terrorist and desired as 
commodity. In the novel, the detention centre discomfits cosmopolitanism’s lofty claims to 
universal belonging. Julius’s trip occurs the earlier summer, before the time of the novel; the 
trip is organised by the ‘Welcomers’ (a name which denotes a generous ethic of hospitality), 
a church attended by his then-girlfriend, Nadège. He describes the congregants as ‘a mix of 
human-rights types and church ladies’, noting that the priest ‘wore no shoes, a practice he 
had picked up during his long years of service in a rural parish in the Orinoco […] out of 
solidarity with the peasants he served, but […] he continued to be shoeless in New York to 
remind himself of others and their plight.’ Julius’s description establishes an ascetic scene 
of embodied empathy, but expresses his scepticism through a note of ridicule as he adds, 
‘[t]he shoeless priest did not come with us to Queens.’110 Julius also remarks, with extreme 
ambiguity, that ‘[m]ost of the group […] were women, many with that beatific, slightly 
unfocused expression one finds in do-gooders.’111 Julius’s motivation for the visit is less 
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pious; he joins the group because ‘it seemed like an interesting way to get to know her 
better.’112  
Officials at the facility select Julius to visit Saidu, a Liberian inmate. Saidu attempts 
to connect with Julius, and asks him if he is African and whether he is a Christian, to which 
Julius replies, ‘I hesitated, then told him I supposed I was.’ Saidu asks Julius to pray for him 
and tells him about the detention centre, before discussing the ‘special relationship’ between 
Liberia and America, whose ‘names [even] bore a family resemblance: Liberia, America: 
seven letters each, four of which were shared.’113 ‘When the war began and everything 
started to crumble’, Saidu tells Julius, he was sure the Americans would come in and solve 
the whole thing. But it hadn’t been like that; the Americans had been reluctant to help, for 
their own reasons.’114 Saidu continues to tell Julius the harrowing story of his life in Liberia 
where his ‘mother and sister were shot in the second war, by Charles Taylor’s men’ , who 
forced him to work in a rubber factory; while there, he notices ‘the best soccer player in 
school’ whose ‘right hand had been severed at the wrist’; after this, Saidu describes his flight 
from Liberia  to the United States, a two-year long journey partly on foot – he walks from 
Nigeria to Guinea – and partly by hitchhiking, before finally flying from Lisbon to JFK 
Airport where he was detained by border guards.115 When the visiting hour comes to an end 
and Saidu finishes his story, he asks Julius to visit him again ‘if [he] is not deported.’116 A 
single sentence is set between this paragraph and the next: ‘I said that I would, but never 
did.’117 After admitting that he never returned to the detention centre, Julius recalls how he 
told Saidu’s story to Nadege, and wonders whether ‘she fell in love with the idea of myself 
that I presented in that story: I was the listener, the compassionate African who paid attention 
to the details of someone else’s life and struggle. I had fallen in love with that idea of 
myself.’118 Julius makes all the right cosmopolitan gestures, posing as a ‘sympathetic ear’; 
but this is only an ‘idea of myself that I presented in that story.’119 Mediated by Julius through 
reported speech, Saidu establishes a poetic connection between two nations through a sort 
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of numerological close reading of their names; thus the interconnection between populations 
and places is conjured aesthetically, but this connection is doubly disappointed: despite the 
history shared by Liberia and the United States, and despite America’s claim to be the 
defender of human rights and democracy, ‘the Americans had been reluctant to help, for 
their own reasons’; this is redoubled in miniature when Julius fails to be demonstrably 
affected by Saidu’s testimony, despite being (aesthetically) ‘absorbed’ in the story; and 
despite posturing as a compassionate cosmopolitan, Julius fails to perform the act of 
solidarity requested of him. This passage foreshadows the novel’s pattern, one that 
aesthetically stages and plots the intersubjective relation between an interlocutor and a 
witness that situates both within a network of connection and difference; but this potential 
is never realised, such that it is disenchanted and transformed into an aesthetics of alienation.  
3.5 Alienated Aesthetics: The Flâneur 
From where, this alienation? To make better sense of this, I will return to figure of the 
flâneur. Although international travel, flight, and the transnational polyphony of Julius’s 
many interlocutors emphatically signal the novel’s cosmopolitan texture, critics more 
commonly locate its cosmopolitanism in the figure of the flâneur, with whom Julius shares 
his habitual walks. For example, the novel prompts Bijan Stephen to ask ‘might flânerie be 
due for a revival?’ in order to combat the intensification of the conditions of modernity that 
created the nineteenth-century flâneur: ‘urban life, alienation, class tensions’ and the dilation 
of time caused by ‘the influence of technology’.120 Giles Foden’s lucid review of Open City 
situates Cole’s flâneur in the context of ‘three city walkers out of literary history: the 
“strolling spectator” type which has informed the novel from its earliest days; the 
Baudelairean flâneur which transferred into fiction prose tales such as André Breton’s Nadja 
[…] and the roving “I” of European romantic modernism, which has found its most eloquent 
recent exponent in the work of W.G. Sebald.’121 Pankaj Mishra establishes Julius as a 
reinvention of the flâneur as a ‘more resourceful and cosmopolitan outsider’ produced by 
the global networks he traverses.122 Devin Zuber reframes the flâneur within the context of 
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a post-9/11 cityscape, in particular the ‘hyperpoliticised’ space of Ground Zero: 
‘[u]ltimately, the discursive, meandering trope of the flâneur might provide the best antidote 
for this kind of warmongering’.123 Furthermore, in their review for Los Angeles Review of 
Books, Michelle Kuo and Albert Wu use the terms ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘flâneur’ 
interchangeably to describe Cole’s narrator.124 In this way, the flâneur becomes the 
metaphorical index to the novel’s engagement with cosmopolitanism. This assessment is not 
unfounded: the flâneur, a figure Benjamin locates in the nineteenth-century Parisian arcades, 
thriving on the atomised city of nascent modernity, has often been identified as a 
cosmopolitan figure. Rebecca Walkowitz, borrowing a term from Homi K. Bhabha, asserts 
that flânerie is a form of ‘vernacular cosmopolitanism’ by virtue of the flâneur’s traversal of 
liminal spaces, physical and conceptual boundaries, and ambiguous relation to commodity 
culture.125 Bhabha defines vernacular cosmopolitanism as being ‘on the border, in between, 
introducing the global cosmopolitan “action at a distance” into the very grounds – now 
displaced – of the domestic.’126 
Just as the flâneur observes the city from a distance, cosmopolitanism ‘endorses 
reflective distance from one’s cultural affiliations, a broad understanding of other cultures 
and customs, and a belief in universal humanity.’127 In other words, distance can be 
extrapolated to renounce identities and allegiances based on nationality, class, or religion 
under a rubric of global and universal belonging. The flâneur is likewise characterised by a 
detached, observer’s gaze, through which he can comprehend and articulate the confused 
chaos of the city. I refer to the flâneur as ‘he’ because he is a rigidly gendered figure. The 
flâneur is a bourgeois white man who enjoys a level of anonymity that that women (the 
flaneuse traditionally appears as a sex worker), people of colour (whose navigation of public 
space is violently policed and delimited), workers (who lack the time to stroll) – and all the 
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intersections of those identities – do not. As Julius remarks during his trip to Brussels, ‘[m]y 
presentation – the dark, unsmiling, solitary stranger – made me a target for the inchoate rage 
of the defenders of Vlaanderen.’128 Even still, there is a tradition of flânerie that does not 
centre around the privileged figure associated with the white male leisure class: George 
Sand, Kate Chopin, and Christa Wolff make use the ‘walking woman’, the female flâneuse; 
and Black Atlantic writers such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Paul Laurence Dunbar, and Ralph 
Ellison explore the experience of the black flâneur, which James Edward Smethurst 
describes as ‘combin[ing] of Baudelairean peripatetic Paris […] and Kafkaesque 
claustrophobic Prague’.129 Walking home one night, Julius takes ‘a detour’ through Harlem, 
presenting a kaleidoscopic portrait of the ‘sidewalk salesmen: the Senegalese cloth 
merchants, the young men selling bootleg DVDs, the Nation of Islam stalls […] dashikis, 
posters of black liberation, and little tourist tchotchkes from Africa’. It is a visibly black 
space; an unknown man ‘raise[s] his head to meet’ Julius, in a gesture that doesn’t strictly 
signal anonymity, but a recognition that they are both in a space where their identities are 
not interpellated as black by the white gaze: ‘[i]n the Harlem night, there were no whites’.130  
The defining feature of the flâneur is not so much his anonymity as it is his isolation 
and detachment. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson neatly summarises the flâneur’s relational 
distance from the city and its inhabitants: ‘the flâneur reads the city as he would read a text 
– from a distance.’131 When Benjamin describes the flâneur as ‘a man uprooted […] at home 
neither in his class nor in his homeland, but only on the ground’, he provides an account of 
the flâneur that resonates with contemporary frameworks of cosmopolitan subjectivity and 
states of exile.132 This detachment allows the flâneur to perceive, read, and reveal (as 
Baudelaire did) ‘the mythical secrets of society, especially when society has forgotten about 
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them and they function unconsciously.’133 The ‘uprooted’ flâneur thus appears to follow the 
cosmopolitan rejection of monolithic identity markers – class, birthplace/nation – in favour 
of the multiplicity – and anonymity – of the crowd. These accounts imply a dialectical 
interplay of proximity and distance in the respective, but often overlapping, discourses of 
cosmopolitanism and flânerie: the cosmopolitan affects detachment in order to comprehend 
and enact ‘multiple or flexible attachments to more than one nation or community’; likewise, 
the flâneur, as Burton writes, ‘stands apart from the city even as he appears to “fuse” with 
it; he interprets each of its components in isolation in order […] to attain intellectual 
understanding of the whole as a complex system of meaning.’134 The flâneur becomes the 
allegorist of modernity, reading the hermetic secrets of the city and gathering them into a 
dynamic hermeneutic network that constantly shifts with the protean urban topography.  
At first sight, Julius is the ‘ideal’ flâneur. He intrepidly ‘sets out into the city’ as a 
‘counterpoint’ to his hectic work as a resident psychiatrist, enabling both an escape from and 
an immersion within the rhythm of the city, which ‘work[s] itself’ into his ‘life at walking 
pace.’ Julius exhilarates in his ‘aimless progress’, for him a ‘reminder of freedom’ and a 
subversion of the regimented order of the ‘countless’ commuters he weaves through on his 
way to ‘find the line that connected me to my part in these stories’.135 Yet, as I have already 
discussed, Julius fails to employ his detached position to achieve this goal; as a 
cosmopolitan, he is unable to forge any meaningful ties out of his transnational encounters 
with others; and as a ‘twenty-first century flâneur’, he is able to read traces of repressed 
histories in the city, but incapable of directing those insights toward his own ‘part in’ – and 
responsibility toward – ‘these stories.’  
If the flâneur is a figure capable of transcending boundaries, as Walkowitz and others 
claim, Julius’s incapacity to meaningfully relate to others frustrates the linked paradigms of 
flânerie and cosmopolitanism. In order to account for this paradox, Vermeulen’s otherwise 
shrewd analysis of Open City all but excludes the figure of the flâneur, asserting that its 
‘dark counterpart’, the fugueur, is a more appropriate model for Julius and his habitual walks. 
Vermeulen derives the concept of the fugueur from Ian Hacking’s monograph Mad 
Travelers: Reflections of the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses, according to which a 
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‘fugue epidemic’ took place in tandem with the flâneur in the late nineteenth-century. The 
fugueur was one such ‘mad traveller’ who succumbed to the sudden compulsion to wander 
away from home and experienced amnesia when they were returned. According to 
Vermeulen, the fugueur embodies the novel’s ‘more obscure meaning: a dissociative mental 
condition that the novel renders through its affectless tone, and that warns readers not to 
mistake aesthetic transport for cosmopolitan achievement.’ Vermeulen even goes to far as 
to quote the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic Statistic Manual (DSM) entry 
for ‘dissociative fugue’ and diagnoses Julius with a dissociative disorder. There are several 
problems with this interpretation. First, in order to account for Julius’s cosmopolitan failures, 
Vermeulen characterises the protagonist as the flâneur’s antithesis, the fugueur – which 
‘cosmopolitan discourses cannot contain’ – in order to mark the limits of aesthetic 
cosmopolitanism. Second, although in many contexts it is both useful and illuminating to 
apply psychoanalytic theory to literary fiction (as I have earlier in this chapter and elsewhere 
in this thesis), diagnosing a fictional character with a mental illness is, in this context at least, 
a limited line of reasoning. The terms with which Vermeulen proposes this argument are 
problematic, to say the least: Vermeulen introduces the fugueur as a ‘sinister […] figure’ 
and, having diagnosed Julius with a dissociative disorder, refers to the fugueur-narrator’s 
‘sinister cosmopolitan dissociation’ as ‘staging a more sinister form of life’.136 Aside from 
imbuing mental illness – which is already routinely demonised across various discourses and 
in various institutions – with a ‘sinister’ quality, Vermeulen minimises Julius’s agency 
(Julius’s act of ‘forgetting links Julius’s psychological association to a failure of memory, 
even to amnesia, while the rest of the novel raises the question of its relations to his incessant 
walking’) and therefore his culpability for Moji’s rape.137 By implicitly diminishing Julius’s 
responsibility for violence, Vermeulen detracts from the ethical stakes of the text.  
Vermeulen discounts the flâneur because, although it has been ‘condemned as a fatally 
bourgeois figure’ he nonetheless ‘emerges from Baudelaire’s and Benjamin’s work as a 
dialectical figure […] who anticipates a cosmopolitan ethos that thrives on intercultural 
curiosity and the virtues of the aesthetic’: this is curious, because the assumption that the 
flâneur possesses a ‘cosmopolitan ethos’ is based on accounts of the flâneur produced by 
the cosmopolitan discourses (especially Walkowitz) Vermeulen (again, justifiably) 
criticises. Vermeulen abandons his cosmopolitan frame of reference and turns to psychology 
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to explain the weaknesses within cosmopolitan discourse that Open City stages; and he views 
Cole as deploying a figure that destabilises the cosmopolitan ethos in order to dislodge its 
inconsistencies, rather than locate instability within certain strains of cosmopolitanism itself. 
If we are to take the claim that Open City critiques the tendency in cosmopolitanism and 
human rights discourse at large to turn to aesthetics instead of praxis seriously, as Vermeulen 
rightly suggests it does, pathologising the narrator will not do. It seems to me that a more 
direct approach would be to locate these limitations from within the bounds of cosmopolitan 
discourse itself – more specifically, within the figure of flâneur itself. What Vermeulen 
pathologises as a psychological fugue state is, in fact, a conceptual problem of detachment. 
Vermeulen is not the only one to dissociate Julius from the figure of the flâneur; in their 
review of Open City, Michelle Kuo and Albert Wu contrast Cole’s ‘alienated cosmopolitan’ 
with the ideal cosmopolitanism of the Baudelairean flâneur who is ‘everywhere at home’.138 
Wu and Kuo conclude that Cole’s flâneur is a ‘different creature’ from Baudelaire’s stroller 
and as such ‘reflect[s] a radical break from the [nineteenth-century] vision of the flâneur’.139 
The difficulty these critics find in identifying Julius as a flâneur pivots around the matter of 
extreme detachment, of alienation; because their understanding of the flâneur is based on 
accounts which emphasise the liberatory, critically-engaged aspects of the flâneur, qualities 
that are essentially irreconcilable with Julius’s character. From Wu and Kuo’s and 
Vermeulen’s view, Julius cannot be a flâneur because he fails to ‘thrive on intercultural 
curiosity and the virtues of the aesthetic’; he must therefore be a ‘different creature’ (the 
fugueur). Yet these accounts are in part produced by the literary cosmopolitanism Vermeulen 
(via Cole) criticises. I argue that Julius does, in fact, find a model in the flâneur and that it 
is through this figure that Cole interrogates contemporary currents of literary 
cosmopolitanism. In other words, by exploding the myth of the cosmopolitan flâneur, Cole 
simultaneously questions the efficacy of a cosmopolitanism based on ‘aesthetic transport’ 
alone.140  
Both Walkowitz and Vermeulen approach the flâneur in more emancipatory terms 
than Benjamin – who in actuality describes the decline of the flâneur – originally proposed. 
Of all of Benjamin’s figures of thought, the flâneur is perhaps the most ambiguous. The 
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flâneur’s detached stance allows him to brush the city against the grain of the capitalist 
production of space; his meandering route resists the purposeful rhythms of the commuter 
and the shopper which enables him to read the city’s secret history and remap its prescribed 
boundaries. This detachment, which makes the flâneur the premier interpreter of modernity, 
emerges as a response to the overwhelming ‘superabundance of images and stimuli’ in the 
nascent city of modernity.141 Julius reiterates the flâneur’s experience when he describes 
entering the subway: ‘Above-ground I was with thousands of others in their solitude, but in 
the subway, standing so close to strangers, jostling them and being jostled by them for space 
and breathing room, all of us reenacting unacknowledged traumas, the solitude 
intensified.’142 This echoes Baudelaire’s complaint: ‘lost in this ugly world, jostled by the 
crowds’, a condition Sanja Bahun describes as ‘populated solitude’.143 The very scale of 
modern urban experience means that relations are anonymised, distant despite the growing 
proximity of city-dwellers to one another: ‘[w]alking through busy parts of town meant I 
laid eyes on more people, hundreds more, thousands even, than I was accustomed to seeing 
in the course of a day.’144 To combat this isolation and derive meaning from the sensorily 
overstimulating city, the flâneur cultivates a stance of detachment. Put simply, in order to 
see – to comprehend – the city, the flâneur must place himself at one remove from it and 
resist being swept up in the crowd. But his detachment, like his alienation, is predicated on 
the crowd’s existence – as Ferguson further explains, the flâneur ‘requires the city and its 
crowds […] yet remains aloof from both.’145 But this response is not so much a resistance to 
the atomised experience of the urban metropolis as a reflection of it, and his desire for 
anonymity, to stand apart from the crowd – even as he stands in it – is in fact an attempt to 
assert individuality – to elevate himself above the crowd like a bird – a pursuit Rob Shields 
describes as ‘a course which alienates him from even the possibility of a deeper inter-
subjective exchange with the other members of the crowd scene.’146 This is precisely the 
course Julius follows.  
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Finally, the flâneur was never cosmopolitan, but a figure whose historiographic 
potential passed away with the closure of the Arcades and the further privatisation of space; 
even in Benjamin’s time, the flâneur was becoming obsolete – it is the passing of the flâneur 
into its cultural afterlife that The Arcades Project records. This potential, however, was 
always delimited by the flâneur’s disinterested spectatorship and sovereign position, over 
and above the crowd, of observation. Such a position is the genesis of Julius’s ethical blind 
spot and forecloses any meaningful social action he half-heartedly performs. The 
indecisiveness that forms the narrator’s aleatory itinerary foreshadows Julius’s rejection of 
Farouq and Khalid, who ‘believe foremost in difference’, because of his ‘distrust of causes’ 
which remind him, ‘I was so essentially indecisive myself’.147 Convinced that ‘a cancerous 
violence had eaten into every political idea’, Julius concludes that ‘the only way this lure of 
violence could be avoided was by having no causes, by being magnificently isolated from 
all loyalties’.148  
This points to the dangers of Benjamin’s fragment on the flâneur’s ambiguous 
movement: ‘The underlying indecision of the flâneur […] having doubts seems to be the 
flâneur’s state […] [m]ovement with the feeling of doubts’.149 In order to stay within his 
observational vantage point, the flâneur is unable to secure his moral convictions. The 
flâneur’s eye consumes images; it is not an eye that makes ‘eye contact’, which would 
establish an intersubjective connection, or of ‘looking someone in the eye’ in a way that 
would constitute an empathic, accountable gaze. Carlo Salzani notes how the flâneur is ‘the 
human equivalent of visual multiplicity and mobility’, a ‘moving eye’ emblematic of 
modernity’s collective gaze.150 But this also contributes to the flâneur’s ‘ontological 
ambiguity’ as the self – the ‘moving I’ – is metonymically displaced by the ‘moving eye’.151 
This detached eye, which elevates the flâneur into a figure of modernity, is also the death of 
the flâneur because its ‘guarded detachment’ inheres in a ‘lack of engagement and emotional 
responsibility’. Julius’s ‘doubts’ are not the doubts of an observer engaged in critical scrutiny 
(at least not any longer) but the irresolution that hesitantly circumvents moral culpability.  
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3.6 ‘The Sebald Thing’ 
In her superb essay on Open City (to which I have referred throughout this chapter), 
Freedman poses the novel’s most urgent question, which she describes as ‘Cole’s problem 
and his project’: ‘is there a measure or a method that can avoid the sensuous exploitation 
that serves as an act of voyeurism rather than an act of witness?’152 This question not only 
informs Cole’s novel but, more broadly, post-9/11 fiction as a whole, which finds itself in 
the midst of a representation crisis where trauma and spectacle have become difficult (but 
essential) to distinguish. Whether trauma can be represented without descending into 
voyeurism, and whether a method of representation can serve as an act of witness are two 
inflections of this question which perhaps no one has explored more intently than W.G. 
Sebald.  
Their shared concerns with trauma, representation, witnessing and testimony has led 
to a glut of comparisons linking Cole to Sebald. This is particularly true for reviews of the 
novel, which almost compulsively categorise Open City as a ‘Sebaldian’ text: the novel’s 
digressive style, the episodic form, and the ‘sly faux antiquarianism’ of Cole’s syntax all 
suggest Sebald’s influence. James Wood writes that the novel ‘move[s] in the shadow’ of 
Sebald’s work, while novelist Anthony Doerr boldly claims that Cole ‘might just be a W.G. 
Sebald for the twenty-first century’.153 Like Sebald’s protagonists, Julius begins his narrative 
by describing his sudden compulsion to walk through New York City: ‘And so when I began 
to go on evening walks last fall [as a] counterpoint to my busy days at the hospital […] I 
often found myself at quite a distance from home late at night […]’.154 These perambulatory 
adventures coincide with another habit of ‘watching bird migrations from my apartment’.155 
Indeed, the reason for and function of Julius’s walks is strikingly similar to that of The Rings 
of Saturn: ‘In August 1992, when the dog days were drawing to an end, I set off to walk the 
county of Suffolk, in the hope of dispelling the emptiness that takes hold […] whenever I 
have completed a long stint of work’.156 Sebald’s narrator is later ‘taken into hospital in 
Norwich in a state of almost total immobility’, which leads him to wonder if it was caused 
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by walks conducted ‘under the sign of the Dog Star’, believed by the ancient Greeks to be a 
harbinger of summer heat and, in medieval iconography, the madness of melancholy. Julius, 
too, is prey to the afflictions of melancholy, and his fatiguing walks appear to put him in an 
ecstatic (but not a fugue) state where he receives alarming visions of historical violence that 
persist in the present. 
Yet, for each of these comparisons, there is a qualifying point of contrast: David Evans 
writes of ‘the chinks […] in Julius’s cultivated veneer […] perhaps even a kind of solipsism’ 
while James Wood concedes that it [is] apparent that Cole is attempting something different 
from Sebald’s project’.157 There are a several moments in which Open City subverts direct 
comparisons between the two authors, and suggest a less straightforward model of influence 
than critics like Doerr suggests. Most resonant of this vexed relationship is Julius’s encounter 
with Farouq, the Moroccan manager of an internet café the protagonist frequents on his visit 
to Brussels. Farouq, who offers Julius hospitality and friendship, is subtly portrayed as a 
Benjamin-like figure whose thesis, a study of Bachélard’s Poetics of Space (‘I was going to 
[…] use it as a basis for societal critique’) was rejected on spurious grounds of plagiarism 
which cloaked Islamophobic (intertwined with xenophobic) sentiments that followed in the 
wake of 11 September (‘My thesis committee had met on September 20, 2001’).158 During 
a conversation about Moroccan literature, Julius mentions the author Tahar Ben Jelloun. 
Farouq remarks on the author’s ‘big reputation’ with ‘a note of disapproval’ and later: 
[H]e writes out of a certain idea of Morocco […] You see, people Like Ben Jelloun 
have the life of a writer in exile, and this gives them a certain – here Farouq paused, 
struggling to find the right word – it gives them a certain poeticity, can I say this, in 
the eyes of the West. To be a writer in exile is a great thing. But what is exile now, 
when everyone goes and comes freely?159  
Farouq’s speech rejects romantic notions of exile emptied of their political weight and 
appropriated by those fortunate enough to have the privilege of freedom of movement. This 
passage gestures toward the complicated relationship between Open City and, for example, 
The Emigrants when it comes to interconnecting notions of exile, cosmopolitanism, 
globalisation, and national identity. While Sebald himself modestly rejected the title of 
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‘exile’, uncritical perceptions of the author continue to perpetuate his quasi-mythical status 
as a melancholy exile whose alienation from his homeland causes restless wandering and a 
permanent sense of foreignness.160 While this is admittedly a fairly reductive account of the 
often-excellent work written on Sebald, it is intended to emphasise the ways in which 
scholarship too often works purely toward confirming, and, in that process, fetishising its 
subject.161 Stuart Taberner highlights this mythologizing tendency of critics toward Sebald’s 
status as an ‘exile’ whose physical detachment from his homeland enables the author to 
transcendentally engage in a ‘universal’ history – wherein he is transformed from a German 
into a European writer. But as Taberner forcefully notes, ‘exile […] does not necessarily 
correspond with a more profound concern with universal humanity […] to abstract Sebald 
from contemporary German debates via a problematic mythologisation of his status as an 
outsider also generates an uncommon generosity in the interpretation of his literary texts’.162 
Taberner’s article brings the more problematic aspects of Sebald to the fore: what exactly is 
the ethical relation of the detached observer (in many of Sebald’s texts, the protagonists are 
not only exiles, but tourists)? Does indirect confrontation really provide meaningful 
restitution, or does it merely co-opt victims’ experiences into aesthetic emblems of world-
melancholy? 
The crude subtext beneath the reception of Cole as a ‘twenty-first century W.G. 
Sebald’ appears to be, ‘what if Sebald had written about 9/11?’ – a question that speaks to 
the vexed question of representing 9/11, as well as the tendency (elucidated by Bond) of 
9/11 discourse to appropriate Holocaust narratives. In an interview, Cole firmly asserts his 
other influences, such as V.S. Naipul, Kazuo Ishiguro, J.M. Coetzee, and the Hong Kong 
filmmaker Wong Kar Wai. That Cole has other influences – and indeed his own autonomy 
as a writer and artist – should be strongly noted. Cole adds that ‘the Sebald thing can obscure 
a key issue in the book: this is a narrative troubled from beginning to end by Julius’s origin 
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in Africa. It is a book about historical memory, it is an African book, it is a city book, and it 
is a book about male privilege. Only one of those things is properly Sebaldian.’163 Cole’s 
statement is key to thinking about how Open City engages with Sebald’s work. Sebald’s 
narrators are white European men; Cole translates their melancholy, perambulatory mode of 
narration into his novel, but focalises it through the perspective of a black, African 
protagonist who, though he enjoys the privileges accorded to a resident doctor, must 
negotiate issues of racism and racial identity in New York that are very different from 
Sebald’s nameless protagonists, whose reception as a ‘pure narrator’ almost certainly has 
some relation to the ‘fantasy’ of the ‘invisibility of whiteness as whiteness.’164 Cole’s 
decision to write Julius’s visit Belgium, and his meditation on its colonial atrocities, is surely 
more political than a simple homage to Sebald.  
As Karen Jacobs notes, ‘where Sebald explores traumatic dislocation at mid-century, 
Cole picks up that subject at the millennium […] and where Sebald concentrates on the 
Jewish diaspora […] Cole devotes his novel to a range of African migrations chiefly to 
American shores.’ Jacobs concludes this summary with an important point of difference 
which suggests that Cole shifts Sebald’s literary paradigm: ‘[b]ecause those African 
migrations derive from such myriad, distinctive, and dispersed […] contexts and crises, they 
lack the ready organizing framework and exhaustive documentation that rank among the 
equivocal legacies of the Second World War. Cole’s novel arguably steps in to provide such 
a framework.’165 While Sebald’s narrators experience acute transgenerational guilt, 
extrapolating from that a more general sorrow directed at Europe’s brutal colonial past, 
Cole’s Nigerian narrator has a completely different relationship to the history of 
colonisation, and the context of his historical memory is shaped by the experiences and 
traumas of the colonised. In effect, Cole is engaged in a spatio-temporal remapping of Sebald 
that does not centre the (white) European gaze. To be clear, Cole is not minimising the 
achievement of Sebald’s work, nor is he delegitimising the obvious merits of Sebald’s 
narrative strategies. My discussion of Cole and Sebald is prompted less by their stylistic 
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resemblances and more by the interpellation of Open City as a ‘Sebaldian’ novel and what 
‘Sebaldian’ might mean. If, schematically speaking, Cole radically shifts Sebald’s frames of 
reference, replacing Europe with the United States, the German exile with the Nigerian 
emigré, histories of the coloniser to histories of the colonised, and so on, then this reframing 
also applies to the ethical position of the narrator and the question of guilt.  
The question of distance figured in discourses of cosmopolitanism and flânérie (points 
of reference Sebald’s work also crosses) manifests itself again when we approach Cole’s 
relationship to Sebald and their ethics. In Sebald’s work, distance is mobilised as a narrative 
ethic that avoids exploiting trauma by keeping a respectful distance from his fictional 
interlocuters, allowing them the space to voice their traumatic histories. Distance also figures 
in the traumatised characters’ dislocation from their repressed past; for example, Austerliz, 
whose childhood is a distant, repressed memory he attempts of uncover. There is the 
additional matter of Sebald’s own small but significant distance from the atrocities 
perpetrated by his parent’s generation, a distance that engenders a sense of transitive guilt, 
as well as anger at the cultural amnesia he perceives in post-war Germany. Ivan Stacy 
elucidates Sebald’s practice of ‘belated witnessing’ in terms of Dori Laub’s ‘three levels of 
witnessing’: ‘the level of being a witness to oneself within the experience, the level of being 
a witness to the testimonies of others, and the level of being a witness to the process of 
witnessing itself.’166 Following Laub’s paradigm, Stacy notes that Sebald is ‘situated at the 
second and third of these levels’.167 Based on these forms of witnessing, which are structured 
by degrees of distance, Sebald’s narrators are situated as ‘interviewer-listeners’ who ‘[take] 
on the responsibility for bearing witness that previously the narrator felt he bore alone’; it is 
this ‘encounter […] between the survivor and the listener, which makes possible […] a 
repossession of the act of witness. This joint responsibility is the source of the re-emerging 
truth.’168 Laub’s model of witnessing describes the general structure of Sebald’s work, and 
although Cole’s novel stages potential encounters of the kind Laub describes, this potential 
is unfulfilled, and the ethical infrastructure of Open City begins to crumble as Julius’s 
narrative self-destructs. If Sebald’s work is based on an ontological and ethical distance from 
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trauma, Open City probes the extent to which his literary model can or should be used as a 
template for the ongoing traumas of the present. 
Since Sebald’s enthusiastic reception by England and the United States, and the flood 
of Sebald criticism that followed, these recognisably ‘Sebaldian’ strategies have become 
signifiers of an ethical aesthetics. Sebald’s narrative ethics are focalised through a narrator 
who, though haunted by transgenerational guilt, is transparently committed to witnessing 
traumatic testimonies. This witnessing is mobilised in a ‘sober, impersonal’ tone which 
reproduces the narrative ethos of approaching traumatic events ‘obliquely, tangentially, by 
reference rather than by direct confrontation’, which is echoed in Julius’s ‘flat affect’, but 
with diametrically opposed results.169 By adapting Sebald’s tropes and stylistics, Cole plays 
on the presupposition that his Sebaldian narrator is an ethical witness who will achieve some 
measure of restitution through acts of memory. As Julius’s catalogue of disappointed 
encounters unfurls itself around Sebaldian tropes, Open City reminds the reader that ethical 
semiotics do not guarantee ethical action. Julius’s unreliable narration requires a level of 
critical engagement that interrogates the reliability of aesthetic markers and their encoded 
ethical claims. (I want to pause for a moment to note Cole is the only source on Open City 
who has asserted that it is a novel about about ‘male privilege’ – that Julius is a male narrator 
contributes strongly to his assumed reliability, perhaps even more so than his ‘Sebaldian 
qualities.’) In this way, Cole remains faithful to Sebald’s sceptical approach to representation 
(which led him to his hybrid mix of documentary and fiction and his juxtaposition of images 
with text). Unlike Sebald, whose novels address ‘the German desire to silence and end 
witness’, Cole’s novel emerges from a post-millennial context where conscious attempts to 
mourn and memorialise 9/11 frequently resulted in both the repression and appropriation of 
other traumatic histories.170 Both Sebald and Cole explore the vicissitudes of memory and 
erasure, but where Sebald’s novels approach these from the perspective of memory, Cole’s 
novel enters this discussion from the standpoint of erasure; this experiment reveals that 
modes of forgetting and remembrance may overlap at various aesthetic points. This is not to 
say that Cole exposes a failed paradigm in Sebald’s work, but that extracting a programmatic 
aesthetic from Sebald’s novels under the rubric ‘Sebaldian’ does not constitute an ethical 
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aesthetics, but an aesthetics of the ethical. Put simply, Cole’s novel cautions against the 
displacement of the ethical into the aesthetic, a lure that deludes the narrator and, initially, 
deceives the reader. Though Cole affixes a Sebaldian gaze to Julius, it does not endow him 
with ethical vision – this constitutes an insight: the ethical dimensions of Sebald’s texts is 
not primarily located in the aesthetic, but in his narrator’s ethical solvency. In other words, 
the ethical infrastructure of Sebald’s texts is mobilised and maintained by a reliable 
narrator. These saintly protagonists do not indicate a weakness, but a virtuous vulnerability, 
which leaves Sebald’s work open to dialogue and prevents the systematisation of his 
narrative strategies. In highlighting this vulnerability, Cole continues Sebald’s struggle to 
find a form adequate to representing acts of witness and restitution.  
3.7 Anamorphosis 
After Sebald, after 9/11, the reader can no longer rely on a narrator to provide an ethical 
frame of reference. Julius himself reminds the reader of this a few pages before Moji’s 
testimony in the second part of the novel (which is prefaced by the epigraph, ‘I have searched 
myself’):  
Each person must, on some level, take himself as the calibration point for normalcy, 
must assume that the room of his own mind is not, cannot be, entirely opaque to him. 
Perhaps this is what we mean by sanity: that […] we are not the villains of our own 
stories. In fact, it is quite the contrary: we play, and only play, the hero, and in the 
swirl of other people’s stories, insofar as those stories concern us at all, we are never 
less than heroic? We have the ability to do both good and evil, and more often than 
not, we choose the good. When we don’t, neither we nor our imagined audience is 
troubled […] because we have, through our other decisions merited their sympathy. 
They are ready to believe the best about us […]171  
The audience is, in fact, troubled. Julius implicitly describes the reader-audience’s adoption 
of ‘[his] point of view’ and their erstwhile faith in the story Julius has told until now. The 
meditation on good and evil initially suggests that Julius has begun to consider his 
responsibility for Moji’s trauma, but the passage takes an alarming turn. Having ‘searched 
himself’, Julius insists that ‘even without claiming any especially heightend [sic] sense of 
ethics’, he has ‘hewed close to the good.’ This excursus on ethics and narration at first 
appears merely philosophical, in line with the melancholy tenor sustained throughout the 
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novel; but on re-reading, it becomes densely ironic and somewhat difficult to unravel. Julius 
continues: 
And so, what does it mean when, in someone else’s version, I am the villain? I am 
only too familiar with bad stories – badly imagined, badly told – because I hear them 
frequently from patients. I know the tells of those who blame others, those who are 
unable to see that they themselves, and not the others, are the common thread in their 
bad relationships. There are characteristic tics that reveal the essential falsehood of 
such narratives. But what Moji had said to me that morning […] had nothing in 
common with those stories. She had said it as if, with all of her being, she were 
certain of its accuracy.172 
In describing the ‘tells’ and ‘tics’ of ‘bad stories’, Julius shows his hand, revealing the 
‘essential falsehood’ of his own narrative. This supremely ironic passage undermines 
Julius’s ethical self-fashioning and reveals the dialectical structure of Cole’s novel. It also 
marks Cole’s divergence from Sebald’s method even as it continues to engage with his 
oblique, sober style of narration. As Kaisa Kaakinen brilliantly observes, ‘the distant and 
melancholic tone of the narrator begins to look like a symptom of avoidance and 
disavowal.’173 The irony that protrudes from this passage alerts us to a double voice 
comprised of Julius’s narration and the text itself that is initially indistinguishable: the reader 
suddenly realises whose ‘version’ they have been following up to now. Moreover, it testifies 
to a pre-existing counternarrative in the text that (to paraphrase Grootenboer) the reader did 
not see in the first place, but which erupts into the frame of Julius’s carefully composed 
discourse.174  
This counternarrative, which allows us to recognise the novel’s ‘double story’, leads 
me to revisit anamorphosis, a concept introduced at the start of this chapter, where I drew a 
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link between Open City’s first epigraph (‘Death is a perfection of the eye’) and The 
Ambassadors, Holbein’s eminently strange ‘double portrait’. It is a portrait of the French 
ambassador Jean de Dinteville, and a religious emissary, George de Selve, the Bishop of 
Lauvar. These figures pose among a heterogenous array of hermetic objects that are self-
consciously emblematic of epistemological power: instruments of science such as an 
arithmetic book, an astrolabe, a gnomon, and objects connected to spiritual knowledge – a 
lute (with a broken string), a hymn book, and a celestial globe. Most famously, there is a 
blurred figure that cuts through the foreground and which, when viewed from a skewed 
angle, resolves into a grimacing skull. Even before it is apprehended as a skull, the 
anomalous blur disturbs the composition like a stain, and, as Chris Pye writes, ‘asks the 
viewer to reverse the vectors of power intersecting the scene.’175 Importantly, though the 
painting contains two perspectives, they are not presented in harmony like a diptych – the 
perspectives do not complement one another: the eye (and the reader) cannot reconcile them. 
As Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass succinctly note, ‘it is literally impossible to 
hold the skull in focus at the same time as the other sitters and other objects’.176 The viewer 
must abandon the privileged view, which has in any case been utterly destabilised, and 
apprehend the subordinated, subversive figure from a marginal position. This is precisely 
the form of hermeneutic reversal that Open City demands of its reader.  
Like Holbein’s ambassadors, Julius is initially seen from a privileged, cohesive 
perspective, but Moji’s anamorphic counternarrative rends this view. On a diegetic level, 
Moji ruptures Julius’s synthetic sense of identity; this ontological incursion splits and 
doubles the text into two opposing narratives, each of which can be traced to a different 
temporality. A clue to this temporal relationality occurs immediately before Julius 
encounters Moji for the first time since he left Nigeria: 
We experience life as a continuity, and only after it falls away, after it becomes the 
past, do we see its discontinuities. The past, if there is such a thing, is mostly empty 
space, great expanses of nothing, in which significant persons and events float. Nigeria 
was like that for me: mostly forgotten, except for those few things that I remembered 
[…] These were the things that had solidified in my mind by reiteration […] which, 
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taken as a group, represented the secure version of the past that I had been constructing 
since 1992. But there was another, irruptive sense of things past. The sudden 
reencounter, in the present, of something or someone long forgotten, some part of 
myself I had relegated to childhood and to Africa.177 
Julius describes life in terms that Benjamin critiques, where the concept of progress inflects 
the perception of history so that time is experienced as a continuum for ‘homogeneous, 
empty time’.178 Julius experiences life in the past perfect continuous (‘the secure version of 
the past that I had been constructing’), an unbroken action begun in 1992. Likewise, Julius’s 
‘secure version of the past’ is not an accumulation of experience over time, but an artificial 
‘construction’ that occludes Africa and his youth. His meditation on the past proleptically 
alludes to his ‘sudden reencounter, in the present’ of an ‘irruptive past’. The collision of 
these two narrative temporalities institutes an anamorphic torsion in which the dominant 
perspective is subverted by the figure it subordinates, constituting what Benjamin describes 
as a ‘moment of danger’. I briefly referred to this moment in section 3, but it is worth 
returning to in order to describe the novel’s dialectical mechanism.  
Cole does not focalise his ethics through the narrator’s redemptive gaze, allowing the 
reader to enact the restitution of history by proxy. The novel itself does not conclude with a 
sense of restored justice. Even when, in the final pages, Julius is absorbed in the sublime 
contemplation of the stars, his apprehension of the past is deferred: ‘I felt in my body what 
my eyes could not grasp, which was that their true nature was the persisting visual echo of 
something that was already in the past.’179 The one insight Julius does attain (which is 
foreshadowed by an earlier discussion with Farouq about Paul de Man) is a recognition of 
his blindness: ‘[m]y hands held metal, my eyes starlight, and it was as though I had come so 
close to something that it had fallen out of focus, or fallen so far away from it that it had 
faded away.’180 Though he does not recognise it, the truth of the past has always been in 
front of him. 
Freedman disagrees with Vermeulen’s reading of the novel as a ‘didactic call to social 
change’: ‘the novel has no such moral in tow.’ Instead, she proposes a less political reading, 
and contends that ‘the book is a defense of the non-motivated examination, the wandering 
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walk, the exploratory metaphor’.181 According to Freedman, Julius ‘does not celebrate 
cosmopolitanism so much as he inhabits its weak potential’; in this account, 
cosmopolitanism does not provide a political or ethical framework, but a purely visual frame 
but a ‘liminal vantage point between inside and outside, for what Barthes might call “a 
subversion that is pensive”.’182 In a reading that may appear to fit the general framework of 
this thesis, Freedman further describes this ‘weak potential’ as ‘a Benjaminian weak 
messianism that cannot save the past but can seize the memory of the past “for a world of 
new representations and alternative meanings.”’183 Yet, as I have already outlined, for these 
‘alternative representations’ – that is, dialectical images – to ‘flash up’, the past and the 
present must be brought into relation; moreover, these images must be read by an active, 
engaged interpreter – a role that Julius falls seriously short of. He is unwilling to 
acknowledge his past even as he is highly attentive with the history of iniquity; and he avoids 
the irruption of that violent past into his present when Moji confronts him. It is not that there 
is no weak messianism in Cole’s novel; but it is not located in Julius’s ‘non-motivated 
examination’. In section 4, I referred to the ‘moment of danger’ Benjamin describes in ‘On 
the Concept of History’, and it is worth returning to in order to describe the dialectical 
mechanism of the novel. He writes: ‘Articulating the past historically […] means 
appropriating a memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger. Historical materialism 
wishes to hold fast that image of the past which unexpectedly appears to the historical subject 
in a moment of danger.’184 It is a moment of danger because the image of the past is 
‘irretrievable’; and that image is irrietrievable because it ‘threatens to disappear in any 
present that does not recognise itself in that image.’185 It is worth making Ilit Ferber’s 
distinction that the operative action here is ‘recognising and not inventing or discovering’ 
the past.186 By ‘intended’, Benjamin means that the past addresses history and the present 
must recognise that address; put another way, history ‘cites’ the present, textually and 
juridically calling it to account. Julius is able to do this – up to the point where the ‘line that 
connect[s]’ him to his ‘part in [the] story’ erupts in a moment of danger: Moji’s indictment 
of him. Julius does not hold this moment fast nor does he recognise it – that moment 
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disappears from him ‘irretrievably’. To paraphrase Kafka, another messianic thinker, there 




Towards a Theory of Messianic Reading 
‘Read what was never written,’ runs a line in Hofmannsthal. The reader one should 
think of here is the true historian.’ 
– Walter Benjamin, ‘Paralipomena’1 
A conclusion inheres finality and finitude: it marks the end, the completion of a work. For 
this study, which has been focused on incompletion – of works, of history, and of language 
– and survival – a conclusion presents a difficult task. For if a work is always taking leave 
of itself, simultaneously and interruptively departing and arriving, is it possible to speak of 
a conclusion? The conclusion of this thesis, then, must also be the afterlife of the study I 
have undertaken. It will be ‘Janus-faced’, as Scholem once described Benjamin, 
consolidating the key ideas and relationships identified in the preceding chapters, but also 
gesturing toward other, potential iterations these might take.2  
The germ of this thesis began ten years ago when I first read Reader’s Block. I wanted 
to identify why his late novels were so affective and startling when on the surface they were 
merely a collection of facts and anecdotes. This led me to contemplate the phrase ‘matter of 
fact’, which describes the unembellished tenor of his works and the ‘material’ that 
constitutes it. If facts and anecdotes were a kind of matter, then they attested to the presence, 
however attenuated and distant, of the past in the present. At the same time, I began to read 
The Arcades Project, which, as I have noted in Chapter 1, resembled Markson’s novels in a 
remarkable way. Benjamin’s work was rich, suggestive, and utterly elusive to my 
understanding. Howe has said that she regards ‘some of his essays [as] poems.’3 I read him 
for his literary value. I came to Howe much later, but I instantly recognised that her work 
performed the ‘blasting’ of the ‘continuum of history’ in its approach to the archive and in 
its formal qualities; it rediscovers the lost aura in material history and the ‘afterlife of works’. 
Cole’s novel was more discursive, but it, too, was strange. It was a response to Sebald’s 
work, certainly – indeed it is also a Sebaldian afterlife – but it troubled his narrative model, 
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as I have outlined in Chapter 3.4 It presented a critical ‘moment of danger’, an incursion of 
the past into the present that the narrator did not recognise, and it urged its readers to consider 
not only the residue of the distant past but to ask the question, ‘[w]hat does it mean when, in 
someone else’s version, I am the villain?’5 Each of these writers display a great sensitivity 
to the materiality and the material of history: David Markson’s minimalist, fragmentary 
novels are the product of the author’s compulsive collection of anecdotes and marginalia. In 
The Nonconformist’s Memorial, Howe uncovers glitches in the archive – moments where 
orthodox histories and systems of classification break down as excesses that constitute the 
‘afterlife of works’. In The Midnight, Howe incorporates archival miscellany into her poetry, 
including ephemera inherited from her maternal family and invests the inexpressive artefacts 
with something that communicates beyond language. Teju Cole’s novel, Open City, deploys 
the privileged figure of the flâneur to read the traces of colonial violence in New York’s 
urban landscape, but also compels a reassessment of the flâneur’s interpretive framework.  
It is noteworthy that the three authors I examine in this study stand between 
modernism and postmodernism. Markson and Howe both grew up under the aegis of World 
War II, witnessed the rise of late modernism and its passing into postmodernity; their points 
of reference are modern, but their formal techniques are identifiably postmodern: 
fragmentation, intertextuality, referentiality. Cole belongs to a much younger generation, 
born fifteen years after the decolonisation of Nigeria (where he spent his childhood) and 
politicised by the so-called War on Terror. The critique of Sebald’s narratology that I 
understand Open City to make situates Cole squarely within postmodernist literature’s 
tendency to rework and subvert previous texts; yet his deployment of the flâneur links him 
to modernism. Moreover, Benjamin’s work was addressed to the specific historical 
circumstances that marked and marred modernity. However, his reconceptualization of 
history and the notion of the afterlife challenges the idea that history and literature fit neatly 
into categorizable periods, or that there is ever a decisive ‘break’ with the past – as Benjamin 
instructs us, the past is always unfinished: the present is confronted with this fact every day. 
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The word ‘modern’ is itself half a millennium old, yet it means ‘person of the present time.’ 
From this etymological definition we might extrapolate that ‘we have always been modern’ 
and that, as Benjamin claims, each moment of the past is a potential ‘now’ if it can be 
recognised. Following this definition, postmodernity (first coined in 1870) is a historical 
condition of being post-, or ‘after’, the ‘present time’; or, as the old saying goes, at the end 
of history.6 If this is the case, Benjamin’s importance to contemporary thought continues to 
be vital. 
This study has been ‘-after’ Benjamin in a triple sense: it emerges after his arrival, 
‘following’ him and ‘like’ him – I have sought to juxtapose his work with the contemporary 
writers who comprise the three chapters of this study in order to transform an understanding 
of both Benjamin’s work and the literary works I have analysed in a sort of ‘interlinear 
translation’ that acknowledges the discrete formal and historical contexts from which each 
emerged but which also, I hope, cultivates new configurations of thought. As I outlined at 
the outset of this thesis, I do not argue that the works I have chosen to examine directly cite 
Benjamin – again, I do not seek to provide an account of literary influence – rather, I have 
‘in-cited’ Benjamin in the works of others, placing his ideas in constellation with 
contemporary literature, and in the other dialectical direction, placed these works in 
constellation with his thought. In each chapter, I argue, an ‘afterlife’ of Benjamin’s thought 
can be discerned: Markson’s fragmentary, montage-like method of novel writing, generated, 
like The Arcades Project, from index cards; Howe’s attentiveness to the materiality of 
history and of language; and Cole’s anamorphic subversion of the flâneur. By the same turn, 
Markson, Howe, and Cole form a constellation of the different facets of Nachleben, or 
afterlife, a term which Benjamin characteristically left open and undefined. What these 
facets have revealed over the course of this thesis has been a poetics of ‘messianic’ reading 
that actualises the afterlife and modifies the past through remembrance. 
I want to make these comparisons explicit by way of an anecdote. In July 2016, Susan 
Buck-Morss delivered a lecture at Birkbeck University’s London Critical Theory Summer 
School, where, among many other marvellous insights, she discussed Benjamin’s 
relationship with Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus.7 Buck-Morss remarked that ‘we cannot see the 
Klee image without the overlay of Benjamin’s comments on it’ in his moving but by now 
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ubiquitous Thesis IX of ‘On the Concept’. Buck-Morss then presented a slide of the image 
– with one striking difference: Klee’s angel was on the screen, but superimposed on it was a 
portrait of Benjamin. It was uncanny: the merging of these two images was seamless; the 
angel’s tousled curls blurred into Benjamin’s, and its wide, enigmatic eyes suddenly took on 
the appearance of glasses. The point Buck-Morss was making, in a distinctly poetic and 
Benjaminian fashion, was that the Klee’s angel and Benjamin’s own image have been so 
cross-identified in their reception as to become indistinguishable. This brings me back to an 
issue I raised at the outset of this thesis. Benjamin’s posthumous reception has enabled two 
fixed myths about his thought and his image as a thinker. On the one hand, he is the helpless 
angel, ineffectual – like the portraits drawn by Arendt, Adorno, and, more recently, Wurgaft. 
On the other hand, he is a melancholy angel, with his face turned toward the past, engaged 
in a nostalgic project of redeeming it, unwillingly blown into the future.  
Thesis IX, which is centred around the angel’s visual orientation, presents us with the 
problem of regarding history: do we look at it simply as ‘one single catastrophe’?8 This is 
the vision of history that many take away from Benjamin’s work, and it is one I have been 
at pains to avoid in this thesis. To put it bluntly, it would have been far easier to analyse the 
texts that form the foundation of this study as bearing melancholy witness to the full-scale 
devastation of history, piling up the wreckage and mimetically, traumatically, representing 
the ruins that lay at the site of disaster that is Western civilisation. I wanted to examine the 
work of Markson, Howe, and Cole and the secret histories they inventoried in a way that did 
not affirm the so-called ‘winners’ of history, but directed its gaze toward what survives and, 
importantly, survivors. This was of particular import in my analysis of Cole’s Open City. It 
may appear that an examination of the concept of the afterlife would entail a traumatic model 
of history. While I have used psychoanalytic criticism to analyse certain aspects of the works 
in this study and have found Melanie Klein’s theory of object relations fruitful in conjunction 
with my discussion of Howe’s allegorical elegy for her mother in The Midnight I am doubtful 
about its world-historical application.  
The traumatic model of history is a model of eternal recurrence in which the 
catastrophe repeats itself again and again. Within this framework, history itself is 
traumatised, acting out a repetition compulsion whereby it continually inflicts disaster on the 
world. The transposition of trauma from the individual to history is problematic. An example 
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relevant to my discussion of Open City would be the proposition that the Iraq War was a 
response to the trauma inflicted on the American body politic. In Chapter 3, I drew on Lucy 
Bond’s criticism of responses to 9/11 that appropriated Holocaust memory as a ‘screen 
memory’ for the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in order ‘to preclude recognition 
of America’s historical shortcomings.’9 The model of history Benjamin provides us with is 
one which relentlessly insists on recognition and critique. If we apply this psychoanalytic 
paradigm to history itself, it is ‘difficult’, as Greg Forter writes, ‘to imagine how we might 
stop transmitting historical trauma.’10 This paradigm supposes that trauma and history are 
interchangeable terms in a way that appropriates, universalises, and, importantly, 
dehistoricises collective historical traumas.11 
Benjamin, who stood at the epicentre of disaster and did not survive it, offers us a way 
of reading history that does not equate it with catastrophe (his Habilitation on baroque drama 
is precisely directed against this impulse); nor does it suppose an absolute recovery of history 
that would occlude the ethically imperative task of remembering the dead or acknowledging 
past and present suffering. In the final analysis, Thesis IX is not a model for viewing history, 
it is a warning: the storm that prevents the angel from closing his wings and intervening in 
history is ‘the storm of progress.’12 In one of the finer exegeses of this passage, which has 
been subject to countless interpretations, Andrew Benjamin writes: 
‘Progress’ is linked therefore to an inability to intervene both within what is 
occurring and equally within what has occurred. To which it should be added that 
progress couldn’t remember. (Remembrance is destructive.) This needs to be linked 
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single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet. The angel would like 
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to the angel’s inability to act. That inability comes to define the angel […] He is 
subject to progress and as such becomes progress’s subject.13   
The angel is not, therefore, an exemplar of either a critical or an ethical historical perspective. 
Regarding history as either ‘a chain of events’ or ‘a single catastrophe’ are two sides of the 
same coin; they are interposed like Buck-Morss’s lecture slide. But, given the history of 
modernity and its continued projection into the present, what is the alternative? The 
intervention the angel wishes to make is that of total reparation: he ‘would like to […] 
awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed.’14 This, too, is an impossibility.  
Benjamin’s philosophy is an effort to conceive of history otherwise: to abandon the 
notion that it is an inexorable chain of progress, or an unending catastrophe, or as the waiting 
room of redemption. All three positions are forbidden to an authentic engagement with 
history and the politics of time. If events proceed sequentially – one thing leads to another – 
then the current state of affairs appears as predetermined, and any number of abuses, 
injustices, and atrocities can be justified; future possibilities (indeed, the very possibility of 
the future) are thus foreclosed. If the future is defined as that which is yet-to-come, the bearer 
of possibility, then ‘homogeneous, empty time’ is a temporality in which there is no future. 
This is why Benjamin calls it ‘empty’. The eschatological vision of a fulfilled, completed 
history is also problematic: if the completion of history – that is, the end of history and the 
end of the catastrophe identified with it – is always held in abeyance, then no intervention 
must be made, no action taken other than waiting for the arrival of the Messiah. 
Catastrophe and redemption dominate Benjamin’s writings, but they are placed in a 
dialectic that delimits their totality and yields an alternative approach to history that neither 
erases past injustices nor forecloses hope for the future: weak messianism, which has been 
the undercurrent of this thesis. While the messianic is frequently mentioned in the wealth of 
critical writing on Benjamin, and its interpretation is the subject of much debate, I understand 
the ‘weak messianic power’ with which “we have [all] been endowed’ as the capacity to 
read in such a way as to interrupt history and alter its meaning.15 In The Messianic Now: 
Philosophy, Religion Culture, Eric Jacobson writes, ‘[w]here would one begin to locate the 
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messianic?’16 Benjamin does not give us an answer to this, but his references to the messianic 
are always framed in terms of language, writing, and textuality:   
If one looks upon history as a text, then one can say of it what a recent author has said 
of literary texts – namely, that the past has left in them images comparable to those 
registered by a light-sensitive plate. ‘The future alone possesses developers strong 
enough to reveal the image in all its details. Many pages in Marivaux or Rousseau 
contain a mysterious meaning which the first readers of these texts could not fully have 
deciphered. […] The historical method is a philological method based on the book of 
life. ‘Read what was never written,’ runs a line in Hofmannsthal. The reader one 
should think of here is the true historian.17   
This brings me to the epigraph quoted at the beginning of this study, where Benjamin asserts 
that historical understanding can only be ‘grasped […] as an afterlife of that which is 
understood; and what has been recognized in the analysis of the “afterlife of works” […] is 
therefore to be considered the foundation of history in general.’18 The ‘afterlife of works’, 
and with it ‘historical understanding’, can only be constituted through an act of critical 
‘messianic’ reading whose injunction is to ‘read what was never written’. A text can be cited, 
criticised, rewritten, annotated, and translated. Reading always alters the text that is read; 
and each reading generates other readings, each of which are singular and unrepeatable – it 
actualises the afterlife of a work, and of the work of history. If history is conceived of as a 
text, it is not fixed to its origin – it can be read, to borrow a phrase from Howe, ‘out of the 
bounds of its bound margin.’19  
By now it should be evident that Benjamin is speaking of reading in messianic terms. 
Now, if reading is thought of in terms of the messianic (not messianism – I will distinguish 
between these two terms shortly) I want to look at how Benjamin formulates the messianic 
in Thesis V:  
[t]he past carries with it a secret index by which it is referred to redemption. Doesn’t 
a breath of air that pervaded earlier days caress us as well? In the voices we hear, 
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isn’t there an echo of now silent ones? […] If so, then there is a secret agreement 
between past generations and the present one. […] Then, like every generation that 
preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak messianic power, a power on which 
the past has a claim.20 
As I have just remarked, Benjamin speaks of reading in messianic terms: ‘[i]f we look upon 
history as a text’; ‘the past has left in them images […] that the future alone’ can ‘develop’; 
and ‘the historical method is a philological method based on the book of life.’21 But, as 
Thesis V demonstrates, Benjamin also frames the messianic in terms of reading: ‘the past 
carries with it a secret index by which it is referred to redemption’; and, in Thesis III, ‘only 
for a redeemed mankind is history citable in all its moments.’22  
The weak messianic power that Benjamin speaks of in his thesis, I want to suggest, 
is something that is figured specifically in the text. The mutual relationship between reading 
as the messianic and the messianic as reading is delineated in these two quotations. Taken 
together, they advance what I have been referring to as a poetics of reading that is articulated 
in terms of textuality, legibility, readability, citability, indexicability, translatability and 
referentiality. I say citability rather than citation, index, and so on in accordance with 
Benjamin’s ‘tendency to formulate […] his concepts by nominalizing verbs, not in the usual 
manner but by adding the suffix -barkeit (which in English can be written either -ibility or -
ability)’, which, as Weber points out in his brilliant study of this suffix, emphasises ‘a 
possibility or a potentiality, to a capacity rather than to an actually existing reality.’23 
Although I have discussed the term at different points throughout this thesis, it is necessary 
to make further the distinction between messianism and ‘weak messianic power’, since it is 
the latter that designates an ethical intervention between apathy and eschatology. As I have 
noted in Chapter 1, pure messianism is the cessation of history and time, the arrival of the 
Last Judgement where temporality is replaced by the law. The weak messianic power that 
‘we’ are all ‘endowed with’ also belongs to an interruptive temporality, wherein ‘the past’ 
is ‘seized […] as an image that flashes up at the moment of its recognizability.’24 It marks 
an intervention into ‘homogeneous, empty time’, but not an apocalyptic closure. The 
distinguishing feature of weak messianic power is that it holds open the ‘narrow gate’ of 
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possibility for the present to recognise and remember, that is to say, read, an image of the 
past. But it is ‘weak’ because it is not an eventuality: it requires that ‘we’ make this 
intervention by actualising these potentialities or, as Weber puts it, ‘-abilities’. 
Read together, Benjamin, Markson, Howe, and Cole form a field of related ‘weak’ 
messianic projects that move away from the identification of history as catastrophe and, 
equally, from notions of transcendent recovery that, at the close of this thesis, I want to 
identify as a ‘poetics of reading’. Though Benjamin provides the philosophical grounds for 
this poetics, it is a project that Markson, Howe, and Cole share with one another through 
their varied articulations of afterlife. Each present three figures of the ‘after’: Markson’s ‘late 
style’ emphasises the afterlife’s link to mortality, writing ‘after’ a life that is now at its end; 
Howe’s poetry performs the archival pursuit of the afterlife in works, ‘following’ dead 
voices and reconstituting them in her poems in an altered but renewed form; Cole’s novel 
suggests a different sense of ‘after’: his narrator, too, searches for images of the past that 
have been deposited in the present. But he is also ‘followed after’ by his own past, and the 
question of his recognition of the afterlife of his own violence is at the heart of the novel.  
In Chapter 1, I describe how Markson presents a series of facts and anecdote focused 
on the decline and decay of works of art and the mortality human life and of its works, in a 
highly fragmented and disarticulated form. At first glance, the unremitting references to 
death and disintegration appear to suggest a wholly pessimistic and mournful approach to 
history. In an essay on Wittgenstein’s Mistress, David Foster Wallace writes that Markson 
‘has made facts sad.’ But these dismal fragments are interspersed with ones which testify to 
the miracle of survival; for example, the unearthing of the Laocöon in a sixteenth-century 
vineyard or the existence, however fragmented, of Sappho’s poems, despite the numerous 
edicts issued to destroy them. Everything that survives does so by chance; it is this 
contingency that ensures that there is ‘the possibility […] at every moment for what is to be 
other than it is.’25 As I have tried to suggest in the first chapter of this study, ‘the afterlife of 
works’ is produced through a dialectical interplay between destruction and survival, what I 
call the ‘dialectic of the fragment’. I have also been emphatic that the afterlife is not eternal, 
but transient. Benjamin’s description of translation as an afterlife is instructive here: ‘For in 
its afterlife – which could not be called that if it were not a transformation and a renewal of 
something living – the original undergoes a change.’ The afterlife of a work (and of history) 
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is thus not a given – it is not acquired through the passage of time. Rather, a work has the 
potential to acquire an afterlife, but in order for it to live ‘after’ its initial ‘life’ it must be 
actualised in the present. ‘If we look upon history as a text’: Benjamin’s formulation is 
conditional, it suggests the possibility of regarding history as a text – then the afterlife of this 
text can only be actualised through the act of reading. And if history can be read, and acquire 
an afterlife, then history can be viewed from the point of the survivor rather than the victor. 
It not only re-orders our relation to time, but also reconfigures our conceptual perspective 
on history. It is a perspective wholly unlike the gaze of Benjamin’s angel that I discussed 
earlier, which is fixed on history as ‘one single catastrophe.’ 
 If Markson’s work reveals the contours of the afterlife, Howe’s work situates it 
within an explicitly ethical frame. Howe’s poetic project is distinctly messianic. In Europe 
of Trusts Howe writes, ‘I wish I could tenderly lift from the dark side of history, voices that 
are anonymous, slighted – inarticulate.’26 As Mandy Bloomfield writes, ‘it is important to 
note […] that her cautious “I wish” articulates both an impulse to recover effaced aspects of 
the past and a recognition of the opacity and inaccessibility of histories consigned to “the 
dark side.”’27 This wish has a weak messianic power. In Chapter 2, I note that Howe, like 
Benjamin, wants to separate from the form of historical transmission that is ‘tainted’ by 
barbarism without, however, giving up the documents or archives completely. One mode of 
transmission that eludes and betrays the strictures and structure of the archive is textual 
ephemera, particularly marginalia, which she ‘tenderly lift[s]’ from the margins and 
repositions them to the centre of her texts: ‘[n]ames who are strangers out of bounds of the 
bound margin: I thought one way to write about a loved author would be to follow what 
trails he follows through the words of others: what if these pencilled single double and triple 
scorings arrows short phrases angry outbursts crosses cryptic ciphers sudden enthusiasms 
mysterious erasures have come to find you too, here again, now.’28 Here, Howe’s rhetoric 
suggests a temporality of afterlife through multiple paths of ‘following’. Melville is behind 
her, in the past, and in front of her, in the archive – Howe also follows his ‘following’ of ‘the 
words of others’. But this is not a wholly retrogressive journey: the marks on the page ‘have 
come to find you too, here again, now’ – the past comes ‘after’ Howe. If Benjamin violently 
‘wrenches’ historical content from its context, Howe bases her poetic historiography on 
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‘feminine’ needlework practices such as cutwork and patchwork; and if Markson’s work 
suggests the capacity for history in and as a text to become legible and therefore readable in 
its afterlife, Howe’s work actualises these potentials and narrates the seizure of images of 
the past as they ‘flash up’. Howe’s poetry restores silenced, ‘inarticulate’ histories but 
preserves their brokenness through gaps, stuttering, and other non-communicative modes of 
‘expression’. 
Cole’s novel places an entirely different emphasis on reading (and) the afterlife of 
works. In his intensely and multivalently visual work, it is exceedingly evident that Cole is 
an art historian and a photographer as well as a writer. It reminds us that, in Benjamin’s 
‘Paralipomena’, the text he speaks of is not limited to script: an image is also a text. Of 
course, discursive texts – like those of Marivaux and Rousseau – contain images. But Cole’s 
novel draws attention to the fact that Benjamin writes of ‘looking upon history’ as a text. 
Benjamin’s metaphor of historical understanding as a photographic plate is instructive in 
understanding Cole’s articulation of the afterlife and Julius’s failure to ‘develop’, or read, 
his own past. Throughout much of the novel, Julius appears to be the consummate flâneur, 
intent on reading the ‘still legible’ traces of colonial and racial violence in the city as 
‘generations [rush] through the eye of the needle’. But as I claim in Chapter 3, the 
construction of the protagonist as a twenty-first century flâneur, and the novel’s initial 
appearance as belonging to the sub-genres of the cosmopolitan, post-9/11, and ‘Sebaldian’ 
novel are tricks of the eye. When Julius is confronted with his own act of violence, he elides 
it completely and turns toward the more distant past, to anecdotes from ancient Rome, to 
Nietzsche, to Mahler – to a time before the ‘after’ of his actions. It begs the question: is 
history any longer ‘legible’ in the sense Benjamin intended? Can close attention to sites of 
memory and historical injustice be used to screen other forms of violence? The answer, I 
think, is yes and no. What I believe Cole’s novel contributes to a Benjaminian understanding 
of history is the necessity of making our own implication and complicity in historical 
violence legible, of reading these legibilities before they become faint traces. Cole’s novel 
reminds us how weak messianic power truly is. The potential to read the afterlife is not 
always enacted. But while his narrator does not recognise his past in the ‘moment of danger’, 
the ‘critical moment on which all reading is founded’, there is hope that the readers of this 
novel will. Through its anamorphic structure, Open City declares the urgency to developing 
a new angle of vision and come to recognise what we did not, at first glance, see. It calls for 
a radical reorienting of our interpretive assumptions.   
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This project began as a comparative reading of Benjamin’s philosophy of history and 
contemporary literature and the different modalities of afterlife they articulated, but it has 
raised complicated new questions surrounding the ethics of form and aesthetics. Whether 
ethics can be ‘aestheticised’ is an open question, but it is clear that there is a vital relation 
between ethics and aesthetics, since reading is a fundamental way of extending one’s 
subjectivity outward and relating to the other. Aesthetics is not sui generis ethical – far from 
it, as fascist movements past and present have demonstrated, but this fact alone makes 
aesthetics an ethical priority. Benjamin was uniquely aware of this, and his philosophy of 
history was devoted to making an ethical discourse around aesthetics and historical 
representation imaginable. For this discourse to be thought – for it to have an afterlife – we 
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